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Abstract 
This thesis explores the reasons for the persistence of deprivation in East Durham 
despite the concerted efforts of the East Durham Task Force and the East Durham 
Local Strategic Partnership over the last 15 years to tackle the social, economic and 
environmental problems caused by the rapid run down of the mining industry in the 
District. It uses a critical realist methodology and techniques of documentary 
research, (participant) observation and semi-structured interviews to analyse the 
processes of strategy formulation and the devising of regeneration projects. The 
research was an ESRC collaborative research project with the District of Easington 
Council. 
The thesis uses a number of theoretical debates in contemporary social science to 
interpret the evidence collected in East Durham which in tum contributes to the 
development of those debates. In particular, the research engages with debates on the 
changing role and geometry of the state and the purported 'hollowing out' of the state 
which is often characterised as a shift from government to governance. The evidence 
collected in East Durham suggests this is not happening in the field of regeneration 
and that the central state remains of primary importance. Local governance occurs 'in 
the shadow of hierarchy' (Scharpf, 1994). This is explored through Jessop's (2003) 
concepts of metagovemance and, in particular, metaheterarchy. These approaches 
echo Foucault's concept of government as 'the conduct of conduct'. Foucault's 
(1982) concept of power as something positive and technical is used to understand the 
changing role of the state. The govemmentality approach provides the conceptual 
tools to understand the processes of governance and the way in which the centre can 
influence local actors without direct involvement in regeneration. Patterns of 
interorganisational cooperation are observed, however, which cannot be adequately 
explained by the shift to governance, and Grabber's (2002) concept of project ecology 
is used to understand governance in turbulent environments. 
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The Easington District has experienced major processes of economic restructuring, 
principally as a result of the run-down of coal mining. This has created severe 
problems for policy makers charged with the economic regeneration of the District. 
The East Durham Task Force, established in the wake of coal mining decline, is cited 
as an example of national and international best practice for the innovative approach 
taken towards regeneration in the context of large scale and complex problems. Over 
a ten year period, much has been undertaken in the way of physical development. 
This has included the reclamation and redevelopment of former colliery sites, 
environmental improvement of the coastline via the Turning the Tide initiative, 
smaller scale environmental improvements and new building and the provision of 
community facilities. This emphasis on physical development has led to a step 
change in the perceived image of the District. 
However, physical regeneration and enhanced image have yet to translate into 
employment creation on a scale commensurate with local employment needs. 
Furthermore, there has been significant employment loss from existing industries in 
the post-mine closure period, notably clothing. Not surprisingly, severe localised 
economic decline has also led to major social problems but social development is only 
now beginning to gain prominence and a higher priority on the regeneration agenda. 
The extent and depth of socio-economic problems was dramatically demonstrated by 
the DETR's Index of Multiple Deprivation (DETR, 2000) which highlights the main 
problems still blighting the District despite the work of the Task Force. Easington 
still suffers from severe social deprivation in terms of health, housing, employment, 
education, geographical access, child poverty and income. In overall terms it ranks as 
the fourth most deprived local authority area in England (the first three are London 
boroughs), from a total of 354 local authority Districts. Furthermore, 21 of its 26 
wards fall in the top 10% of deprived wards in the country. In 2001 the government 
introduced new institutional arrangements, in the form of Local Strategic 




This research emerges, therefore, from a convergence of interests between key policy 
makers within the District of Easington Council and current academic debates on the 
nature and efficiency of particular forms of regeneration and the changing concepts of 
regulation and governance in the context of the regeneration process. 
The main question that the research seeks to address is why, despite all of the effort 
and resources that have gone in to the regeneration of the District since the 
establishment of the Task Force in 1991, do the problems faced by the District remain 
so acute? Finding an answer to this question is obviously highly significant for the 
District Council and the Local Strategic Partnership as efforts to regenerate the 
District continue and large amounts of money continue to be spent by a number of 
agencies in the District. In order to tackle this question, however, it needs to be 
developed into a series of manageable research questions. These are set out towards 
the end of this chapter, but first evidence is presented on the nature of the problems 
faced by the District and the attempts which have been made to tackle them. 
The District of Easington 
The District of Easington is a small, rural district on the coast of north east England. 
It is located between the conurbations of Wears ide and Tyneside to the north and 
Teesside to the south (Figure 1). The District has the largest population (93,993: 
Census, 2001) of the seven Districts of County Durham despite a population decline 
of 16,000 (15%) since 1970. The District covers 145 square kilometres and is the 
second smallest District in the County. There are two main towns in the District, 
Seaham and Peterlee, and 16 smaller villages. The administrative centre of the 
District is located in Easington Village, although a growing number of agencies and 
public services are locating in Peterlee. 
The economic and social history of the District is dominated by a single industry -
coal mining. Before the extraction of coal began in the early nineteenth century, the 
District was a small agricultural backwater. 
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Figure 1 Easington District as represented in the East Durham Task Force's 1993 
Programme for Action 
(source: EDTF, 1993: 6) 
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The legacy of coal mining in Easington 
Coal mining was the economic raison d' etre of the District of Easington for over 100 
years. The District's dependence on coal was ultimately a factor in the enormous 
social and economic problems which faced, and continue to face, the District 
following the run-down of the nationalised coal industry. 
The early years of coal extraction in the District created the 'texture' of life which 
remains today. The growth of many of the District's villages is directly related to the 
sinking of pits and the employment that this created. A number of the District's 
villages even bear their origins in their name - Easington Colliery and Shotton 
Colliery for example. Even the District's new town, Peterlee, is named after a 
celebrated miners' leader. Mining, therefore, gave rise to the settlement structure of a 
large number of small villages spread throughout the District. This structure 
originated in the need for miners working round-the-clock shifts to live close to their 
place of work. As employment in the mines declined and eventually disappeared this 
dispersed settlement pattern itself became an obstruction to the development of the 
District. The new forms of employment that the District was able to attract have 
tended to locate in the main towns, particularly around Peterlee, creating significant 
transport problems. 
The built environment has also been substantially influenced by the mining heritage 
of the District. The expansion of mining occurred rapidly in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. The demand for labour in a formerly largely sparsely populated 
district necessitated significant in-migration and the construction of housing to 
accommodate the miners and their families. Consequently, colliery villages are 
characterised by a relatively uniform built environment of small, brick built, terraced 
houses characteristic of the early twentieth century (Figure 2). These houses, built at 
high density and without amenities, have created a legacy which continues to 
influence the health and quality of life of the District's residents today. The District 
also has a large stock of comparatively old social rented accommodation which, 
although well built, no longer adequately meets modem housing needs. In addition, 
much of the housing in the District's new town, Peterlee, suffers from structural and 
design problems despite its original conception as a solution to the 'squalor' of the 
- 17-
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older mining villages (Clarke, 1946). The exposure of many of the District's coastal 
settlements to the ravages of the North Sea coast has exacerbated the structural 
problems and speeded up the decay of many properties. 
Figure 2 Colliery Houses, Shotton Colliery 
Mining has also influenced the natural landscape of the District. Although largely 
removed through expensive regeneration schemes, the District was once dominated by 
the spoil heaps associated with the mining industry, and the coastline polluted by the 
disposal of colliery waste at sea. 
Coal mining has also potentially shaped the people of the District in more subtle 
ways. On the positive side, authors such as Frankenberg ( 1969) have described the 
way in which the shared experience of physically demanding and dangerous work and 
economic hardship have fostered the creation of strong communities with a sense of 
their own identity and social support structures. On the other hand there has been 
considerable rivalry, even hostility, between different pits and different settlements. 
This antagonism, cultivated by the Thatcher governments during their attack on the 
- 18-
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mining industry, remains today amongst the District's older residents. In addition, 
mining was a strongly paternalistic industry and the District has a strong Labourist 
political culture. This creates challenges for the District in the current climate with its 
emphasis on entrepreneurialism. The District has a large aged population which 
expects the local authority to provide for their needs in old age. The District is not 
immune to wider social changes, however, and the Council now has a large stock of 
council housing for which demand is falling as younger generations no longer aspire 
to live in social rented accommodation (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Social housing awaiting demolition, Peterlee 
The nationalisation of the coal industry 
The coal industry was nationalised in 1947. The coal industry in County Durham had 
been in decline since the early decades of the twentieth century, with output having 
reached its peak in 1913 (Reid, 1970 in Hudson, 1986: 171) while employment 
reached its maximum of over 170 000 in 1923 (Bulmer, 1978 in ibid: 171 ). The 
period from nationalisation until 1958 was one of comparative stability in coal mining 
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in the north east. The rate of decline accelerated in 1958, in the midst of the period of 
post-war expansion in the economy. This was largely due to the policies of the UK 
state for the management of the nationalised industries. Over the three decades 
following the nationalisation of the coal industry and before the election of the 
Thatcher government in 1979 a consensus gradually emerged within the UK state 
between the Conservative and Labour governments as to the way in which and criteria 
by which the nationalised industries were actually to be operated. Although not the 
'commanding heights' of the economy, the nationalised industries, including coal, 
were seen as central to the performance of the national economy. Since the objectives 
set for the nationalised industries were defined in terms of underpinning the 
competitiveness of private manufacturing capital and the national economy they had 
to be operated on the same sorts of 'efficiency' criteria as those used by private capital 
itself. This was made explicit in 1961 with the introduction of the rate of return on 
investment criteria for the management of the nationalised industries. These criteria 
were largely accepted by both political parties and the workforces and unions of the 
nationalised industries. 
In 1958 a decision at national level by the UK state to switch to a multi-fuel economy 
caused an acceleration in the rate of decline in output and employment in the north 
east coalfield. There was a distinctive geography to the closures as production was 
concentrated in the larger collieries on the east coast where the unit costs of producing 
coal were lower. Although many of Easington's pits survived the early closures, 
given the advantages of their location, this was the start of the District's 
unemployment problems since many of the District's mining jobs were filled by 
experienced miners relocating from the west of the County. Young men entering the 
labour market were no longer able to find work in the collieries and youth 
unemployment became a problem for the District. 
The north east continued to lose mining jobs throughout the 1970s despite the 
apparently greater emphasis on the role of the coal industry within national energy 
policy signalled by the 1974 Plan for Coal produced by the newly elected Labour 
government, the NCB and NUM following the strikes of 1972 and 1974. The 
emphasis remained heavily on producing coal 'competitively'. Producing 
competitively and rate-of-return criteria were used to direct investment and run down 
- 20-
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production in high-cost collieries, which included most of those in the north east. By 
1981/2, all but three of the NCB' s collieries in the north east were classified as loss-
making by the Monopolies Commission (including all of those in Easington). The 
closure of the region's remaining pits followed swiftly. "The implications in terms of 
unemployment were all the more severe because - in contrast to the 1960s - there was 
no commitment to even attempting to implement a regional employment policy. 
Coping with the social and economic impacts of decline was to be left to the 
individuals affected, to local authorities in coalmining areas, and to the cosmetic 
policies of ad hoc agencies such as NCB (Enterprises) Ltd." (Hudson, 1989b: 192) 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 4 British Coal Enterprise's Industrial Units, Horden 
Industrial change in the north east 
Until 1958 the region' s employers, both private capitalists but especially the NCB, 
vigorously and successfully opposed the introduction of any new male-employing 
manufacturing industry in the region. After 1958, the shift to a multi-fuel economy 
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and the corresponding contraction m the mmmg industry, along with other 
nationalised industries concentrated in the north east, especially shipbuilding, led to 
the re-creation of extensive male and female labour reserves in the region at a time of 
tight labour market conditions in the growth regions of the UK economy as well as 
those in other major capitalist states. These large reserves of labour and central 
government financial incentives, particularly after 1966, to encourage private capital 
to invest in the north east, together with changes internal to the organisation of 
production within companies, led to some diversification of manufacturing 
employment in the region, although there was very little net growth and an overall 
substantial reduction in industrial employment because of the job losses in mining. 
Across the region, "this diversification was accompanied by significant qualitative 
changes in the types of jobs available and the gender composition of the wage-labour 
force, for almost half of the net increase in manufacturing employment was for 
women." (Hudson, 1986). Furthermore, this industrial diversification was to sow the 
seeds of future structural problems since the north east in the 1960s was a particularly 
attractive environment for capitals which could profit by locating in branch plants 
those parts of their overall production processes which required de-skilled labour 
power. Thus the north east became one link in chains of corporate production and 
restructuring which were, and are, increasingly globally rather than nationally based. 
This type of industrial development has proved to be highly transient, and the region 
has subsequently moved from being a 'global outpost' within the international 
division of labour to largely redundant to the requirements of an increasing number of 
industrial capitals. This story is particularly clear in the history of the clothing and 
textiles industry in the District of Easington. 
Industrial decline and changing employment patterns in Easington 
The local economy of the District has been hit by successive waves of 
deindustrialisation. Mining in the District survived the early rounds of pit closure in 
the 1960s and 1970s largely unscathed. The District's pits were larger, deeper and 
more productive than those in the west of County Durham, and it was not until the 
changed political environment of the 1980s that District's pits began to close on a 
larger scale. This had a significant effect on the nature of deindustrialisation in the 
District. The closure of the mining industry in Easington District was extremely 
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rapid. The scale of the job loses in mining over such a short period of time posed 
significant problems for the re-employment of redundant miners. In addition, the 
closure of the mines during a period of intense global restructuring in manufacturing 
and in industry more generally, left little prospect for the creation of employment on a 
scale commensurate with the needs of the District. The District continues to suffer 
today from the speed and the scale of the job loses in mining, with only 12 years 
having passed since the closure of the last pit. 
The District's history of re-industrialisation is largely characterised by its transitory 
and gender-specific nature. One of the earliest new factories to be built was the 
Dewhirst textiles factory in Peterlee new town in the 1950s. The District successfully 
attracted further branch plants during the 1970s and 1980s, such as Walkers Snack 
Foods and Mattei. These plants tended to employ female labour. The 1980s, 
therefore, saw a shift in the gender composition of the labour force ofEasington. This 
can be characterised as a shift from male to female employment, from full to part-time 
work, and from well paid, skilled work in the mining industry to poorly paid, 
unskilled work in branch plants. 
Social and economic deprivation 
The rapid and large scale job losses associated with the deindustrialisation of the 
District have led to widespread economic deprivation. The District also suffers from 
extensive social deprivation. This takes many forms, such as poor health, low levels 
of educational attainment, poor quality housing, social tensions and anti-social 
behaviour and transport problems. These are examined in more detail below. The 
social and economic deprivation in the District are manifested in the depressed local 
housing market and the steady depopulation of the District. 
Social and economic deprivation are related in complex and mutually reinforcing 
ways. There are multiple causes of deprivation which interact in to produce a variety 
of effects, ranging from poor health and low aspirations to social exclusion. Although 
it is often impossible to separate the causes of deprivation, and indeed it is difficult to 





One of the most fundamental causes of deprivation in the District is the high level of 
unemployment and joblessness. The effects of the high levels of unemployment are 
compounded by their longevity. The pattern of unemployment in the District reflects 
the historic dependence which Easington District has had on the coal industry 
(Hudson eta!, 1984). In 1971, for example, the coal industry accounted for just under 
half of total employment (49.4%) and over two-thirds of male employment (67.6%). 
Between 1971 and 1981, employment in coal mining fell from 17,962 to 12,092, a net 
loss of 5,870 jobs (-32.7%), the majority of these losses affecting male employment. 
During the same period there was a net expansion of male jobs outside mining of only 
818 compared with the loss of 5885 male jobs in the coal industry itself. Furthermore, 
there were significant increases in long-term unemployment among men of all age 
groups, suggesting that redundant miners were not being absorbed into jobs in other 
sectors of the economy (ibid). 
The unemployment problems faced by the District escalated during the 1980s with the 
further rapid run-down of the mining industry and additional job losses in 
manufacturing (Table 1 ). 
Table 1 Change in Total Employment Count, Easington District 1981- 1989 
r! l ) ; 
; j ~ ;"< September 1981 September 1989 Change Perc~1:1~age 
Male Full Time 22,900 14,000 -8,900 -39% 
Female Full Time 6,100 7,300 1,200 19.9% 
Male Part Time 600 600 0 0% 
Female Part Time 4,400 5,000 600 12.5% 
Source: Census of Employment, Nom1s 
Unemployment remains high today, although changes in recording methods mask the 
scale of the problem considerably. A considerable proportion of the unemployed 
population are no longer counted in official unemployment statistics because they are 
registered permanently sick or disabled and receiving incapacity benefits or have 
taken early retirement (Table 2). This is a reflection of the 'real' scale of 
unemployment and the poor prospects of finding work which propel large numbers of 
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the working age population to become economically inactive (Beatty and Fothergill, 
1996; Fieldhouse and Hollywood, 1999). 
Table 2 Economic Activity of the District's population 2001 
Resident population aged 16 to 74 (percentage) 
Easington England and Wales 
Employed 48.2 60.6 
Unemployed 4.3 3.4 
Economically active full time students 1.4 2.6 
Retired 15.3 13.6 
Economically inactive students 3.1 4.7 
Looking after home/family 7.4 6.5 
Permanently sick or disabled 16.3 5.5 
Economically inactive 4.0 3.1 
Source: 2001 Census, ONS 
Many of the miners made redundant following the closure of the mines in the late 
1980s and early 1990s have failed to be reabsorbed into the labour force and have 
remained economically inactive ever since (Table 3). 
Table 3 Long term unemployment in the over 16 population, 2001 
Resident population aged 16 to 74 
Easington Percentage 
All People aged 16 - 74 67731 100 
In employment 33432 49 
Not in employment 34299 51 
Not in employment, last worked in 2001 1648 2 
Not in employment, last worked in 2000 2729 4 
Not in employment, last worked in 1999 1962 3 
Not in employment, last worked in 1998 1630 2 
Not in employment, last worked in 1997 1291 2 
Not in employment, last worked in 1996 1203 2 
Not in employment, last worked in 1995-1991 6317 9 
Not in employment, last worked before 1991 13286 20 
Not in employment, never worked 4233 6 
Source: 2001 Census, ONS 
- 25-
James Wadwell 
The District's current unemployment problems are masked to a considerable degree 
by the dependence of many older redundant miners on sickness and incapacity 
benefits. 
Health 
According to the Department of Health, "People [in Easington] experience much 
worse health than the general population in England and Wales. Deaths from all 
causes are increased for residents over 15 years of age. Twice as many women die 
from cancer of the stomach than the national average; the occurrence of lung cancer 
and malignant melanoma in women is much greater than the national average. Cancer 
deaths in men show a 50% increase over the national average, most notably in 
stomach and lung cancer. In both sexes, death due to heart disease and stroke are 
more than 40% more likely than in the rest of the country." (Department of Health, in 
Guardian 26.03.03). In addition, 30% more people than the national average 
experience mental health problems (ibid). 
The poor health of the District's residents is compounded by the structure and under-
funding of the local health service. There is no hospital in the District, and hospital 
services in Sunderland are under threat in the latest round of health service re-
organisation. People requiring hospital treatment have to travel out of the District to 
Durham, Sunderland or Hartlepool. In addition, despite serving one of the most 
deprived districts in the country, the local Primary Care Trust receives only 78% of its 
target funding and despite receiving one of the largest increases in funding of any 
Trust in the country will still be £24 million per annum below target by 2005/6 
(Bolas, quoted in Guardian, 26.03.03) 
Table 4 Self-reported health status of the District's population, 2001 
Resident population (percentage) 
Easing ton England and Wales England and Wales Rank 
/376 
Good 57.8 68.6 
Fairly good 24.9 22.2 
Not good 17.3 9.2 1 
Source: 2001 Census, ONS 
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The health of many of the older residents of the District bears the legacy of their 
employment in the mining industry. Rates of long-term illness are substantially 
higher than the national average, with 30.8% of the District's population reporting a 
long term illness compared to an average of 18.2% for England and Wales. Easington 
has the highest proportion of residents with a long-term illness of any District (Census 
2001, ONS). 
In addition, standards of public health in general are low, reflecting a wide range of 
factors, including high levels of smoking and alcohol consumption, poor diet and 
widespread poor housing conditions. Teenage pregnancy rates are also high in the 
District. The District's health problems are related in complex and reciprocal ways to 
the problems of economic deprivation, poverty, poor housing, lack of opportunity and 
the sense of powerlessness that many people feel in the face of the problems they 
face. 
Education 
Levels of educational attainment in the District are low. The pass rates for GCSEs 
and GNVQs of the six secondary schools in the District are significantly below the 
national average and are the lowest in County Durham. They are shown in Table 5. 
Ofsted reports have found the quality of the District's schools to be lacking. In 
addition, there are significant adult numeracy and literacy problems with one third of 
adults having basic literacy and numeracy problems compared to a national average of 
24% (Basic Skills Agency, 2004). The working age population of the District 
possesses significantly fewer qualifications than the national average (Table 6). 
Table 5 Secondary School Performance 2003: GCSE 1 GNVQ Results 
Percentage of pupils aged 15+ 
5 +A*- C 5+ A*- G No passes 
England Average 52.9% 88.8% 5.2% 
Easington Community School 45% 87% 7% 
Peterlee St Bede's Catholic Comprehensive School 41% 87% 5% 
Dene Community School of Technology 23% 74% 6% 
Shotton Hall School 38% 83% 7% 
Wellfield Community School 35% 88% 7% 




Table 6 Qualifications 2001 
Resident population aged 16-74 
.~ :"~ ,:-€ l~~ ",;:::: ;]i!~,: , i, t [,y , E<i~i!lgiqfllJ 'iPer~'tase: 
*' '"' ""' ", 
,~~n~ ~ Vitl:lbs ~EI~~n~ag~ 
All People 67731 100 100 
No qualifications 29889 44 29 
Level 1 11963 18 16 
Level 2 11619 17 19 
Level 3 3315 5 8 
Level 4/5 6135 9 20 
Other qualifications 1 level unknown 4810 7 8 
Source: 2001 Census, ONS 
Housing and Environment 
The District has one of the highest proportions of local authority owned housing in the 
country. Much of this housing is in a poor condition, and the District Council 
estimate that £300m is required to improve its stock to the government's 'decent 
homes' standard (DEC, 2002). This large social rented sector reflects both a strong 
local socialist political tradition and the dominance of the mining industry in the 
District. In addition to the social rented sector, there is a large quantity of former 
colliery and NCB owned housing which is now privately owned and is of relatively 
poor quality and inadequate for modem requirements (Table 7). Furthermore, as the 
population of the District ages, there is a change in the nature of demand for social 
rented accommodation from family houses to bungalows adapted for the elderly. This 
has combined with a general trend of declining popularity of local authority housing 
to produce significant problems of void properties due to lack of demand. The 
council is beginning to address these problems through selective demolition, although 
this is proving to be both expensive and controversial (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Easington Colliery 
Table 7 Housing Stock 2002 
Total Dwelling Stock 
Easington Percentage 
Total Dwelling Stock 41153 
Local Authority Dwelling Stock 11805 29 
RSL Dwelling Stock 1690 4 
Owner Occupied and Private Rented Dwelling Stock 27648 67 
Unfit Local Authority Dwellings 4371 
Percentage of LA Dwellings that are unfit 37 
Owner Occupied and Private Rented Dwellings that are unfit 2361 
Percentage of 00 and PR Dwellings that are unfit 9 
Total Unfit Dwellings 6732 16 
Percentage of LA dwellings requiring 'Capital Type' investment at 30 1st April 2002 and associated costs of less than £5,000 
Percentage of LA dwellings requiring 'Capital Type' investment at 50 1st April 2002 and associated costs from £5,000 up to £14,999 
Percentage of LA dwellings requiring 'Capital Type' investment at 15 1st April 2002 and associated costs of over £15,000 
Source: DEC, 2002 
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The poor quality of the existing housing stock has a negative impact on the well-being 
of the residents. Until recently, coal fires were common and standards of insulation 
were low. 
The poor quality and variety of the housing stock combine with the depressed local 
economy and the general poor quality of the local environment to depress the local 
housing market (see Table 8 below). 
Table 8 Housing Market Profile 2001 
Detached 89,165 
Semi- 45,617 detached 
Terraced 28,526 
Flat 41,942 
All property 45,554 
£'s and number of households (percentage) 
Percentage of households 









Sources: 2001 Census, ONS 
The Land Registry, 2001 
The built environment of the District is also generally of a poor quality. In many 
settlements, for example, there are significant numbers of empty shops and houses, 
and many properties in advanced states of disrepair. The depressed local economy 
means that many of the shops that do survive are poor quality, marginal enterprises 
(Figure 6). The relationship of the poor physical environment with social and 
economic deprivation is a complex one. On the one hand many people believe that 
the poor quality of the local environment serves to deter outside investment in the 
District. On the other hand, the poor quality local environment has a significant 
impact on the well-being of the District' s residents who commonly cite it as their 
priority for improvements when consulted on the spending of regeneration money (for 
example through the Community Appraisals carried out for the District Council by 
consultants in 2002). 
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Figure 6 Local Shops, Shotton Colliery 
Crime and Anti-social behaviour 
Levels of crime in Easington compare favourably with the national average (see Table 
9). Of greater concern, however, are levels of anti-social behaviour which have risen 
sharply in recent years (see Table l 0 below). 
Table 9 Levels of Crime in Easington 2000- 2001 
Notifiable offences recorded by the police. April 2000 - March 2001. 
Violence Sexual Robbery Burglary Theft of a Theft from 
against the offences from a motor a motor 
person dwelling vehicle vehicle 
Total number 
of offences 629 35 22 536 458 571 
recorded 
Easington 
Rate per 1,000 
population 6.8 0.4 0.2 5.8 4.9 6.2 
Easington 
Rate per 1,000 
population 11.4 0.7 1.8 7.6 6.4 11.9 England and 
Wales 
Source: Home Offtce 
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Table 10 Anti-Social Behaviour Complaints 1998- 2001 
Antisocial behaviour complaints received by the pollee. 1998 - 2001 
1999- 2000 c. 6,900 
2000 - 2001 7,183 
Source : District of Easington Community Safety Partnership 
An outline of regeneration policies and practices in the District, 1991 - 2003 
A large amount of effort and considerable resources have been spent in the District of 
Easington in the decade since the closure of the last mines in 1993. The processes of 
economic restructuring described above began in the 1960s. They were as much the 
result of central government programmes as local initiatives. The Peterlee New Town 
Development Corporation, which was appointed by central government, played a 
significant role in attracting new manufacturing jobs to the District. Local efforts to 
secure economic development continued throughout the 1980s in a largely ad hoc 
fashion with relatively small scale work undertaken by both the District and County 
Councils, including the construction of industrial units and improvements to the 
transport infrastructure of the District. The first concerted attempts to tackle the 
District' s problems caused by the decline in the mining industry came in 1991 with 
the establishment of the East Durham Task Force. The organisational structure of the 
Task Force and the strategies it produced directed regeneration in the District for 10 
years. In 2001 , the Task Force was 'wound up ' and replaced by the East Durham 
Local Strategic Partnership. The Local Strategic Partnership has subsequently taken 
on the role of producing a regeneration strategy for the District and co-ordinating the 
regeneration work of the many partners which now operate in the District. The 
regeneration of the District is outlined below through the lens of these organisational 
structures. 
The East Durham Task Force 
The East Durham Task Force was established with the approval of government 
ministers in 1991 and represents the start of recent efforts to revive the economy, 
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physical infrastructure and social and environmental conditions of the former East 
Durham Coalfield. The East Durham Task Force was different from previous 
regeneration activity both in its scale and its approach to the District's problems. 
The Task Force brought together representatives from Durham County Council, 
Easington District Council and the regional directors of a number of government 
departments and agencies to address the problems caused by the closure of the 
District's mines. The Task Force quickly produced a 'Programme For Action' 
detailing the work the members believed needed to be undertaken to tackle the 
District's severe problems and secure its future prosperity. The Task Force had three 
main aims in producing the strategy. These were, first, to gain greater recognition of 
what was needed to reverse the area's decline. Secondly, the Task Force sought to 
secure the continuing active involvement of all agencies in the regeneration of the 
District, a reflection of the extent to which the District was in competition with many 
others to secure the resources necessary to tackle its problems. Thirdly, the 
Programme for Action sought to develop a series of initiatives through which the 
District's problems could be addressed (EDTF, 1991). 
The Programme for Action, which drew heavily on a report on the potential for 
investment projects in East Durham commissioned from consultants in 1988 (Ecotec, 
1988), sets out the Task Force's understanding of the main causes and solutions to the 
District's problems. The emphasis of the Task Force's first Programme for Action 
was squarely on creating jobs to replace those lost with the closure of the mines. Jobs 
could only be created on the scale needed to match employment needs, the Task Force 
reasoned, by attracting inward investment to the District. In order to attract 
investment, the District had to be made attractive to manufacturing investors. The 
Task Force's approach essentially reiterated the development model of the Aycliffe 
and Peterlee Development Corporation which was wound up in 1988. The Task 
Force's strategy sought to make the District attractive to inward investment through 
improvements to the District's poor transport infrastructure in order to make the 
District more accessible. Once opened up by the construction of new roads, industrial 
land and industrial property needed to be developed to attract companies to the 
District. The reclamation of derelict land and the despoiled coastline were also 
central elements of the Programme as the Task Force believed that it was necessary to 
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create a high quality environment to attract mobile investment to the District. 
Programmes were devised to provide training to equip the population with the skills 
necessary to work in the new industries, and business support agencies were created 
to cater for the in-coming employers. Settlement renewal and the provision of 
community facilities also featured in the Programme to improve the general quality of 
the environment. Finally, a number of measures to increase the contribution of 
tourism to the local economy were proposed. 
The Task Force estimated that £158 million was needed to implement its 1991 
Programme for Action. The Programme was revised in 1993 following the closure of 
the last mine in the District, and, as the number of jobs needed rose to 10,000 so the 
cost of the Programme was increased to £390 million. The second Programme, 
subtitled 'Signs of Hope', continued the emphasis of the first Programme on attracting 
inward investment through the development of the transport network, industrial land 
and premises, although it acknowledged that "the wider experience in the region 
suggests that the manufacturing sector is unlikely to be a major net contributor to 
employment up to the end of this decade." (EDTF, 1993). The Programme was 
updated once more in 1997. The final programme, subtitled 'The Road to Success', 
continued the earlier Programmes' emphasis on industrial land and premises, but also 
reflected a broadening of the Task Force's approach to include themes such as 
community safety, a greater emphasis on housing and the comprehensive regeneration 
of the town of Seaham. By 1997, the total cost of the Programme for Action was 
estimated at £541 million (EDTF, 1997). 
The Task Force did not have an income or budget of its own. Its running costs were 
largely met by the District and County Councils providing staff on secondment, and 
by a small amount of finding from the EU' s RECHAR programme. Funding for the 
Programmes for Action and the projects they contained came from a variety of 
sources. Both the District and County Councils contributed money from their 
mainstream budgets, but the majority of the funding came from other sources. 
English Partnerships provided a considerable amount of money for the reclamation of 
derelict colliery sites and the construction of roads and the development of industrial 
land. Substantial funding was also received from the European Union (RECHAR and 
Objective 2) and from the government (Single Regeneration Budget). This funding 
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formed part of wider regeneration programmes upon which the Task Force was able 
to draw, and these programmes are considered in greater detail below. 
RECHAR 
The RECHAR programme was a European Community programme aimed at tackling 
the problems of the former coal mining areas. The District received £8m from the 
first RECHAR programme, which ended in 1993, and a further £8.5m from the 
second programme between 1993 and 1999. Like most other funding programmes, 
the RECHAR funds were allocated through a competitive bidding process and bidders 
were expected to secure matched funding from other sources to enhance the impact of 
the funding. The Task Force's RECHAR bids comprised a package of a large number 
of small projects, each of which was to be funded up to 50% of its cost from the 
RECHAR funds. The Task Force's bidding documents drew heavily on the 
Programmes for Action and sought to highlight the links between the aims of the Task 
Force and the European Union's RECHAR programme. The Task Force's RECHAR 
2 package sought funding for 82 separate projects, ranging from the construction of 
access roads, through the development of credit unions, funding for the East Durham 
Development Agency, training for industry, basic skills and bio-technology (EDTF, 
1995). 
Objective 2 
Objective 2 funding forms part of the European Union's Regional Development Fund 
and is targeted at areas affected by industrial decline. The first round of Objective 2 
funding was distributed between 1997 and 1999. The second round, which 
incorporates the needs of former coalfield areas formerly addressed through the 
RECHAR programme, runs from 2000 to 2006. The District of Easington secured £4 
million from the EU under Priority 3 of Objective 2 for a £10 million package of 
projects which aim to tackle East Durham's deep-rooted problems through the 
provision of a complete portfolio of strategic sites, and through complementary 
human resource development support targeted at those most in need. The District 
secured a further £3 million under Priority 4 of Objective 2 for a £7 million package 
of projects to secure 'community economic development' in 17 designated wards. 
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Single Regeneration Budget 
The Single Regeneration Budget is a central government programme to distribute 
regeneration funding through a process of competitive bidding. It was established in 
1994 and brought together a large number of separate programmes into a single 
source of funding. The 'competition' has been run six times, and for each round the 
government has issued bidding guidelines to give an indication of the types of 
regeneration projects it wishes to see put forward in bids. As with the European 
regeneration funds, bidders are required to secure matched funding from other sources 
to complement the government's resources. The District secured funding from the 
Single Regeneration Budget in rounds one, five and six. 
In round one the District secured £4.6 million from the Single Regeneration Budget 
for a programme with a total cost of £13.1 million. The programme included 
infrastructure improvements, environmental improvements, business support and 
training provision in Murton and Seaham between 1995 and 2002. The Task Force 
submitted an unsuccessful bid in round three of the SRB in 1996 for its flagship 
regeneration project in Seaham. This was interesting since it was one of the first signs 
of a significant mismatch between the government's approach to regeneration and 
local perceptions of what needed to be done. The Task Force's SRB3 bid sought 
money for the extensive physical re-modelling of the town of Seaham at a time when 
the government was moving towards 'softer' regeneration measures focussing more 
on people than capital development projects. The District was successful again in 
round 5 in 1999, securing £4.96m towards a project focusing on the improvement of 
housing in Dawdon and Parkside as part of a £26 million county-wide bid. The 
project included the clearance of void and derelict properties, improvements to local 
authority owned housing and the preparation of sites for the construction of low-cost 
private sector housing. The District received a further £3.2 million in the final round 
of SRB (round six, 2000) as part of a county-wide bid focussing on health, housing, 
youth and community safety. 
The East Durham Task Force came to an end in 2001. It had always been envisaged 
that it would require at least ten years to begin to address the District's problems 
following the closure of the mines, but the orderly succession from the Task Force to 
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other organisational arrangements was somewhat overtaken by events and policy 
developments by the government. 
The East Durham Local Strategic Partnership 
Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) are a central element of the government's 
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. They were first proposed in April 
2000 by Policy Action Team (PAT) 17 - 'Joining it up locally', one of the 18 Policy 
Action Teams established in the wake of the Social Exclusion Unit's 1998 report 
"Bringing Britain Together: a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal" (SEU, 
1998). Hilary Armstrong, then minister for local government and the regions, 
described "the key idea of "local strategic partnerships", bringing together local 
authorities and other service providers, business, voluntary sector and communities to 
develop more co-ordinated approaches to the challenges they all face." (DETR, 2000: 
5). Government guidance accompanying the Local Government Act 2000 gave local 
strategic partnerships a central role in the production of Community Strategies 
(ODPM, 2000). 
The Local Strategic Partnership agenda was embraced enthusiastically in the District. 
The East Durham Local Strategic Partnership became, nominally at least, the 
successor to the Task Force, although operationally there are significant differences 
between the two partnerships. The membership of the LSP is markedly different from 
that of the Task Force. Whereas the Task Force brought together regional directors of 
government departments and regional agencies, the LSP has a much more local focus. 
Its members include the District Council's director of housing, the chief executives of 
the local Primary Care Trust and Groundwork Trust, the leader of the District Council 
and a number of District and County Councillors, the local police divisional 
commander and representatives of the local community. The membership of the East 
Durham LSP is shown in appendix A. The LSP has, however, adopted a very similar 
structure to the Task Force with a small executive, a number of thematic policy 
groups focussing on areas such as education, health, the economy and housing, all of 
which report to the Partnership itself which ultimately is the nominated decision 
making body. The structure of the East Durham LSP is shown in Figure 7 below. 
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Source: East Durham LSP Community Strategy, 2003 
Unlike the East Durham Task Force, the Local Strategic Partnership has its own funds 
to resource its regeneration strategy. These funds have come from the government in 
the form of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. In contrast to other government 
funding regimes, such as the SRB, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund is allocated 
according to need rather than by competition, and the LSP has been, nominally at 
least, free to decide how it is spent. The policy context within which the LSP 
operates, however, is markedly different from the environment in which the Task 
Force worked. Although the LSP is free to choose how it spends its NRF allocation, 
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the government has placed a number of conditions on the partnership in order to 
qualify for the funding. First, the LSP itself must be accredited by the Government 
Office for the North East. This process requires the LSP to demonstrate that it meets 
certain criteria, namely that it is strategic, inclusive, action-focussed, performance 
managed, efficient, learning and developmental (DETR, 2001: 19). Secondly, the 
LSP is required to produce a Community Strategy and a Local Neighbourhood 
Renewal Strategy, which must again be approved by Government Office. Third, the 
LSP has to monitor the spending and the impact of the NRF monies and provide 
Government Office with monitoring information. Fourth, and most significant, the 
LSP has an obligation to address the government's floor targets in areas such as crime 
reduction, education and health. The East Durham LSP has, nevertheless, had 
considerable freedom in shaping its structure and the way in which it spends its NRF 
allocation. 
The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
The District received £9.9 million in the first round ofNeighbourhood Renewal Fund 
allocation for the period 2001 - 2004. It has subsequently received an additional 
£17.7 million for the period 2004- 2006. The East Durham LSP is one of only 26 to 
receive additional funding from the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund in the second 
round in recognition of the 'distance' the District remains from the government's 
floor targets. 
The Community Strategy 
The East Durham LSP published its Community Strategy in June 2003. The strategy 
contains contributions from each of the six thematic Implementation Groups of the 
Partnership, and it "includes the views of local people gathered through consultations 
undertaken over the last two years". (EDLSP, 2003). The Community Strategy will 
direct the work of the partnership and sets out a vision for the District which it hopes 
to achieve by the end of the decade. 
Other Central Government Programmes 
The District has also benefited from funding through other central government 
programmes to improve public services in deprived areas. Examples include 
Education Action Zones, Sure Start and Health Action Zones. Recently the Council 
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has created an Arm's Length Management Organisation (ALMO) to manage its 
housing stock to enable it to borrow a considerable amount of money to fund the 
repairs needed to meet minimum quality standards. 
The Coalfields Task Force 
The Coalfields Task Force was established by the Prime Minister shortly after the 
election of the Labour government in 1997 and produced its report, "Making the 
difference: a new start for England's coalfield communities" in June 1998. Kingsley 
Smith, Chief Executive of Durham County Council and Chair of the East Durham 
Task Force was a member of the Coalfields Task Force. The Coalfields Task Force's 
report highlighted the particular problems facing the former coalfields and 
emphasised the need to acknowledge coalfields as a priority in their own right. The 
report set out its authors' belief that generating wealth through jobs is central to 
securing the future of the former coalfield communities. The Task Force envisaged 
job creation through inward investment, call centres and tourism, although community 
businesses and Intermediate Labour Markets also received a passing mention. The 
report concentrated on the need to provide training for the unemployed, industrial 
sites, improved accessibility through new transport links, financial support, fiscal 
incentives and the relaxation of planning guidelines to encourage inward investment 
and business development. The report also highlighted the poor quality of the 
housing stock in the former coalfields and the problems caused by absentee private 
landlords, transitory populations, void properties and depressed housing markets. The 
report records the "shock" of the Coalfields Task Force at the "dreadful conditions" it 
saw on a visit to Easington Colliery (CFTF, 1998: 23). Cleaning up the dereliction 
left by the mining industry and improving the environment of the former coalfields is 
also identified as a priority for action. 
The Coalfields Task Force Report sets out recommendations for changes to 
mainstream policies and regeneration funding streams in order to reflect the needs of 
the former coalfields. It also emphasises the importance of partnership working, 
involving the private sector, greater integration of public services and empowering 
communities in tackling the regeneration of the coalfields (Coalfields Task Force, 
1998). The government published a detailed response to the Coalfields Task Force 
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Report which it presented at a conference at Peterlee Leisure Centre in December 
1998. The response set out what the government was already doing to help the former 
coalfields and presented a paragraph-by-paragraph response to the recommendations 
made by the Coalfields Task Force (DETR, 1998). This response was followed up by 
a progress report published 12 months later (DETR, 1999). 
County and Regional Governance Structures 
There are three tiers of local government in the District of Easington. At the lowest 
level, the District is covered by 18 Town and Parish Councils. The District Council is 
the local authority with responsibility for housing, environment and, following the 
Local Government Act 2000, the social and economic well-being of the District's 
residents. Durham County Council forms the upper tier of local government and has 
responsibility for education, social services, highways and is actively involved in 
economic regeneration. The County Council was established in 1888, along with 
England's other County Councils. Easington District Council was formed in 1974 by 
the merger of Seaham Urban District with most of Easington Rural District. The two 
tier structure of local government was the subject of a review in 1991, although at the 
time the commissioners recommended that the structure be left unchanged. The 
structure oflocal government in County Durham is once more the subject of review as 
part of the government's proposals for a directly elected regional assembly for the 
north east. The government has stated that should there be a vote in favour of a 
directly elected regional assembly local government should be rationalised. Six of the 
seven districts of County Durham have commissioned a study from the Institute of 
Local Government at the University of Birmingham and now favour the formation of 
three larger district councils and the abolition of the County Council (INLOGOV, 
2003). The County Council, on the other hand, has made a case for the abolition of 
the seven district councils and their replacement by a single county authority. 
Although the establishment of the LSP represents a considerable devolution of 
responsibility to the local level, notwithstanding the limitations placed on the exercise 
of that responsibility alluded to above, County and Regional governance structures 
remain significant for the regeneration of the district. 
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The County Council plays a significant role in the regeneration of the District in a 
number of ways. As the Local Education Authority it is responsible for the shape of 
educational provision in the District. As the local highways authority it continues to 
play a significant role in the development and maintenance of the District's road 
network. The County Council also has a large and active regeneration department and 
continues to spend large amounts of money on regeneration throughout the County. 
The County Council has a longstanding involvement in the economic development of 
the county, which includes the establishment of the County Durham Development 
Company as the Council's inward investment and business development arm. The 
County established the County Durham Economic Partnership in 1994 which brings 
together a large number of partners involved in the economic development of the 
county. The County's economic partnership has produced two economic 
development strategies for the county, the first in 1994 and the second in 2002. The 
County has subsequently established its own local strategic partnership - the County 
Durham Strategic Partnership. This brings together representatives from the seven 
LSPs in the county and other representatives from the public and private sectors. The 
County Council has a difficult role to fulfil in spreading its resources among seven 
districts each with deep rooted but substantially different problems and balancing the 
claims of the formerly industrial east with the rural west. 
The highest level of sub-national governance which engages in the regeneration of the 
District is the Government Office for the North East. The Government Office plays a 
particularly important role in relation to the LSP. This takes two forms. First, the 
government office is the body responsible for implementing the central government's 
monitoring requirements of the way in which the LSP spends its NRF. Second, there 
is high level representation from government office at all of the LSP's meetings. 
Historically, government office had a significant role in the administration and 
monitoring of the Single Regeneration Budget in the regions, although the 
administration of the remaining projects of the final rounds passed to the regional 
development agency, One North East, in 1999. 
As well as monitoring the final rounds of SRB, the regional development agency is 
responsible for the Single Programme Fund. The agency has, however, devolved the 
distribution of the Single Programme money to the four sub-regional partnerships. In 
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the case of Easington, the sub-regional partnership is the County Durham Economic 
Partnership which has an allocation of £34m from the RDA's Single Programme to 
spend in the County between 2002 and 2005. One North East's other significant 
contribution to the governance of the region has been the production of the Regional 
Economic Strategy. Regardless of the merit of this document it is highly significant 
as it forms a central reference point for most county and district level strategies. 
The Research Questions 
The research undertaken for this thesis was carried out in the context of the Economic 
and Social Research Council's CASE programme for collaborative research. The 
project was developed in collaboration with the District of Easington Council and the 
research questions arise from a convergence of interests between key policy makers at 
the District Council charged with the social and economic regeneration of the District 
following the closure of the mining industry there and academic researchers in the 
Geography Department at the University of Durham. The research questions seek to 
address issues which are both of relevance to policy makers and contribute to a 
number of current theoretical debates in the social sciences. The research questions 
are outlined below, and the theoretical approach underlying the development of the 
research questions is presented in chapter four. 
The central empirical question which forms the raison d'etre for the whole research 
project is why, despite all of the effort and resources which have gone into the 
regeneration of the district since 1991, do the problems of social and economic 
deprivation described above remain so acute. This central research question is 
addressed through a number of smaller concrete research questions. 
The research was undertaken as an interpreted case study of regeneration efforts in the 
District in light of a body of literature on governance, govemmentality and the role of 
the state. This has shaped the way in which the research questions have been 
developed. The research methodology is informed by critical realism and by shifting 
between the concrete and the abstract seeks to understand the relationships between 
structures, mechanisms and events (Sayer, 1992). The research questions seek to 
uncover the relationships between the regeneration activities of various organisations 
-43-
James Wadwell 
that have worked in the District over the past decade and the impact they have had on 
social and economic conditions in the District. The evidence provided in this 
introduction suggests that so far much of the regeneration has had relatively little 
impact on the District, especially in terms of the social and economic well-being of 
the residents. The research will try to uncover why this has been the case. First, the 
research will ask how problems are made visible and amenable to solutions. This will 
seek to uncover how regeneration activity is shaped by different agencies' 
understandings of the District's problems. The influence of government policy on the 
shaping of solutions to local problems will be examined. 
Having acknowledged that there are multiple agencies involved in the regeneration of 
the District it then becomes necessary to address the relationships between those 
agencies and the balance of power in shaping and delivering regeneration in the 
District. The research will investigate the balance of power between central and local 
government in the regeneration of the District. The East Durham Task Force and the 
East Durham Local Strategic Partnership will be analysed in order to answer 
questions about the changing nature of governance. The factors which influence the 
outcome of partnership working will be examined. A key activity of regeneration 
partnerships has been the formulation of regeneration strategy. The research will seek 
to understand the relationship between strategy, regeneration problems and solutions. 
It will examine the role of strategy in the governance of regeneration and the function 
of strategy as a governmental technology. Finally, the research will investigate the 
ways in which governance and strategy combine to produce concrete efforts to tackle 
deprivation. These research questions will provide an understanding of the factors 
which have limited the impact of past and present efforts to tackle deprivation. The 
findings will, therefore, be significant for future efforts of regeneration partners in 
Easington and in other areas characterised by industrial decline and for central 
government. 
Improving 'best practice' 
The concept of improving 'best practice' is central to this thesis and this is reflected in 
its prominent position in the thesis' title. The importance of improving best practice 
stems from the CASE context of the research outlined above and has significant 
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methodological implications for the work. As has already been noted, the East 
Durham Task Force is regarded as an example of national and international best 
practice, and the subsequent efforts of the East Durham LSP are also highly regarded. 
Given the scale of the problems that continue to face the district, however, the 
Council and its partners are keen to improve the impact of their regeneration 
activities, and this is one reason for their participation in the project. The goal of 
improving the District's 'best practice' is, therefore, implicit throughout the whole 
thesis. By analysing what has taken place in the District over the last 15 years by way 
of regeneration and seeking to identify the reasons for the successes and failures, the 
thesis will enable the District and its partners to learn from their experiences and 
improve future regeneration policies and practices. To this end, the thesis will 
contribute to the process of place based learning. 
Best practice is not, however, a politically neutral term. Central government is also 
interested in improving 'best practice' and sharing it with other places. The transfer 
of best practice between places poses some significant problems for the concept of 
place based learning. Whilst there are no doubt lessons that can be learnt and shared 
between places, the uncritical transfer of best practice between places suggests that 
place does not matter. The thesis will, therefore, explore the extent to which 
government policy, in its own drive to improve best practice, balances knowledge 
transfer with the importance of place and place based learning. 
Conclusions 
This chapter set out the rationale for the thesis and highlighted the importance of the 
research questions to the District of Easington. Patterns of social and economic 
deprivation in the District have been explored and their origins in the District's 
distinctive industrial structure were analysed. In particular, the role of the state, 
through its energy, industrial and regional policies was shown to have been central in 
shaping the structural problems with which the District has had to deal. The District's 
problems stem from the almost complete dependence of the local economy on coal 
mining as a source of male employment, and the fragility of the manufacturing 
employment which the District had managed to attract in the face of mining decline. 
The District's problems were crystallised by the rapid and total closure of the mining 
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industry, which left more than 10,000 miners out of work when the final colliery 
closed in 1993. 
Despite the implication of the state in the District's problems, efforts to tackle the 
legacy of the mining industry and the impact of its rapid closure have been largely 
undertaken by local institutions. This introduction has outlined the role of the East 
Durham Task Force and the East Durham Local Strategic Partnership, two 
consecutive local governance structures established to tackle the District's problems. 
The operation of these two institutions and the transition between them form the focus 
for the substantive research on which this thesis is based. Although considerable 
progress has been made in tackling the physical problems associated with the decline 
of mining, including dealing with derelict land and property, cleaning up the 
despoiled coastline and improving accessibility through road building and the 
provision of serviced industrial sites, this has not yet led to job creation on a scale 
commensurate with local need as envisaged by early regeneration strategies. In 
addition, only recently has policy makers' attention turned to the social deprivation 
associated with the decline of mining and the problems of long-term unemployment, 
poverty, ill health, anti-social behaviour and low levels of educational attainment 
which the District now faces. These themes are developed in subsequent chapters. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. The first part presents the literatures within which 
the research is set. Chapter two presents a critical review of the regeneration policy 
literature which deals with government responses to social and economic decline. A 
critique of government regeneration policy is developed on three levels. First, policy 
is analysed 'in its own terms'. Second, a social science critique of the theoretical 
underpinnings of government policy is developed. Third, the governmentality 
perspective is used to analyse regeneration policy in relation to the processes of 
governmg. Chapter three reviews the literature on theories of the state, governance 
and governmentality and presents an argument for the centrality of the state in 
political economic analyses. The chapter lays the foundations for integrating the 
governance and governmentality approaches through Foucault's conceptualisation of 
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power and Scharpfs 'shadow of hierarchy' thesis (Scharpf, 1994). Chapter four 
presents the methodology which shaped the design and implementation of the 
research. The philosophical approach, namely critical realism, and the research 
methods used are explained. 
Then the thesis analyses the structures which have been developed in the District to 
secure regeneration following the closure of the mining industry. Chapter five 
explores the changing patterns of governance of regeneration in the District and 
evaluates the extent to which these constitute a shift from government to governance 
as described in the literature. The East Durham Task Force and the East Durham 
Local Strategic Partnership are considered in tum. Chapter six re-asserts the 
importance ofthe central state in local regeneration through an exploration ofJessop's 
concept of meta-governance (Jessop, 2003) and technologies of government (Rose, 
1999). 
The final chapters focus on the regeneration strategies of the East Durham Task Force 
and the East Durham Local Strategic Partnership. Chapter seven analyses the 
formulation of regeneration strategy and the way in which problems are identified and 
solutions devised. Chapter eight examines the ways in which governance structures 
move from regeneration strategy to regeneration projects. This chapter uses 
Grabher's (2002) concept of project ecology to develop an understanding of the way 
in which governance structures shape the implementation of regeneration strategy and 
the impact this has for understanding of governance. 
Chapter nine presents the conclusions and policy recommendations. 
Images of East Durham 
The following images are included to give a flavour of the District of Easington, the 




Figure 8 A new call centre awaiting tenants, Whitehouse Point, Peterlee 
Figure 9 Peterlee North West Industrial Estate - 'old' manufacturing units 
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Figure 10 Houses in Peterlee New Town 
Figure 11 Terraced Houses, Horden 
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Figure 12 Aged Mine Workers' Homes, Easington Village 
Figure 13 Easington Colliery Primary School in the centre of the village 
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This chapter presents a brief outline of central government regeneration policy. This 
is important, since "[t]he framing of the problem, the language or discourse that is 
used . . . determines the way in which the problem is viewed, the causes that are 
thought to be operative, and the policies that are thought to be appropriate." (Oatley, 
2000: 89). It then explores the conceptual underpinnings of regeneration policy. A 
critique of the foundations of policy is developed at three levels. First, a critique of 
key policies is developed 'in their own terms'. The implications and limitations of 
policies are explored. Second, a social science critique of regeneration policy is 
developed which engages critically with the concepts on which policies are based. 
Finally, the govemmentality approach is used to develop an understanding of the way 
in which policies are related to the processes of governing. This will form the basis 
for an engagement with the concept of governance in chapter three. 
Trends inn government approaches to regeneration 
Stewart (1994) identifies the dispersal of concentrations of the population in 
congested and decaying urban areas to edge-of-town and new town locations in the 
years following the Second World War as the first phase of an identifiable urban 
policy. This approach was based on the belief that tackling the environmental 
conditions of poor urban areas would improve the lives of their inhabitants. The re-
emergence of social problems in the newly constructed social housing in the 1960s 
and 1970s caused a re-evaluation of the nature of the urban problem. Urban policy 
underwent a shift in emphasis which identified social pathology as the cause of urban 
problems (Stewart, 1994; Lawless, 1988). This approach assumed that poverty was a 
limited problem generated by inadequacies operating at the levels of families and 
individuals and concentrated in small areas within which a definable anti-social 
culture could be identified -what Callaghan described as a 'deadly quagmire of need 
and apathy' (Callaghan, 1968 quoted in Lawless, 1988: 532). A series of small scale, 
experimental special programmes followed, including the Community Development 
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Projects (1969 - 1972) and the Inner Area Studies (1972). The reports of these 
projects demonstrated that there was in fact nothing unique about the areas they were 
studying, and that they suffered from the same problems as other inner urban areas, 
namely economic decline, contraction in employment opportunities and diminishing 
individual and community wealth (CDP, 1977 in Chatterton and Bradley, 2000; 
Lawless, 1988). The implications of these reports were clear: deprivation was not 
confined to easily identifiable areas, and the revival of the local economy was central 
to tackling deprivation. These findings were reflected in the Department of the 
Environment's 1977 White Paper 'Policy for the Inner Cities' (DoE, 1977). 
The Community Development Projects 
The Community Development Projects, a senes of 12 action research projects 
established between 1969 and 1972, and eventually wound up in the late 1970s, are 
still regarded by many as the high water mark of community involvement in area-
based regeneration initiatives (Foley and Martin, 2000). The projects were set up to 
empower inner city communities suffering from multiple deprivation to press for 
improved services and to organise self-help schemes. The projects challenged 
existing assumptions about the causes of deprivation and argued that poverty was 
inextricably linked to deep-seated changes in the political economy of inner city areas, 
in particular the large-scale withdrawal of private capital associated with the decline 
of manufacturing industries. 
Conservative Urban Policy 1979-1997 
The direction of urban policy shifted agam, however, with the election of the 
Conservative government in 1979. The Conservatives' neo-liberal explanation of 
structural decline shifted the parameters of the regeneration debate. The solutions to 
the problems of deprivation were to be found in free-market liberalism and 
entrepreneurialism. Thus regeneration policy in the 1980s was characterised by 
property-led development (Robinson and Shaw, 1994) and included initiatives such as 
the Urban Development Corporations, Enterprise Zones, and City Action Teams. 
Furthermore, the 1980s saw the increasing centralisation of control over regeneration 
and reduction in the freedom of local authorities in the areas of capital and revenue 
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spending and housing (Lawless, 1991). The limitations of property development and 
the failure of 'trickle down economics' to spread the benefits of growth to the most 
disadvantaged were, however, implicitly recognised by the Major government with 
the launch of City Challenge in 1991 which sought, largely unsuccessfully, to involve 
the local community in regeneration projects (Nevin and Shiner, 1998). As the 
number of initiatives to tackle the problems of the declining urban areas proliferated 
in the late 1980s, the National Audit Office described the government's urban policy 
as "a patchwork quilt of complexity and idiosyncrasy." (NAO, 1989 in Lawless, 1991: 
19). This report laid the foundations for a fundamental review of regeneration policy 
in the 1990s and the replacement of a large number of regeneration programmes with 
the Single Regeneration Budget. 
The Si11gle Rege11eration Budget 1994-1997 
The introduction of the Single Regeneration Budget in 1994 can, therefore, be seen as 
a response to a decade of policy which had little impact upon disadvantaged localities 
(Hall and Nevin, 1999). The Single Regeneration Budget promised "holistic, locally 
devised solutions to complex, socio-economic problems to be delivered by local, 
inclusive partnerships" (ibid: 477). It retained the broadly economic focus of earlier 
policies, but the emphasis shifted from development and capital grants to employment 
related skills, education and job prospects - what might broadly be termed 'supply 
side' measures. Most importantly, the Single Regeneration Budget recognised that 
there was a role for both local authorities and 'the community' in regeneration, 
although their opportunity for influence and control over the outcomes is open to 
question. Whereas previous regeneration policy had been targeted at least ostensibly 
at the areas of greatest need, the Single Regeneration Budget took the form of an open 
competition to which all local authorities were eligible to apply. The result has been 
that resources have been spread much more thinly than before, with only five out of 
555 successful bids receiving funding equivalent to a City Challenge bid by 1999. 
This has led some to question whether a 'critical mass' of resources for regeneration 
is available any longer (ibid). The Single Regeneration Budget is one of the longest 
lived regeneration initiatives, and even the modifications made by the incoming New 
Labour administration in 1997 represent only relatively minor modifications. This 
continuity is all the more surprising given the Labour Party's pledge to end the 
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"beauty competition approach to regeneration funding" whilst in opposition (Labour 
Party, 1995 quoted in Hall, 2000: 1 0). 
New Labour and the Local Government Modernisation Agenda 
Regeneration policy since 1997 must be understood in the context of the local 
government modernisation agenda. The democratic reform of local governance has 
been a key priority of the New Labour government since its election in 1997. This 
has taken two forms. First, there has been a great deal of emphasis on the institutional 
reform of representative systems of local democracy designed to make decision-
making processes within local authorities more transparent and accountable to local 
electorates. Examples include the Best Value review process and reforms to the 
structure of local authorities. Second, the government has placed increasing emphasis 
on the role of active citizens as direct participants in the politics of local service 
delivery. This emphasis on participatory democracy encourages citizens and 
communities to mobilise themselves and take on active roles in the way they are 
governed (DETR, 1999 quoted in Raco and Flint, 2001: 586). Reforms have sought 
to widen community participation in decision making processes and devolve decision 
making to the community level in order to increase the efficiency and accountability 
of service providers. Indeed the emergence of 'community' has been one of the 
underlying features of local state restructuring over the last 30 years (Cochrane, 1986; 
Hastings, 1996). The pace ofthis reform has accelerated since the 1997 election. 
The Best Value regime 
The Best Value regime is the centrepiece of New Labour's attempts to 'modernise' 
local government. It aims to increase the role of service users and communities by 
enabling local people to hold councils to account for improving the responsiveness, 
quality and cost-effectiveness of local services (Blair, 1998; DETR, 1998b ). It aims 
to bring about "a fundamental shift in power and influence towards local people" 
giving them "a bigger say and a better deal" (DETR, 1998c: 1 ). These changes are 
brought into force by the Local Government Act 1999 which places a duty on local 
service providers to consult widely on all aspects of their activities with service users. 
Best Value authorities have to involve users, citizens and communities in reviewing 
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current service provision and setting future performance targets. They are required to 
publish Best Value Performance Plans giving details of recent performance using both 
national and locally developed indicators, specifying targets for year-on-year 
improvements in cost-effectiveness and service quality and outlining the authority's 
plans for achieving them. A standard set of questions has been developed which 
councils are obliged to use following a centrally prescribed survey methodology to 
produce performance indicators of 'user satisfaction' in seven key services delivered 
by local authorities (Foley and Martin, 2000). The Best Value regime represents a 
paradox insofar as it has its roots in the 'new public management' with its emphasis 
on efficiency, value for money, inspection and quantitative performance indicators 
and yet it envisages a key role for community leadership and service delivery (Geddes 
and Martin, 2000). 
Regeneration Policy since 1997 
The election of the Labour government in 1997 added new impetus to the 'tum to the 
community' (Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997) evident in earlier regeneration policy. The 
government sees the involvement of the local community as essential to the 
development and implementation of successful area regeneration policy (Foley and 
Martin, 2000). For example, the Social Exclusion Unit stated in its 1998 National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal that "it has become conventional wisdom that 
communities need to be involved both in designing what is to be done and in 
implementing it" (SEU, 1998, para. 2.3). In particular, the SEU has been critical of 
top-down, provider-led approaches, and its national strategy for neighbourhood 
renewal advocates much greater community involvement in and neighbourhood 
management ofpublic services (SEU, 1998). One ofthe main themes of the National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal is "reviving communities" in order to arrest, 
reverse and prevent the decline of deprived neighbourhoods. The strategy contains 
three key proposals to achieve this. First, help should be given to residents to tackle 
problems that threaten to undermine the community. Second, action should be taken 
to stimulate community activity and third, residents should be helped to get involved 
in turning round their neighbourhoods (SEU, 1998 quoted in Oatley, 2000: 88). The 
problems which the National Strategy seeks to address are framed in terms of 
neighbourhood, and throughout the document neighbourhood and community seem to 
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be used almost interchangeably. The consequence of framing the problem in terms of 
places or neighbourhoods is that policy solutions tend to be area-based (Oatley, 2000). 
Whereas the competition-based, challenge funding programmes of the 1980s and 
1990s were designed to instil a more business like approach to regeneration in local 
authorities, the policies and initiatives introduced by the Labour government 
following the election in 1997 were designed to instil a culture of more collaborative 
working between local service providers. They emphasise the need for statutory 
agencies and for the private and voluntary sectors to work with communities to 
address local priorities (Clarence and Painter, 1998). This is paralleled by a shift 
away from input-driven and market-oriented approaches and a much stronger focus on 
'joined-up working', 'cross-cutting issues' and 'citizen-centred services'. 
The Single Regeneration Budget 1997- present 
Despite its promise to end the "beauty competition approach to regeneration funding" 
whilst in opposition (Labour Party, 1995 quoted in Hall, 2000: 1 0) the government 
has held three further rounds of the Single Regeneration Budget since coming to 
power. The bidding guidelines for the competition have, however, been revised three 
times, each time placing greater importance on the role of the community. The 
guidelines issued for round 4, for example, stated that it was important that the 
scheme "encourages local people, businesses and other organisations to come together 
as partners" (DETR, 1998 quoted in Foley and Martin, 2000: 483). The role of the 
community was strengthened in the guidelines for round 5, published eight months 
later. Bids had to demonstrate that they had the 'wholehearted support of the local 
community' and had to show "how local communities have been involved in the 
development of the bid [and] how the partnership will ensure the local community 
have a say in decisions" (DETR, 1998e: 9). The guidelines for round 6 went further 
still, encouraging the involvement of the community at the highest level and stating 
that "it should not be assumed that a public sector body should necessarily lead the 
partnership. Consideration should be given to building the capacity of other partners, 
particularly those from voluntary and community sectors to enable them to do so." 
(DETR, 1999a: 5). 
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The New Deal for Communities 
The government further embraced the role of the community in the regeneration of 
deprived neighbourhoods with the launch of its New Deal for Communities in 1998. 
This programme, initially launched in 17 'Pathfinder' areas, was an attempt to 
respond to criticism of earlier regeneration policy. Its aim was to take a radical long-
term approach to tackling the problems of the poorest neighbourhoods. (DETR, 
1998). In order to facilitate genuine community involvement, the New Deal for 
Communities funding is not allocated through a competitive bidding process, and 
longer lead-in times are allowed for the development of 'bids' and funding is provided 
to support the development of proposals (Foley and Martin, 2000). Partnerships must 
be able to demonstrate that communities have been involved in both the selection of 
target areas and the development of programmes. Although the District of Easington 
has not been a New Deal for Communities Pathfinder, the programme demonstrates 
the government's commitment to 'the community' as a central element in successful 
regeneration and its conflation of community and neighbourhood. 
Local Strategic Partnerships 
Local Strategic Partnerships are a central element of the government's National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. They were first proposed in April 2000 by 
Policy Action Team (PAT) 17 - 'Joining it up locally', one of the 18 Policy Action 
Teams established in the wake of the Social Exclusion Unit's 1998 report "Bringing 
Britain Together: a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal" (SEU, 1998). They 
have a broad and poorly defined remit which ranges from improving the quality of 
public services in deprived areas to the promotion of economic wellbeing and 
environmental sustainability. The Local Government Act 2000 imposed a duty on 
local authorities to produce a community strategy. Government guidelines state that 
Local Strategic Partnerships should take the lead in producing Community Strategies. 
The guidelines state that the objectives of community strategies are: 
e to allow local communities (based upon geography and/or interest) to 
articulate their aspirations, needs and priorities; 
e to co-ordinate the actions of the council, and of the public, private, voluntary 
and community organisations that operate locally; 
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e to focus and shape existing and future activity of those organisations so that 
they effectively meet community needs and aspirations; and 
o to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development both locally and 
more widely, with local goals and priorities relating, where appropriate, to 
regional, national and even global aims. 
(ODPM, 2000) 
The underlying principle behind Local Strategic Partnerships is that the failure to 
tackle deprivation stems from a lack of local co-ordination amongst service providers 
and that by achieving better co-ordination problems will be solved (SEU, 2001). 
In order to deliver Neighbourhood Renewal, the government created the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, an unhypothecated grant allocated to the 88 most 
deprived local authority areas (identified by the Index of Multiple Deprivation), to 
which it allocated £900 million between June 2001 and March 2004. Unlike previous 
regeneration programmes, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund was allocated by central 
government using a needs-based formula rather than by competition between deprived 
areas. 
A critique of New Labour's Modernisation Agenda 
New Labour thinking as it is embodied in the local government modernisation agenda 
and as it begins to unfold through programmes such as the New Deal for 
Communities, the Best Value regime and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, contains 
numerous tensions and contradictions. One of the most significant is the tension 
between national prescription and local flexibility and the government's growing 
frustration at variations in standards across the country. It is proving difficult for a 
government with strong centralising tendencies and a politically driven 'zero 
tolerance of failure' to reconcile the flexibility it believes is necessary to tackle local 
problems with the local variations in standards that this is likely to produce. This 
critique of the new localism (Walker, 2002) makes uncomfortable reading for a 
government which has invested so heavily in the powers of local communities to 
manage their local services. 
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In addition, the effects of a shift from representative to participatory democracy are 
not fully understood, and the impact of changes in the structure of local government, 
with the concentration of power in the hands of a smaller number of councillors with 
the introduction of cabinet-style local government, remains unclear. 
The emphasis on greater local flexibility has, however, enabled ministers to pass to 
local policy makers much of the responsibility for resolving the paradoxes within the 
new regimes, especially the tensions between the emphasis on 'bottom-up' initiatives 
and the strong centralising effect of national indicators and targets (Foley and Martin, 
2000). In doing so, the government has distanced itself from the responsibility for 
tackling particular problems. The emphasis on community development has been 
linked to the wider nee-liberal objective of creating active citizens to promote self-
reliance, local initiative and reduced 'dependence' on the welfare state (Kearns, 1992; 
Lovering, 1995). 
The conceptual underpinnings of regeneration policy. 
Commu11ity 
Community has been a central concept in sociology since the early twentieth century. 
The review of government policy presented above shows that New Labour's 
enthusiasm for community involvement in shaping local service delivery is being 
backed up by a number of policies to engage the community at the local level. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the government's commitment to community 
involvement, however, remain somewhat ambiguous. The government's approach 
has its origins in the partnership between state and civil society identified with the 
'third way' (Giddens, 1998), and authors such as Pimlott ( 1997) and Freed en (1999) 
have documented the influence of communitarian thinking on the Prime Minister. 
This is particularly clear in the desire to recreate a sense of belonging and association 
to combat the rootlessness, individualism and disregard of communal obligations that 
are perceived to have weakened communities. 
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There are a number of reasons why the government is keen to involve local 
communities in tackling deprivation. First, communities bring 'tacit' local knowledge 
to policy debates and programme design which, it is hoped, will result in better 
decision making and improved programme outcomes which are more attuned to local 
needs. Second, involving the local community lends policies and programmes greater 
legitimacy associated with a wider sense of ownership. McArthur (1993), for 
example, points to increased participation as a means of generating a sense of local 
ownership and stewardship, which in turn increases the likelihood of communities 
taking a role in maintaining their neighbourhoods. 
Whatever the motivation for involving the local community, the reality of policies and 
programmes which seek to engage with the community is often less straightforward 
than those policies would suggest. Evidence from previous regeneration initiatives 
and attempts to decentralise local services reveals the constraints on the capacities of 
both communities and service providers to respond in the ways envisaged by 
ministers and their advisers. The literature on policy implementation contains 
numerous examples of the failure of organisations to involve the local community in a 
meaningful way in partnership structures. Furthermore, community aspirations are 
rarely as homogenous as government policy would imply. Policies fail to recognise 
that communities can be deeply fragmented and highly politicised. Community 
representation is also a highly problematic concept for a number of reasons, all of 
which are glossed over by policies which seek to engage the community. First, 
community representatives are rarely representative of the communities on whose 
behalf they claim to speak. They are likely to represent the most powerful groups 
within the community and may be complicit in the suppression of dissent or minority 
views. Second, their engagement with the local state and other 'professional' partners 
is often problematic. Community representatives usually lack the resources of their 
professional counterparts to engage with policy making and implementation, both in 
terms of resources such as time and money and in terms of the necessary skills. 
Although formally recognised within partnership arrangements, it is, therefore, easy 
for community representatives to be sidelined by professional partners (Colenutt and 
Cutten, 1994 in Nevin and Shiner, 1998). 
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The government's approach to community is clearly based on a locality or spatial 
understanding of the concept. This is reflected in the use of the term 'neighbourhood' 
almost interchangeably with community in many policy and programme documents 
(for example the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, 
the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders). This raises a number of questions 
about the appropriateness of a spatial concept of community to deliver the kind of 
outcomes which policy makers envisage. As will be shown below, social change may 
be undermining place-based communities and removing their ability to deliver the 
changes envisaged by the government. It also fails to engage with the criticism of 
previous area based strategies to tackle deprivation. 
Although the government appears to favour the concept of neighbourhood in its 
policy making, Wallace (2001: 2165) - an insider at the Social Exclusion Unit -
makes it clear that policy seeks to draw on something more than people living in the 
same place: "it is essential that neighbourhoods are not seen simply as places, but 
above all as communities". This is a clear indication that government policy sees 
communities and neighbourhoods as the potential basis of political organisation. 
Partnership 
Most commentators agree that partnership approaches now dominate regeneration and 
local economic development policy (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Atkinson, 1999; 
Lawless, 2001), even if Peck and Tickell (1994) observed that many partnerships 
were formed simply to secure competitively allocated funding, whether from the 
government or from Europe. Furthermore, partnership is "a key component of the 
emergent process of governance and one which suffuses the governance culture from 
the very generalised level of national political rhetoric, through to the detailed 
mechanics of policy delivery, and the allocation of funding and responsibility for 
addressing substantive issues at the local level" (Jones and Little, 2000: 171 ). 
Partnership "invokes notions of efficiency, of pulling together and getting things 
done; it implies a meeting of minds, a pooling of resources, maybe even a bearing of 
souls." (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 251 ). Scepticism is justified, however, since "the 
underlying policy analysis or set of assumptions which relates the partnership 
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approach to successful urban regeneration has been barely articulated by the 
government. There is no explanation of why partnership is fundamental." (Hastings, 
1996: 253). This highlights the tension between structure and process that lies at the 
heart of the partnership debate. Whilst "the government demands that certain 
structures involving the public, private and voluntary sectors are set up before it will 
release renewal funds [a]rguably what it actually seeks to tap into, however, are the 
benefits of partnership as a process." (ibid: 253). A common theme in critical 
analyses of regeneration partnerships has been the perhaps unsurprising shortfall 
between the unstated intended outcome of the partnership process and the output of 
poorly conceived partnership structures (for example Raco, 2000 on the Cardiff Bay 
redevelopment, Gibbs et a!, 2001 on the Humber sub-region). 
The nature of regeneration partnerships has changed as the style of regeneration has 
evolved over the last two decades. Initially, partnerships were formed between the 
public and private sectors. "Such partnerships [with the private sector] were 
increasingly seen by hard-pressed councils as a source of expertise, funds and possible 
channels of influence to central government. Indeed, by the late 1980s, demonstrating 
that an effective local partnership had been formed between the public and private 
sectors became a prerequisite for access to funding through programmes like City 
Challenge." (Bassett, 1996: 540). A number of authors have sought to analyse these 
partnerships using a variety of theoretical frameworks, including growth machine 
theory, urban regime theory and policy network analysis (for example, Bassett, 1996; 
Logan and Molotch, 1987; Lauria, 1997), although these have been largely 
unsuccessful once removed from their North American origins (MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). Subsequently, partnerships have evolved to include the local 
community which 1s now a key player in efforts to bring about sustainable 
regeneration (Taylor, 2000). 
Many of the criticisms ofthe partnership approach are based on the differential access 
to power and influence of the partners. For Atkinson (1999), the problem is created 
by the rules of engagement within which the partnership is established and operates. 
These rules of engagement are discursively created through policy documents, 
operating procedures and funding regulations. For example, although the bidding 
guidelines for Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Funding emphasise the need to 
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include representatives of the community m the partnership, the vanous policy 
documents associated with the bidding process, including documents expressly 
addressing how to involve the local community in partnerships (DETR, 1993, 1995 & 
1997 in Atkinson, 1999), construct a discourse which "may also have the effect of 
reinforcing existing relations of domination and control, of legitimating a particular 
re-presentation of reality which defines what is 'reasonable' and the language in 
which demands can be made." (Atkinson, 1999: 70). The result is "a process of 
internalised self-censorship" and reflects the fact that "the discourses through which 
they [those involved in regeneration partnerships] think and express themselves are 
not neutral, that they construct problems, solutions and actions in particular ways that 
are congruent with existing relations of power, domination and the distribution of 
resources." (ibid: 70). In this way, existing institutional actors play a 'gatekeeper' 
role, controlling the access of community actors to the partnership process (Bache, 
2001). These problems are particularly pertinent for excluded communities which 
often lack the social capital to participate effectively in regeneration partnerships 
(Taylor, 2000). 
A critique of 'community' 
The following section provides a critique of the concept of community from the social 
science literature. It begins with a number of definitions of the concept and outlines 
the limitations of these understandings when they are applied to contemporary 
communities. The critique developed below will then be used in subsequent chapters 
to interpret the evidence collected on the role of the community in regeneration policy 
making and implementation in Easington. 
The term 'community' encompasses the broad realm of social arrangements beyond 
the private sphere of the home and family but more familiar than the impersonal 
institutions of wider society (Crow and Allan, 1994). Consequently, community is 
often defined in relation to state and society. The earliest uses of the term community 
were as a normative political ideal based on the institutional arrangements for the 
administration of ancient Greek and medieval European city-states. From the 
seventeenth century, community formed the basis of a critique of the changes in the 
organisation of the state. By the nineteenth century, community had come to be 
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associated with the quest for the perfect society (Delanty, 2003). These changes 
reflect an ambivalence which lies at the heart of the idea of community. On the one 
hand, it expresses locality and particulamess - the domain of immediate social 
relations, the familiar and proximity. On the other hand, it suggests the universal 
community in which all human beings participate. Since the beginning of the modem 
period, writing on community has been structured by a narrative of loss and recovery 
of communal forms of organisation. Notions of community have been dominated by 
a nostalgic and romanticised view of community which is increasingly defined in 
opposition to both state and society. 
One of the most enduring and influential writers on community was Ferdinand 
Tonnies (Delanty, 2003). Tonnies, writing in 1887, contrasted community as living 
and natural, based on a sense of belonging and a system of shared traditions amongst 
its members, with society which was rational and a mental product based on relations 
of exchange. For Tonnies, with the arrival of modernity, society replaced community 
as the primary focus of social relations as the principles of society became 
progressively established in communal life. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, community was understood in 
terms of local social relations. This gave rise to the spatial concept of community 
which has remained dominant ever since. The community studies of the middle 
decades of the twentieth century brought together the cultural conception of 
community developed by social anthropologists, based on shared meaning and 
identity, with sociologists' interest in social organisation, interaction and social 
practices. The result has been the general acceptance of a threefold classification 
which, with slight variations, has been proposed by a number of authors (Willmott, 
1986; Lee and Newby, 1983 both in Crow and Allan, 1994). Without any implied 
hierarchy, this classification ranges from shared residence in a particular place, 
through shared interests to a more emotional shared bond, sometimes referred to as 
commumon. These features of community may be present either individually or in 
combination. This classification is less than satisfactory, since it leads to a 
romanticised view of the community which lends support to the 'loss of community' 
thesis. This has only been possible because of the tendency of researchers to 
"romanticise the community they study, finding and reporting only solidarity and 
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cooperation and ignoring the schism and conflict in social life, highlighting the 
positive, celebrated sides of communities and neglecting their coercive and oppressive 
aspects" (Crow and Allan, 1994: 37). 
Early community studies focused on isolated, rural settlements such as mmmg 
villages and well defined urban areas such as Bethnal Green (Frankenberg, 1969) 
which offered the possibility to study local social relations in their entirety. These 
early studies were subject to increasing criticism as community studies moved on to 
larger settlements and began to be influenced by urban sociology. Stacey (1969), for 
example, working in Reading, observed that "physical proximity does not always lead 
to the establishment of social relations" (Stacey, 1969: 144), and proposed a number 
of factors which were likely to influence the formation of community in an area, 
including the degree of heterogeneity in the local population and the rates of inward 
and outward mobility. Suttles (1972) further undermined the idea that communities 
are natural and that social order and stability emerges automatically, and instead 
proposed that communities are created and require the active involvement of 
individuals and groups in their construction. 
The development of the network approach to the study of social relations in the late 
1970s further undermined the concept of place-based communities. The network 
conception of community stresses relationships and flows of activities, and "does not 
take as its starting point putative solidarities- local or kin." (Wellman, 1979 in Crow 
and Allan, 1994 ). This opens up the opportunity for communities that are no longer 
connected with place, often labelled communities of interest. 
Despite the mounting challenges to the concept of place-based community from the 
work of Stacey and the network theorists which showed that social relations extended 
far beyond the place where a person lives, place-based communities remain pre-
eminent in current work on community, and especially in the conceptual foundations 
of policy making. The 'place based' understanding of community has such a strong 
hold and yet is open to such criticism that "the concept of community no longer refers 
to any useful abstraction" (Stacey, 1969: 134). Rather, community as a concept is 
dead, if it ever existed at all (Bauman, 2001 ). If the concept of community is to be 
useful, we must abandon its romantic, nostalgic attachment to place. The 
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'traditional', place-based community of mutual support and reciprocity has been 
undermined by the changing nature of work and social relations. This form of 
community, which Bauman calls 'ethical community', is rarely, if ever, to be found 
any more. It has been replaced by a temporary, issue-based, transitory community 
which can come together and coalesce around a single issue and then disband as its 
members return to their individual lives. Such 'aesthetic communities' come together 
to oppose developments, campaign for improvements to local services or protest 
about the housing of paedophiles in their midst. They are united by a single issue. 
Such a conception of community has profound implications for government policy. 
Community does not exist as a resource that can be tapped into at will, but as a force 
which is brought to life by particular issues or events and then fades away- probably 
leaving little trace of its existence. 
The concept of community on which government policy is based is clearly highly 
problematic. It is firmly rooted in place even though numerous studies have 
suggested that place is no longer central to the way in which people's social 
relationships are structured. Even the notions of solidarity on which the concept is 
based have been called into question by authors who identify the increasing 
individualisation of society (Bauman, 2001). The governmentality approach, 
however, offers an insight into why the concept remains so useful in government 
policy even when it is apparently so problematic. 
A critique of community from the govern mentality approach 
Nikolas Rose has observed that, in a reversal of Tennies 1887 formulation, "'The 
social' may be giving way to 'the community' as a new territory for the 
administration of individual and collective existence ... [This] is indicative of a 
mutation ... in the ways of thinking and acting that used to be conducted in a 'social' 
language. These new political languages are embodied in the ways in which a whole 
series of issues are problematized - made amenable to authoritative action in terms of 
features of communities and their strengths, cultures, pathologies." (Rose, 1996: 331 ). 
The governmentality approach identifies community as a potential solution to the 
problems of government. This is demonstrated by the use of 'community' since the 
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mid-1960s as a diagram for the reorganisation of publicly provided, bureaucratically 
organised and professionally staffed services, including community care, community 
correction, community policing and much more (Rose, 1999). Community, therefore, 
is "a fertile ground for experimentation in the development of political technologies of 
government: it was a space in which one could observe the hybridisation of political 
power and other non-political forms of authority in a variety of attempts to enframe 
and instrumentalize the forces of individuals and groups in the name of the public 
good." (Burchell, 1991: 144 ). This reflects a deep-seated paradox in the concept of 
community, namely that "On the one hand, [community] appears as a kind of natural, 
extra-political zone of human relations; and this 'natural-ness' is not merely an 
ontological claim but implies affirmation, a positive evaluation. On the other, this 
zone is identified as a crucial element in particular styles of political government, for 
it is on its properties and on activities within it that the success of such political 
aspirations and programmes depend." (Rose, 1999: 167). 
For Rose (1999), the community through which government is to be re-invented is 
community as a moral field binding persons into durable relationships, what Etzioni 
has described as "a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, 
relationships that often criss-cross and reinforce one another. .. and second, a measure 
of commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history 
and identity - in short to a particular culture" (Etzioni, 1997 in Rose, 1999: 172). 
Government through community (Rose, 1999: 176) "does not involve the colonisation 
of a previous space of freedom by control practices; community is actually instituted 
in its contemporary form as a sector of government ... In the institution of community, 
a sector is brought into existence whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, 
deployed in novel programmes and techniques which encourage and harness active 
practices of self-management and identity construction, of personal ethics and 
collective allegiances." Significantly, Rose observes that "[ o ]ver the second half of 
the twentieth century, a whole array of little devices and techniques have been 




This chapter has presented an outline of government regeneration policy in England 
since the 1960s. A number of trends in regeneration policy were identified, and 
particular attention was drawn to the engagement of the community in regeneration. 
Although popular in the 1960s and early 1970s, community engagement fell out of 
fashion during the 1980s when government attention was focussed on property-led 
regeneration, reflecting its neo-liberal understanding of the causes of poverty and 
deprivation. Government policy returned to the community in the 1990s, tentatively 
at first, and, following the election of the New Labour government in 1997, 
community became the central plank of government regeneration policy. 
Community, however, is a highly problematic concept. This chapter has critically 
engaged with the conceptual underpinnings of government regeneration policy. 
Although policy is only weakly grounded in any form of conceptualisation, the use of 
community was shown to be particularly problematic. Community was shown to be a 
highly contested concept, often coloured by a sense of loss and the need to recreate 
former relationships which might never have existed. Evidence was presented which 
suggested that community might no longer exist, particularly in the place-based form 
on which government policy is based. In this context, it should not be surprising that 
government policy does not deliver the anticipated outcomes. 
Finally, community was analysed from the governmentality perspective which gave 
an insight into the government's use of community in regeneration policy. This 
approach, developed in subsequent chapters, shows how the way in which 





Governance and Governmentality 
State restructurfing 
This research engages with contemporary debates on the recomposition and re-scaling 
of sub-national governance in England. This is part of a wider debate on the 
recomposition of political space (Keating, 1997) across Europe in which a number of 
authors have identified trends towards a 'hollowed out' state (Jessop, 1997), multi-
level governance (Marks, 1993) and a 'three-tier system' of regulation (Tommel, 
1997). The approach taken here draws on Jessop's regulation-theoretic approach to 
state restructuring to explore the new geographies of governance which emerge as 
state capacities are reorganised both territorially and functionally. However, whereas 
many analyses of this era focussed on the region as the pre-eminent scale of the re-
structured state, this research examines the implications of denationalisation and 
destatisation for the relationship between central and local government. 
Regulation theoretic accounts of state restructuring stress the socially embedded, 
socially regularised nature of economic activities, organisations and institutions 
(Jessop, 1990). The emergence of regulation theory is closely linked to the crisis in 
Atlantic Fordism and the search for a new social mode of economic regulation 
(Jessop, 1995). A Fordist regime of accumulation, founded upon the virtuous circle 
of mass production and mass consumption and regulated by Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies whereby national growth was redistributed towards social 
welfare and regional policies to help integrate depressed spaces is widely considered 
to have been the hegemonic landscape of Western capitalism between 1945 and the 
early 1970s (Amin, 1994). However, by the late 1960s this Fordist 'institutional fix' 
ran out of regulatory steam and was no longer able to internalise the sharpening 
economic, socio-political and spatial tensions (Peck and Tickell, 1994). The resulting 
institutional meltdown (MacLeod, 1999) was accompanied by a "profound reworking 
of geographical scales" in the regulation of production, money, consumption and 
welfare (Swyngedouw, 1997: 153). 
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The outcome of the crisis of the national Fordist socio-spatial scalar fix has been the 
territorial and functional re-organisation of state capacities in an attempt to secure the 
conditions for continued capital accumulation. Jessop (1997) sees this as leading to 
the continuing movement of state power upwards to supranational regimes, 
downwards to local and regional levels and sideways in the form of trans-local and 
regional linkages. As a result, there no longer appears to be a relatively privileged 
level in and through which other scales are managed (Jessop, 1998). This 
'relativisation of scale' and re-territorialization of state power and institutional 
capacity has serious implications for the ways in which cities and regions are 
governed. 
Jessop identifies a second and equally significant trend in the contemporary 
restructuring of the state, namely the destatisation of the political system. This trend, 
often characterised as a shift from government to governance, is associated with a 
relative decline in the state's direct management and sponsorship of socio-economic 
projects and an analogous engagement of quasi- and non-state actors in a range of 
public-private projects. This shift is examined in detail below. 
The object of enquiry of this thesis is the evolving form of governance of regeneration 
over the past 15 years in the District of Easington. This will be presented as an 
interpreted account in chapters five to eight. Such detailed concrete research is 
essential in order to develop a full understanding of the processes of regulation given 
their constitution through unevenly developed social practices (Painter and Goodwin, 
1995). This will be explored further in chapter four. 
Governance and governmentality are the two broad theoretical literatures within 
which the research on the regeneration of Easington District is set. These two bodies 
of work provide a means of conceptualising power and government and sensitise the 
research to the broad changes which many commentators have described in the 
relationship and balance of power between the levels of government and organisations 
beyond government involved in regeneration. The following chapter explores the two 
literatures which are subsequently critically deployed in shaping research questions 




Governance has become an important concept for narrating and/or analysing the 
contemporary world (Jessop, 1995). It has been used in a wide range of disciplines 
and has been particularly useful in analyses of political economy. The term has also 
gained popularity amongst a wide range of practitioners and politicians although in 
these contexts it is frequently used for rhetorical rather than substantive reasons 
(Stoker, 1998). Despite its popularity, however, governance does not operate at the 
level of causal analysis, nor is it a normative theory of political economic organisation 
(ibid). In contrast to regulation theory, with which governance shares many meta-
theoretical assumptions, governance theories "tend to be more meso-political or more 
generically inter-organisational in scope. Thus they tend to examine specific sectors, 
localities or functional areas rather than more global systems ... governance theory 
tends to remain at the pre-theoretical stage of critique." (Jessop, 1995: 319; emphasis 
in original). Despite these apparent short-comings, the governance perspective has 
much to offer. In particular, new approaches which incorporate Foucauldian writings 
on govemmentality and Jessop's work on meta-governance promise a more refined 
understanding of the re-organisation of the state and its powers. 
Heterarchy and increasing social complexity 
The various approaches to governance share a rejection of the conceptual trinity of 
market-state-civil society. In political economy there has been "growing 
dissatisfaction with a rigid public-private distinction in state-centred analyses of 
politics and its associated top-down account of the exercise of state power." (Jessop, 
1995: 31 0). This has been mirrored by an interest in "various forms of political co-
ordination which not only span the conventional public-private divide, but which also 
involve 'tangled hierarchies', parallel power networks and other forms of complex 
inter-dependence across different tiers of government and/or different functional 
domains." (ibid: 31 0) Interest has been focussed on "the potential contribution of 
these new forms of governance to solving coordination problems in and across a wide 
range of specialised social systems (such as the economy, the legal system, the 
political system, and the health system) and in the lifeworld (or, broadly understood, 
civil society)." (Jessop, 2003: 1). 
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Governance theory arose from a paradigm crisis in the social sciences in which the 
demise of the period of Fordist regulation saw the taken-for-grantedness of national 
states, national economies and national societies as units of analysis increasingly 
challenged by the dialectic of globalisation-regionalisation. Furthermore, 
conventional binaries which had structured much social scientific thinking, such as 
state and civil society, market and plan, became less relevant for understanding the 
organisation of modem society (ibid). In addition, growing social complexity poses 
challenges for both market and hierarchy based systems of co-ordination to which 
governance theory promises some solutions (Jessop, 1999). As Scharpf points out 
"the advantages of hierarchical coordination are lost in a world that is characterised by 
increasingly dense, extended and rapidly changing patterns of reciprocal 
interdependence, and by increasingly frequent, but ephemeral, interactions across all 
types of pre-established boundaries, intra- and interorganisational, intra- and 
intersectoral, intra- and international." (Scharpf, 1994: 3 7). Theories of governance 
were one way in which analysts sought to respond to these changes and understand 
the emergent forms of social organisation. 
The governance approach has been strongly influenced by its close linkages with 
changes in contemporary political organisation to the extent that "Anglo-American 
work on governance ... was largely concerned at first with more substantive problems 
of effective policy making." (Jessop, 1995: 314). Practitioner interest in governance 
stems from its promise, however partial, temporary and provisional, to provide a 
solution to the crisis of state planning in the mixed economy and the failure of 
deregulated neo-liberal market forces (Jessop, 2003). As noted above, governance 
also offers the prospect of securing coordination in the face of growing social 
complexity. 
In substantive terms, the governance approach opens up new terrain for analysis 
between the 'invisible hand' of uncoordinated market exchange based on the formally 
rational pursuit of self-interest by isolated market agents and the 'iron fist' of 
centralised, top-down imperative co-ordination in pursuit of substantive goals 
established from above (Jessop, 2003). Governance, therefore, seeks to examine 
heterarchy as a distinctive form of organisation between the anarchy of the market and 
the hierarchy of the state. Heterarchy offers the possibility to progress beyond 
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description and to offer analytical insight into, if not explanation of, changes in 
contemporary social organisation. There is, however, a danger evident in some 
governance writing that governance theory becomes normative and in doing so 
forecloses the analytic capacity of the approach. The result is what Jessop identifies 
as "an unfortunate celebratory tendency in some recent contributions to debates on 
governance ( eg uncritical accounts of the potential of stakeholding, associational 
democracy, or learning regions)." (Jessop, 1999: 2). Following Goodwin and 
Painter's (1996) work on regulation theory, this dichotomy reflects the analytical and 
substantive elements of governance. Analytically, governance theory can sensitise 
investigations of political organisation to the extension of political influence beyond 
the traditional institutions of local government. This analytical framework can then 
be used to document the substantive elements of a shift from government to 
governance. The analytical and substantive elements of governance theory are 
considered in tum below. 
Modalities of governance 
Jessop provides a succinct description of the central elements of approaches to 
governance. "Governance is defined as the reflexive self-organisation of independent 
actors involved in complex relations of reciprocal interdependence, with such self-
organisation being based on continuing dialogue and resources-sharing to develop 
mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the contradictions and dilemmas 
inevitably involved in such situations." (Jessop, 2003: 1). As this definition implies 
the origins of governance approaches lie in institutional and evolutionary economics. 
This is key, since it is the emphasis in these approaches on the socially embedded and 
socially regulated nature of economic systems which gives the governance approach 
its analytical power. Indeed, the emphasis on the wider social environment and the 
embedding of the economy in the wider nexus of social institutions characteristic of 
these approaches are central to theories of governance. It is also clear that the 
processes of governance represent "a social means of social coordination" (Jessop, 
1995: 317, emphasis added). This is in contrast to the regulation approach which is 
based on social modes of economic coordination (ibid). The distinctive features of 
the governance approach follow from this emphasis on social coordination. 
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Governance theories work with the paradox of organisations, institutions and systems 
which are both operationally autonomous from each other and structurally coupled 
through various forms of reciprocal interdependence (Jessop, 1999). This has led to a 
fruitful vein of theorizing on the modalities of governance, including Scharpfs 
exploration of the usefulness of game-theoretic models for the explanation of real-
world interactions in complex institutional settings (Scharpf, 1994) and Jessop's three 
levels of embedded social organization and their corresponding three distinctive forms 
of governance (Jessop, 1999). Thus, for Jessop, governance can be usefully examined 
at three levels in terms of interpersonal networking and the social embeddedness of 
interpersonal relations, inter-organisational negotiation and the institutional 
embeddedness of inter-organisational relations, and inter-systemic coordination and 
the 'societal' embeddedness of functionally differentiated institutional orders (Jessop, 
1999). These three levels of governance each have their own preconditions and are 
also related in 'tangled hierarchies' (ibid) such that lower levels are constrained by 
higher levels yet simultaneously help to shape them. Kooiman (2003) has written 
extensively on the sociology of the interactions between different societal and 
political actors which constitute governance. 
The role of the state and the shadow of hierarchy 
Perhaps the most valuable contribution to governance debates has been that of Fritz 
Scharpf (1994). Whilst still primarily concerned with the modalities of governance, 
his approach is nevertheless sufficiently sensitive to the objects of governance to 
provide a new and fruitful direction to the governance approach. Scharpfs work on 
structurally embedded self-coordination, for example, has been developed by Jessop 
through his work on meta-governance (eg Jessop, 2003). Having revealed the 
limitations of both hierarchy and heterarchy through the abstract deployment of game 
theory, Scharpf draws on his study of policy-making in the German ministerial 
bureaucracy to argue that "many of the limitations of negotiated coordination will be 
overcome, or at least extended, when negotiations are in fact embedded within 
hierarchical or network structures" (Scharpf, 1994: 3 7). This is significant since it 
brings the state back into theories of governance. There is an unfortunate tendency in 
the literature to consider governance as being coordination beyond the state, 
especially amongst those more descriptive studies which frame themselves around a 
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shift from government to governance. As Jessop notes, governance is not a neutral 
third term in the sequence market-hierarchy-governance (Jessop, 2003). Rather it is 
another meeting ground for the balance between market and state (hierarchy) to be 
contested. 
Scharpfs work, neatly encapsulated in the phrase 'self-coordination in the shadow of 
hierarchy' (Scharpf, 1994: 37), shows the importance ofthe state in governance even 
when it is not an active participant in the processes of self-coordination. This takes 
two forms. First there is the contingent insertion of governance mechanisms into the 
state system. The state is likely to retain control of access to the institutional support 
and resources needed to pursue reflexively arrived at objectives. As government and 
governance mechanisms operate on different temporal and spatial scales, success at 
one scale may depend on what happens at another - an area where the members of the 
heterarchy may have little control (Jessop, 2003). Second, and more significantly, 
"the state will often have defined (or even created) the groups and corporate actors 
whose agreement will be required, and the procedures through which it is to be 
obtained" (Lindberg and Campbell, 1991 in Scharpf, 1994: 41). This is the basis of 
Jessop's theory of meta-heterarchy (Jessop, 2003) and has strong resonance with 
Foucauldian work on governmentality (discussed below). For Jessop, meta-
heterarchy involves "the organisation of the conditions of self-organisation by 
redefining the framework for heterarchy or reflexive self-organisation (Jessop, 2003: 
6). This conceptual framework is deployed by Whitehead in an analysis of the 
governance of the Single Regeneration Budget in the West Midlands in which he 
demonstrates the role of central government in the governance of local regeneration 
(Whitehead, 2003). 
Governance is increasingly seen as a potential solution to both market and state 
failure. This is particularly the case in the context of regeneration where complex 
governance arrangements have been initiated by the state in response to the failure of 
market mechanisms and previous state-managed solutions. Failure, however, is the 
most likely outcome of governance itself (Malpas and Wickham, in Jessop, 2003). 
This is only to be expected, since "failure is a central feature of all social relations: 
'governance is necessarily incomplete and as a necessary consequence must always 
fail."' (ibid: 5). Jessop cites policy cycles and changes of government as evidence of 
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responses to the failure of particular modes of governance. He argues that governance 
success may be limited, partial and localised, and consequently governance needs to 
be approached with requisite irony, implemented with requisite variety and 
undertaken in a reflexive manner if it is to fulfil expectations. 
The analytical framework described above has been widely used to examme a 
purported substantive shift from local government to local governance. Goodwin and 
Painter ( 1996) observed the diminishing power base of local government as spending 
powers and priorities were increasingly transferred to central government. Johnston 
and Pattie (1996: 672) identified a "wide range of other actors, institutional and 
individual, private and voluntary and public sector, which are involved in regulating a 
local economy and society." The shift from government to governance and the 
rupture with previous forms of organisation that this binary implies has not gone 
uncontested, however. Imrie and Raco (1999) argue that there are significant 
continuities between 'new' and 'old' forms of governance. This view was hotly 
contested by Ward (2000). The substantive concerns of governance theory are 
unsurprising given the nature of the majority of empirical work on local governance. 
Perhaps inspired by American work on growth coalitions and growth machines, much 
empirical research in the UK has focused on the economic development of large 
cities. Imrie and Raco (1999), for example, studied Urban Development Corporations 
in Cardiff and Sheffield. Ward (2000) used evidence from the 'contest' between 
Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham to become England's 'second city'. 
Limits to governance 
While these studies contribute to what Stoker identifies as "the value of the 
governance perspective in its capacity to provide a framework for understanding 
changing processes of governing" (Stoker, 1998: 18) they remain overwhelmingly 
institutionally focussed and can, therefore, only provide a partial understanding of the 
changes taking place in the local state and its relation to the national state. An 
alternative theoretical approach is required in order to move beyond this institutional 
impasse and to begin to understand how the substantive changes identified by the 
governance approach are related to changes in state power and the relationship 
between the central and local state. This is provided by the growing body of writing 
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on govemmentality. Jessop (1995) makes a brief reference to the potential of 
Foucauldian writings on the intersection of technologies ofpower and technologies of 
the self to contribute to an understanding of governance. His writings of meta-
heterarchy (Jessop, 2003), along with those of Scharpf (1994) are rich in 
governmental overtones. The following section examines the implications of 
Foucault's rejection of top-down analyses of state power for an understanding of 
central-local state relations and the restructuring of the local state. 
Meta-governance 
For Jessop, the need for structures of meta-governance is based on the inevitable 
failure of all modes of governance - markets, states and heterarchies. Failure is a 
routine and inevitable feature of everyday life, which is inevitably full of contingency 
and surprise. Furthermore, Kooiman (1993) observed that governance needs to be 
dynamic, complex and varied in order to respond to the contingency and complexity 
of social relations. As governance becomes increasingly complex, 'meta-structures' 
of interorganisational coordination become increasingly important. Jessop explores 
these meta-structures through his concept of meta-governance. 
Jessop defines meta-governance as the governance of governance. It involves the 
organisation of the conditions for governance in its broadest sense (Jessop, 2003). 
Jessop identifies four different types of meta-governance broadly corresponding to 
three different types of governance (market, hierarchy and heterarchy) and one over-
arching form of coordination. First, meta-exchange involves the reflexive redesign of 
individual markets and/or the reflexive reordering of relations among two or more 
markets by modifying their operation and articulation. Second, meta-organization 
involves the reflexive redesign of organisations, the creation of intermediating 
organisations, the reordering of inter-organisational relations and the management of 
organisational ecologies. Third, meta-heterarchy involves the organisation of the 
conditions of self-organisation by redefining the framework for heterarchy or 
reflexive self-organisation. Finally, true meta-governance involves re-articulating the 
different modes of governance themselves. 
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Elements of all four aspects of meta-governance are relevant in interpreting the 
changes taking place in East Durham. Whilst meta-exchange might appear to be the 
least relevant to the organisation of inter-organisational arrangements in the District it 
can nevertheless be observed in surprising places. This is particularly the case given 
the infusion of market logics into public services. The changes taking place in the 
management of public sector housing in the District, along with attempts to 
'revitalise' the private housing market are one example of meta-exchange taking 
place. Examples of meta-organisation are more obvious. The creation of the LSP 
itself as an intermediating organisation, along with its plethora of sub-groups and 
associated partnerships, represents an attempt at the reordering of inter-organisational 
relations. The introduction of the LSP could be seen as no less than the "redesign, re-
scaling and adaptation of the state apparatus ... and the manner in which it is 
embedded in the wider political system." (Jessop, 2003: 6). The distinction between 
meta-organisation and meta-heterarchy is difficult to delimit. This distinction is 
perhaps best understood through the insights into advanced liberal rule presented by 
the governmentality approach. Indeed Jessop's description of meta-heterarchy as the 
"organisation of the conditions of self-organisation" has distinctly Foucauldian 
overtones and is reminiscent of Foucault's description of government as "the conduct 
of conduct" (Foucault, 1982). In the case of the LSPs, meta-organisation reflects the 
fact that local authorities effectively had no choice in the decision to introduce the 
new partnership structures, at least in the 88 areas receiving Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund money, whereas meta-heterarchy reflects the structured freedom given to the 
new partnerships to shape their own organisations. This freedom has, nevertheless, 
been circumscribed by the requirements that the new partnerships meet certain criteria 
specified by the government and are subjected to a process of accreditation (see 
Figure 15 below), emphasising the role of the government in organising the conditions 
of self-organisation. Finally, taking a longer-term view, meta-governance has been 
central in shaping approaches to regeneration over the last two decades. This is 
reflected in the change in emphasis between market-led, property driven approaches 
to attempts at regeneration that are pursued through the public sector and, lately, 
through the community (see below). 
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figure 15 Accreditation Criteria for L§Ps 
Accreditation will depend on LSPs demonstrating that they are: 
1. Strategic 
they are effective, representative and capable of playing a key strategic role 
2. Inclusive 
they actively involve all the key players, including the public, private, 
community and voluntary sectors 
3. Action focussed 
they have established genuine common local priorities and targets and agreed 
actions and milestones leading to demonstrable improvements against 
measurable milestones 
4. Performance managed 
members have aligned their performance management systems, criteria and 
processes to that of the LSP 
5. Efficient 
they reduce, not add to, the 'bureaucratic burden' 
6. Learning and developmental 
they build on best practice from successful partnerships by drawing on 
experiences of regional structures and national agencies 
(Source: DETR, 2001: 19) 
Jessop observed that "governments play a major and increasing role in all aspects of 
meta-governance: they get involved in redesigning markets, in constitutional change 
and in the juridical re-regulation of organisational forms and objectives, in organizing 
the conditions for self-organisation and, most importantly, in colliberation." (Jessop, 
2003: 6). With central government playing such a pivotal role, it is reasonable to say 
that governance occurs "in the shadow of hierarchy" (Scharpf, 1994: 41). Jessop 
outlines a number of ways in which the centre fulfils its role in the process of meta-
governance. These include "providing the ground rules for governance and the 
regulatory order in and through which governance partners can pursue their aims; they 
ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and 
regimes; they act as the primary organizer of the dialogue among policy communities; 
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they deploy a relative monopoly of organisational intelligence and information with 
which to shape cognitive expectations; they serve as a 'court of appeal' for disputes 
arising within and over governance; they seek to re-balance power differentials by 
strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or 
social cohesion; they try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic 
capacities and interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic 
contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics." 
(Jessop, 2003: 6) Of all the tactics of meta-governance deployed by the centre, the 
last is the most interesting since it challenges current conceptions of government. It is 
based on new ways of thinking about government and power which extend beyond the 
state. In particular, it uses Foucault's distinctive conceptualisation of power as 
something positive and technical, rather than more traditional definitions which see 
power as negative and juridical (Foucault, 1982). A renewed understanding of power 
as taking these forms is central to understanding the role of the contemporary state. 
This is explored below through the concept of governmentality. 
Governmerntality 
Governmentality has become an increasingly popular theme in work which has 
engaged with the operation and restructuring of the state (eg MacKinnon, 2000, 2003; 
Painter, 2002; Raco, 2003). In addition, there is a wide body of literature in the social 
sciences which has deployed the governmentality approach to develop a distinctive 
understanding of government (eg Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1996, 1999, 2000; Rose 
& Miller, 1992). Whilst this work can be characterised as sharing a broadly similar 
approach to the diverse range of problems with which it has engaged, it does not 
constitute a 'Foucauldian' stance (Dean, 1999). There is no Foucauldian 
governmental theory of the state. Rather, governmentality is a distinctive method for 
the study of power and government. Unlike work on governance, the governmentality 
approach is not a sociology of rule. It is not concerned with the actual relations of 
authority and domination existing between different groups or levels of government 
(Dean, 1999). The govemrnentality approach addresses questions of how we think 
about governing. In the sense in which the term was used by Foucault, 
governmentality refers to the "deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices employed 
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by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to 
ensure good and avert ill." (Rose, 1996: 328). These themes will be developed below. 
Foucault developed the concept of governmentality in a series of lectures delivered at 
the College de France in 1977- 8 (Foucault, 1991). The concept reflects Foucault's 
desire to "cut off the king's head in political theory" and to develop a political 
philosophy that is not erected around the problems of sovereignty, nor therefore 
around problems of law and prohibition (Foucault, 1980, cited in Rabinow, ed, 1984). 
The approach, therefore, has provided a valuable starting point to develop new 
conceptualisations of power and rule (Dean, 1999) and for reframing political thought 
(Rose, 1999) which have profound implications for our understanding of the 
restructuring of the state. It is worth reiterating, however, that work on 
governmentality inspired by Foucault's writings shares a distinctive method rather 
than developing a coherent theory of the state. This method is characterised by its 
empirical approach to the subjects of study (Rose, 1999). Indeed, Rose argues that the 
concepts of governmentality are "more important for what they do than what they 
mean. Their value lies in the way in which they are able to provide a purchase for 
critical thought upon particular problems in the present." (ibid: 9). 
The concept of governmentality is based on Foucault's distinctive work on the science 
of police which developed in various parts of Europe from the seventeenth century. 
The defining feature of his work was the centrality of thought and knowledge in 
informing the activity of governing. Foucault examined the ways in which 
knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation and rationalities were 
transformed through thought and subsequently operationalised by governments in 
order to govern. Through his genealogical research, he showed how the practices of 
government, shaped by thought and deliberation, ultimately gave rise to particular 
forms of truth. The term 'governmentality' which Foucault used to describe these 
processes reflects the fusion of' government' and 'mentality' (Dean, 1999: 16). 
Foucault's understanding of government is central to his concept of govemmentality. 
Foucault described government as "the conduct of conduct" (Foucault, 1982 in Dean, 
1999: 1 0). It is the attempt to shape human conduct for specific ends based on a 
particular rationality. This could, of course, take many different forms. Liberal 
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modes of government are distinguished by trying to work through the freedom or 
capacities of the governed. Liberal ways of governing thus often conceive the 
freedom of the governed as a technical means of securing the ends of government 
(Dean, 1999). Government, therefore, requires the deployment of knowledge and 
expertise to structure the field of possible action. Studies of governmentality are 
interested in thought as it is embedded within programmes for the direction and 
reform of conduct, as it becomes linked to and is embodied in technical means for the 
shaping and reshaping of conduct in practices and institutions. To analyse mentalities 
of government is to analyse thought made practical and technical (ibid). An analytics 
of government assumes that discourses on government are an integral part of the 
workings of government rather than simply a means of its legitimation and that 
government is accomplished through multiple actors and agencies rather than a 
centralised set of state apparatuses. Regimes of practices, the organised practices 
through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves, give rise to 
and are informed and reshaped by various forms of knowledge and expertise, such as 
medicine, criminology, social work, therapy, pedagogy and so on. Such forms of 
knowledge define the objects of such practices (the criminal, the unemployed, the 
mentally ill etc), codify appropriate ways of dealing with them, set the aims and 
objectives of practice, and define the professional and institutional locus of 
authoritative agents of expertise (ibid). Regimes of practices are associated with 
programmes of government - deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought 
that endeavour to transform those practices in order to achieve the ends of 
government. Studies of governmentality seek to understand how the processes of 
thought involved in the operation of government interact with, shape and deploy 
regimes of practices. This reflects Foucault's concern with the overvaluation of the 
notion of the state in modem politics. He suggested that the state possesses neither 
the unity nor the functionality ascribed to it, rather the state is but a 'composite 
reality' and a 'mythicized abstraction'. For Foucault, "perhaps what is important is 
not the etatisation (state domination) of society, but the governmentalisation of the 
state" (Foucault, 1991: 1 03). 
The governmentality approach is concerned with the technical aspects of government 
- the means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies 
and vocabularies by which authority is constituted and rule accomplished. These 
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technologies of government seek to translate thought into the domain of reality and 
establish devices for acting upon the world. 'Knowing' an object in such a way that it 
can be governed is more than a purely speculative activity: it requires the invention of 
procedures of notation, ways of collecting and presenting statistics, the transportation 
of these to centres where calculations and judgements can be made and so forth. It is 
through such procedures of inscription that the domains of 'governmentality' are 
made up, that objects such as the economy, the enterprise, the social field and the 
family are rendered in a particular conceptual form and made amenable to 
intervention and regulation (Miller and Rose, 1990). Furthermore language is an 
intellectual technology - it provides a mechanism for rendering reality amenable to 
certain kinds of action. Describing a world such that it is amenable to having certain 
things done to it involves inscribing reality into the calculations of government 
through a range of material and rather mundane techniques. The events and 
phenomena to which government is to be applied must be rendered into information -
written reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, charts, graphs, statistics. This 
information must be of a particular form - stable, mobile, combinable and 
comparable. This enables pertinent features of the domain to be literally re-presented 
in the place where decisions are to be made about them (ibid). Information in this 
sense is not the outcome of a neutral recording function. It is itself a way of acting 
upon the real, a way of devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make 
the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention (ibid). 
The links with work on governance are clear when we consider another aspect of 
governmentality - the mechanisms which link the conduct of individuals and 
organisations to political action. In advanced liberal democracies, indirect 
mechanisms of rule, or what can be termed, after Latour (1987), "government at a 
distance", are particularly important. The self-regulating capacities of subjects, 
shaped and normalized in large part through the powers of expertise, have become 
key resources for modem forms of government (Miller and Rose, 1990). The process 
of government becomes one of trying to shape, sculpt, mobilise and work through the 
choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups 
(Dean, 1999). Government is an activity that shapes the field of action and therefore 
attempts to shape (but does not constitute) freedom (ibid). The links with Jessop's 
concept of 'meta-heterarchy' and Scharpfs 'shadow of hierarchy' are clear and 
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should provide evidence to further understandings of both governance and 
governmentality debates. 
A wide range of work has been undertaken in the field of political economy using the 
governmentality approach. One of the most significant contributions was that by 
Rose (1996) on community. Rose argued that "the social, as a plane of thought and 
action, has been central to political thought and political programmes since the mid-
nineteenth century [and]... that while themes of society and concerns with social 
cohesion and social justice are still significant in political argument, the social is no 
longer a key zone, target and objective of strategies of government ... 'The social' 
may be giving way to 'the community' as a new territory for the administration of 
individual and collective existence ... [This] is indicative of a mutation ... in the ways 
of thinking and acting that used to be conducted in a 'social' language. These new 
political languages are embodied in the ways in which a whole series of issues are 
problematized - made amenable to authoritative action in terms of features of 
communities and their strengths, cultures, pathologies." (Rose, 1996: 327). This 
shows the centrality of thought in the processes of government. Rose goes on to 
demonstrate how a whole range of problems which were previously conceptualised in 
terms of 'the social' are now understood in terms of community. Community 
becomes governmental when it is made technical (Rose, 1996), and the implications 
of this can be seen in a whole range of programmes from welfare to urban 
regeneration. 
MacKinnon (2000, 2002) has also used the governmentality approach to study local 
economic governance in Scotland. He demonstrated how governmental technologies, 
including budgetary management, audit and targeting, are instrumental in giving the 
central state the capacity to shape local institutional practice (MacKinnon, 2000). He 
also investigated the way in which community action and local involvement in 
economic governance is mediated by local and regional agencies as a result of the 
tensions created by centrally imposed managerial technologies, such as targeting and 
financial controls, designed to ensure that local agencies are accountable to (central) 
government (MacKinnon, 2002). Raco (2003) used the governmentality approach to 
study Scottish devolution and the ways in which the government sought to mobilize 
expertise and knowledge in the form of the business community in support of its 
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devolution objectives, and also the way in which elements of the business community 
used similar processes to shape the government's agenda. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has engaged with debates on governance, meta-governance and 
governmentality. It has presented an outline of the work which has been undertaken 
from these perspectives in the areas of economic development and regeneration. This 
final section sets out the approach to governance used in the remainder of this thesis 
to interpret the regeneration of the former East Durham coalfield. Then it sets out the 
way in which the governmentality approach adds to the analysis and extends earlier 
work on governance. 
Governance was shown to be a broad term encompassing many different forms of 
inter-organisational interaction. Indeed some authors have questioned the continuing 
usefulness of the term given the wide range of circumstances in which it has been 
deployed. The approach taken here follows Jessop (2003) by adopting a relatively 
narrow definition of governance which focuses attention on how governance 
arrangements differ from more traditional forms of organisation which could be 
characterised as government. Governance, then, is taken to be "the reflexive self-
organization of independent actors involved in complex relations of reciprocal 
interdependence, with such self-organisation being based on continuing dialogue and 
resource-sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the 
contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations." (Jessop, 2003: 1) 
This approach has a number of benefits. First, its emphasis on reflexivity in inter-
organisational relationships allows us to distinguish between partnership 
arrangements which have been imposed from above or adopted for pragmatic grant-
related reasons and remain shallow or purely edifice and inter-organisational 
relationships which are deeper and involve some degree of change in the 
organisations involved. Secondly, the notion of continuing dialogue and managing 
contradictions stresses the long-term nature of the relationships of governance and 
again allows us to distinguish governance from temporary forms of collaboration 
around isolated projects (see chapter eight). 
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Metagovernance is an equally important concept for interpreting the changes taking 
place in East Durham. Metagovernance approaches acknowledge that the central state 
plays an important role in local governance. The central state's role in 
metagovernance stems from the inevitable failure of all modes of social and economic 
coordination - state, market and hierarchy - and the need for meta-structures of 
interorganisational coordination in order to secure the conditions for continued 
governance in its broadest sense. The state fulfils this role in a number of ways, for 
example by defining (or creating) the groups which participate in local governance 
and the structures through which they interact and, more fundamentally, through "the 
organisation of the conditions of self-organisation" (Jessop, 2003: 6) The 
govemmentality approach was used to develop these ideas. 
The govemmentality approach offers new ways of thinking about power which 
provide insights into the role of the central state in local governance. Combining 
Foucault's oft-cited understanding of government as 'the conduct of conduct' and his 
rejection of top-down, negative, juridical concepts of power in favour of an approach 
which sees power as something positive and technical (Foucault, 1982 in Dean, 1999), 
the govemmentality approach allows an investigation of how the central state 
influences local governance. In particular, the govemmentality approach provides a 
de-centralised understanding of power which allows us to identify the ways in which 
the state engages in local governance through its attempts to "try to modify the self-
understanding of identities, strategic capacities and interests of individual and 
collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for 
preferred strategies and tactics." (Jessop, 2003: 6). The govemmentality approach, 
therefore, provides the tools to uncover the role of the central state in local 
governance, even when it is not formally engaged in local governance arrangements. 
In doing so, the govemmentality approach furthers our understating of the role of the 
state by drawing attention to the tactics, techniques and practices by which it is able to 






This chapter presents the methodology which informed the formulation of the 
research questions, the undertaking of the research and the analysis of the evidence 
gathered. The research was undertaken in the broad framework of critical realism 
(Sayer, 1992, 2000). Following Sayer (1992) the chapter begins with an outline of the 
central ontological and epistemological claims of critical realism and their 
implications for the conceptualisation and theorisation of the objects of the research. 
The chapter then addresses the critical realist approach to method in social research, 
and in particular the relationship between concrete and abstract research. This 
provides the basis to further develop the research questions introduced in chapter one, 
and to explore the implications of the CASE context of this particular research 
project. Finally the chapter presents the research methods used to collect and analyse 
the evidence which formed part of the empirical stages ofthe project. 
Critical Realism 
The methodology used for the research is one of critical realism (Sayer, 1992, 2000). 
This approach was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the model of causation and mode 
of explanation characteristic of realism was considered particularly appropriate for the 
objects of the research. Secondly, the distinction between concrete and abstract 
research and the potential for subsequent recombination of these two elements in the 
development of understanding was considered particularly appropriate given the 
nature of the research questions and the CASE context of the project. 
Ontology and epistemology 
Critical realism's foundational ontological tenet concerns the independence of the 
world from our thoughts about it. This distinguishes critical realism from empirical 
realism, or empiricism, which identifies the real with the empirical. An important 
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implication of this is that critical realist knowledge is fallible. Furthermore, 
knowledge is unavoidably conceptually-mediated and theory-laden since it is 
embedded in social practices. 
In addition to distinguishing between the world and our experience of it, critical 
realism also distinguishes between the real, the actual and the empirical. As will be 
shown below, this is central to the critical realist approach to the conceptualisation of 
objects. The real refers to whatever actually exists, regardless of whether it is an 
empirical object for us, or whether we have an adequate understanding of its nature. 
The real is the realm of objects, their structures and powers. Much critical realist 
conceptualisation involves attempts to identify the structures and causal powers of the 
objects identified in the research. Implicit in this is that there is both necessity and 
possibility, or potential, in the world - things which must happen and things which 
could happen given the nature of the objects involved. The actual refers to what 
happens when the powers of objects are activated. The empirical is the domain of 
experience and may refer to either the real or the actual. The relationship between the 
empirical and the real or the actual can be based on either the criteria of observability 
(the ability to observe directly that which exists) or causality (observable effects 
which can only be explained as the products of unobservable entities (Collier, 1994 in 
Sayer 2000)). Critical realism, therefore, has a stratified ontology. The nature of the 
objects present at a given time constrains and enables what could happen but does not 
pre-determine what will happen. The powers of objects in the real may be activated 
in the production of the actual, or they may remain dormant. In addition, critical 
realism argues that the world is characterised by emergence - the conjunction of two 
or more features of objects gives rise to phenomena which have properties which are 
irreducible to those of their constituents, even though the latter are necessary for their 
existence. 
Causation 
Critical realism is not a nomothetic approach to social science. Causation is not 
understood on the model of regular and repeated successions of events. What causes 
something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times it has been observed 
to happen before. Explanation depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms and 
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how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what 
conditions. The critical realist model of causation is based on the world having 
ontological depth: events arise from the workings of mechanisms which derive from 
the structures of objects, and they take place within geo-historical contexts. 
Context plays a significant role in the critical realist view of causation. The same 
mechanism can produce different outcomes according to the context in which it 
operates. Context refers to the spatio-temporal relations of an object with other 
objects which have their own causal powers and liabilities and which may trigger, 
block or modify its action. Explanation must, therefore, take account of contingent 
necessity- the interaction of two objects which are contingently related. 
Finally, it is necessary to note the interpretive or hermeneutic dimension of critical 
realism. Critical realism acknowledges that social phenomena are intrinsically 
meaningful, and that meaning is constitutive of phenomena and not simply externally 
descriptive of them. Interpretive understanding, therefore, is central to critical realism 
since meaning must be understood and cannot be measured or counted. Social 
science operates in a double hermeneutic in which the researcher must enter the 
hermeneutic circle of the researched. The distinguishing features of a critical realist 
approach to these issues are the ability of 'reasons' or understanding to act as causes 
(to have causal powers), the acknowledgement that communicative interaction is 
grounded in material settings and that social life also has a non-discursive dimension. 
Critical realist method 
Abstraction and structural analysis 
The model of causation which characterises the realist approach views objects and 
social relations as having causal powers which may or may not produce regularities, 
and can be explained independently of them. In order to be practically-adequate, 
knowledge must grasp these differentiations in the world. It is necessary to 
individuate objects, and to characterise their attributes and relationships. Abstraction 
is the process of excluding those conditions which have no significant effect and 
focusing on those which do. Even when we are interested in wholes, we must abstract 
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their constituents in order to understand how they operate and interact. The emphasis, 
therefore, is on the qualitative nature of social objects and relations on which causal 
mechanisms depend. 
Concrete and abstract research 
Concrete research "studies actual events and objects as 'unities of diverse 
determinations"' (ibid: 88). Abstract theoretical research, on the other hand, "deals 
with the constitution and possible ways of acting of social objects, and actual events 
are only dealt with as possible outcomes." (ibid: 87). The relationship between 
concrete and abstract research is central to critical realist research methods. 
Understanding concrete objects involves a double movement - from concrete to 
abstract and back to concrete (ibid). The first stage involves intensive, in contrast to 
extensive, concrete research to identify the mechanisms, structures, events and objects 
which are significant for explanation. This is followed by a process of abstraction 
which isolates in thought a one-sided or partial aspect of an object for further analysis. 
This generates understanding of the object which can in tum be deployed to enhance 
understanding of the concrete. It is important to note that the distinction between 
concrete and abstract is not the same as that between empirical and theoretical. 
Whereas abstraction is a means of dividing the world into more manageable units for 
study, theory refers to a way of conceptualising the world. Theory, therefore, forms a 
central element ofboth the concrete and the abstract elements of research. 
Causation and causal analysis 
Causation concerns the explanation of what it is about an object which enables it to 
produce a particular change or effect. In the critical realist view, objects or relations 
have causal powers or liabilities. It is these ways of acting or 'mechanisms' which are 
implied by causation. Such mechanisms can exist whether or not they are being 
exercised. Causation, therefore, does not concern the relationship between two 
separate events, rather what an object is like and what it can do and only derivatively 
what it will do in any particular situation. Mechanisms exist in virtue of their object's 
nature- the nature of an object and its causal powers are internally related. In seeking 
explanation, therefore, critical realists attempt to understand what it is about an object 
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which enables it to produce a particular effect or change. Again, context is crucially 
important since whether a causal power or liability is actually activated on any 
occasion depends on conditions whose presence and configuration are contingent. 
Furthermore, when they are exercised, the actual effects of causal mechanisms will 
again depend on the conditions in which they work. In summary, the relationship 
between causal powers or mechanisms and their effects is not fixed but contingent. In 
addition, processes of change usually involve several causal mechanisms which may 
be only contingently related to one another. The effect of causal mechanisms is often 
unclear from empirical events, and the discovery of causal mechanisms often requires 
considerable effort (see below). 
Explanation takes two forms. Firstly, explanation can proceed by a process of causal 
disaggregation whereby "events are causally explained by retroducing and confirming 
the existence of mechanisms, and in tum the existence of mechanisms is explained by 
reference to the structure and constitution of the objects which possess them." (Sayer, 
1992: 236). It is important to note that this does not exclude the possibility of events 
being co-determined by several distinct causes. Secondly, where an event is the result 
of emergent powers arising from the combination of objects but irreducible to their 
respective powers, causal disaggregation will not work. In these circumstances 
explanation occurs through a process of description of the causes and enabling 
conditions which produce actions and may include reference to abstract theory where 
certain actions are relatively well understood (ibid). Indeed the role of abstract theory 
and its relationship to concrete research is particularly important for developing 
understanding. 
Complexity Theory 
Critical realism provides the conceptual and methodological tools to engage with 
recent debates in sociology on complexity theory ( eg Byrne, 1998). Indeed 
complexity has "ontological and epistemological implications which make it 
essentially part of the realist programme of scientific understanding and enquiry." 
(ibid: 7). Critical realism's treatment of emergent properties and its sensitivity to 
context in particular have strong resonance with complexity theory's observation that 
"relationships between variables can be non-linear with abrupt switches, so the same 
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'cause' can produce qualitatively different kinds of effect in specific circumstances." 
(Law and Urry, 2004: 401). Complexity theory makes two assumptions: first, that 
there is no necessary proportionality between 'causes' and 'effects', and second, that 
system effects do not result from the simple addition of individual components (ibid). 
One consequence of this is that it is not possible to know in advance what the 
outcome of actions will be. These observations seem to be particularly relevant for 
the policy-related objects of this research project since they provide a framework for 
investigating the interaction of the hermeneutic circles of policy makers and those 
charged with implementing policy (which may or may not overlap) and the material 
circumstances in which the policy is implemented which in tum may differ from the 
circumstances envisaged by policy makers. The policy process rarely makes any 
concessions to social complexity and complexity theory can, therefore, provide an 
insight into the reasons for the failure of policy to achieve its intended outcomes. 
The ontological and epistemological similarities between critical realism and 
complexity theory make a detailed explanation of complexity theory unnecessary 
here. The main point that I wish to draw from complexity theory is that the social 
domain is characterized by complexity and this reinforces the value of the critical 
realist approach in developing understanding of social phenomena. 
The research questions 
The main research questions were outlined at the end of chapter one. This section 
specifies how the methodology of critical realism discussed above was used to 
develop the research questions and shape the empirical work on which the thesis is 
based. The primary research questions, which relate to the persistence of socio-
economic deprivation within the district, arise directly from the interests and practices 
of the District Council. These form the basis of the concrete elements of the research. 
In order to develop a better understanding of the issues raised in the concrete research 
questions, they are subsequently developed through the process of abstraction into a 
series of abstract research questions. This process is set out below. 
In order to address the Council's question as to why deprivation remains so intense 
despite the regeneration efforts of the last 15 years two further concrete research 
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questions were developed. First, do the organisations engaged in the regeneration of 
the District share an understanding of the problems faced by the District, and does 
their understanding enable them to develop practicable regeneration strategies? This 
in turn raises questions about the way in which the District's problems are identified 
and measured and about the conceptualisations of those problems which underpin the 
approach of policy makers at a range of different scales from local and regional to 
national and supranational. This question, therefore, lays the foundations for further 
concrete and abstract research questions by identifying the organisations and 
relationships which are significant and beginning to identify their causal powers and 
the mechanisms through which they may operate. The second concrete research 
question examines the strategies developed by a number of organisations to tackle 
deprivation in the District and asks whether they have the potential to have a 
significant impact on the District's problems. Note here that the emphasis is on the 
potential of regeneration strategies to tackle the District's problems. This is for two 
reasons. The first stems from the critical realist belief that objects can have potential 
regardless of whether or not this is activated and it should, therefore, be possible to 
investigate the extent of this potential independently of its activation. Secondly it 
allows the separate investigation of the conditions of implementation and the 
identification of factors and mechanisms which influence the delivery of regeneration 
strategy. 
These concrete research questions are further developed through a number of abstract 
research questions which, in true critical realist fashion, isolate in thought a one-sided 
element of the concrete phenomena under investigation. The first abstract research 
question relates to the role of partnerships in securing regeneration in the District. 
This research question engages with debates on governance and the changing role of 
the state and seeks to identify the role of the different scales of state intervention in 
tackling deprivation. The second abstract research question investigates the role of 
the concept of community in regeneration and in the way in which technologies of 
government in general reflect the way in which the state thinks about the activity of 
governing. This research question draws on the governmentality debate. 
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Alll JE§RC CA§JE Research lP'mject 
This project was undertaken in the context of the Economic and Social Research 
Council's CASE programme for collaborative research (Bell and Read, 1998). As 
outlined in chapter one, the collaborating partner was the District of Easington 
Council. The council's engagement stems from a longstanding relationship with the 
Geography Department at Durham University and a convergence of interests between 
key policy makers at the District Council charged with the social and economic 
regeneration of the District and academic researchers in the Geography Department. 
In line with the ESRC's guidelines, the District Council were involved in designing 
the original research proposal and on an ongoing basis throughout the research project 
in the capacity of an associate supervisor. The District Council also contributed 
financially to the project. The CASE context has significant implications for the 
design and undertaking of the research, and these are considered below. 
The District Council played a central role in specifying the original research questions 
for the project. The Council's interests were largely policy related and addressed 
mainly concrete issues. All of the research questions stemmed from the Council's 
desire to understand why problems of deprivation remained so acute despite the 
considerable regeneration activity that had been undertaken in the District over the 
last 15 years. The methodology of critical realism presented above allowed a research 
project to be designed which addressed both the concrete interests of the Council and 
also some more abstract research questions which relate to debates in contemporary 
social science. Although the Council was central in shaping the initial project it has 
subsequently taken a 'back seat' role and allowed the project to develop without 
significant direction from its designated supervisor. In part this reflects changes in 
personnel as the individual responsible for setting up the project left the Council 
before the research began. The Council has, nevertheless, continued to fully support 
the project and has remained cooperative and helpful throughout. 
One of the most beneficial aspects of the CASE context of the project has been the 
access to key informants, documents and meetings provided by the formal 
relationship with the District Council. Because the Council is internal to the research 
project it has not been necessary to negotiate access to these sources from scratch. 
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However, such a close relationship with the Council can prove to be a mixed blessing 
as Macmillan and Scott (2003) describe, particularly when it comes to engaging with 
individuals and organisations who are sceptical of, or even hostile towards, the 
Council. The nature of the access provided by the CASE collaborator also raises 
ethical questions about the relationship between researcher and researched, and these 
are addressed below. 
Methods 
Semi-structured interviews 
The majority of the evidence collected to address both empirical and theoretical 
questions was obtained through semi-structured interviews with a range of 
practitioners and politicians operating within the District and beyond. A list of 
interviewees is included in appendix B. The model of the corporate interview 
proposed by Schoenberger (1991) is particularly useful in this context, since it is 
"more sensitive than other survey methods to historical, institutional and strategic 
complexity ... [and] is particularly appropriate in periods of economic and social 
change that challenge traditional analytical categories and theoretical principles." 
(Schoenberger, 1991: 180). Whilst there are obvious differences between a District 
Council and the type of corporation which formed the focus of Schoenberger's 
research, the corporate model is nevertheless appropriate for the investigation of the 
District of Easington Council. The corporate, semi-structured interview was a central 
part of my data collection since "the evidence it yields is the testimony of participants 
in complex, on-going processes whose material effects, but not necessarily the 
rationales underlying them, are captured in statistical data." (ibid: 181 ). Qualitative 
techniques are, therefore, the only way to access information which will help to 
understand the why questions behind the process which can be observed to be 
operating in the District and those which have shaped the District in the past. A 
further advantage of the corporate semi-structured interview is that it "recognises that 
firms [or organisations more generally] are embedded in a complex network of 
internal and external relationships. They are populated by individuals faced with a 
myriad of constraints and possibilities which are difficult. .. to disentangle." (ibid: 
181 ). This was invaluable for the investigation of some of the more theoretical issues 
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addressed by the research, in particular those Issues surrounding debates over 
governance and govemmentality. 
Questions exist about the validity and reliability of information obtained through 
semi-structured interviews. Concerns over the reliability of the information gathered 
stem from the scientific tradition in which the replicability of information by others is 
of key importance. The validity of the information produced concerns the extent to 
which it conforms to the 'true' reality. To a certain extent, the issue of reliability is 
not a problem in the District of Easington, since there are relatively few individuals 
involved who might 'contradict' one another. But this is to miss the point of the 
research. A central concern is to uncover the extent to which individuals in different 
organisations hold similar or competing interpretations of events, concepts, roles and 
responsibilities. Concerns over the validity and reliability of the data obtained from 
qualitative semi-structured interviews will be addressed by the rigorous techniques 
used in the interviews. The goal of the semi-structured interviews is a "collaborative 
dialogue that engages the respondent in working through the research problem" (ibid: 
182). In this way, rather than simply proceeding mechanically through a series of 
question-answer pairs, the interviews will produce "a richness of detail and historical 
complexity ... [which] allows one to reconstruct a coherent representation of how and 
why particular phenomena came to be" (ibid: 182). They also produce a detailed 
understanding of the ways in which policies, problems and concepts are understood 
and operationalised by different actors. 
A key advantage of semi-structured interviews is the opportunity they afford to 
investigate the meanings that interviewees attach to the questions asked and their 
responses. Whilst this is useful at the level of whether interviewees consider that 
particular questions are pertinent to the problems under discussion, or indeed whether 
the most significant problems have been identified, it offers more significant 
advantages. Central to my research questions is the problematization of a number of 
key terms and concepts which are often used uncritically in lay and academic 
discourses. The way in which terms such as 'community', 'regeneration' and 
'partnership' are used by different individuals and organisations and the meanings that 
they attach to these terms is of central importance in addressing both the theoretical 
and applied research questions. A san1ple interview schedule is included in appendix 
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C. Interview schedules were written for each interviewee to reflect their particular 
experience and interests. 
Documentary research 
Documentary research also played a major role in gathering evidence to address the 
research questions. Documentary research and the semi-structured interviews are 
seen as complimentary research tools and not as a crude means of 'triangulation'. 
Indeed such a concept of triangulation suggests an empirical realism (Winchester, 
1999 in Crang 2002) which is at odds with the critical realist approach outlined above. 
Documentary research will, therefore, fulfil two roles. First, documents are an 
important source of evidence in their own right. Documents record decisions that are 
taken, set out understandings of problems to be tackled and give details of the 
regulatory framework within which organisations operate, to name just a few 
examples. Secondly, document analysis played an important part in my preparation 
for the semi-structured interviews. As outlined above, the interviews offered the 
opportunity to explore the context in which documents were produced, the ways in 
which they were interpreted and their role in shaping the actions of organisations. 
Furthermore, Schoenberger points out that for the semi-structured corporate interview, 
"The most important interview strategy for minimizing the problems described is to 
be well informed about the firm and the business before the interview. . . Good 
preparation is also likely to make the interview interesting to the respondent, perhaps 
the key to a productive interview." (Schoenberger, 1991: 187). 
The documents used in this research fall into three broad categories. Firstly there are 
a number of published documents, including county and district regeneration 
strategies, the Task Force's Programmes for Action, central government policy 
guidance and legislation, which form the context in which organisations are working. 
These were a significant source of information in themselves, but also formed the 
basis of interviews to investigate how they are interpreted, how they shape action and 
the priorities they embody. Secondly, all council meetings, Local Strategic 
Partnership and County Strategic Partnership meetings and the meetings of their sub-
groups are minuted. Comparison of the official minutes and my own notes from 
meetings that I have attended show the District Council's minutes to be an accurate, if 
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somewhat brief, record of the discussions which took place. In addition, minutes 
produced by the District Council contain a wide range supporting documents, reports 
and correspondence, making them a valuable research resource. Minutes, therefore, 
contain a wealth of primary evidence and are also useful as a source of questions for 
semi-structured interviews where they raise significant issues which need further 
exploration. The final type of documentary evidence to which I have had access is 
correspondence and internal memos produced by the District and County councils. It 
is unlikely that much of this primary material could be used ethically as empirical 
evidence, but it nevertheless represents an invaluable insight into the processes and 
attitudes which lie behind significant events and policies. Correspondence has been 
used, therefore, to direct questions in the semi-structured interviews thereby allowing 
interviewees the opportunity to decide whether they wished to discuss the issues 
raised and to allow them the opportunity to respond to the points made. 
(Participant) observation 
The final method of evidence gathering used in this research is (participant) 
observation. This has been closely linked to the collaborative CASE context of the 
research. (Participant) observation has been used on two levels throughout the 
project. First, I spent approximately one day each week working from the offices of 
the District of Easington Council during the first 24 months of the project and less 
frequently during the final 12 months. Whilst at the Council I worked on a 
combination of my own research project and small projects for the council's staff. 
This involved me working amongst the staff in the Economic Development 
Directorate in an open-plan office. Working with the council's staff gave me access 
to their library which contained a substantial grey literature. It also gave me the 
opportunity to interact with the council's officers and to share their experience of the 
day-to-day business of regeneration in the District. Through working alongside the 
council's regeneration staff I gained invaluable insight into the pressures, and 
frustrations, they face in balancing the often competing demands of the wide range of 
organisations and individuals with which their work engages. In addition, the long-
term nature of my presence in their office went some way to dispelling the initial 
novelty of having a 'researcher' in their midst, and once I eventually became 
relatively inconspicuous I was able to gain an insight into the more mundane, 
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everyday operation of the team. This offered considerable advantages in terms of 
addressing the research questions, since, like most professionals, the council's officers 
were initially keen to present a positive image of the high-points and successes of 
their work. 
The second level on which I gathered evidence as a (participant) observer was through 
attendance at a range of meetings. These included meetings ofthe East Durham Local 
Strategic Partnership, the LSP's Chairs' Group, the SRB and European Funding 
Partnership, the County Durham Economic Partnership and the County Durham 
Strategic Partnership Officers' Group. Access to these meetings was granted by the 
chair of the meeting in question and on the basis of my association with the District 
Council. Whilst I was by virtue of being present in these meetings a 'participant' my 
primary purpose for attending was to observe the meeting and the exchanges which 
took place without taking part in them. This is somewhat of a false distinction, 
however, since a second and equally important benefit of attending meetings was the 
opportunity it afforded to meet and chat with the participants informally at the end of 
the official business. This was particularly valuable at the LSP and LSP Chairs' 
meetings which provided the opportunity to meet with representatives of a wide range 
of organisations on a regular and on-going basis. This had similar benefits to my 
regular visits to the council in terms of gaining a degree of familiarity and acceptance 
amongst a wide range of organisations. The effect varied from individual to 
individual and ranged from an active interest in my work to my acceptance as 'just 
another council officer' and the willingness of people to carry on with their business 
uninhibited in my presence. This raises a number of ethical and methodological 
questions, as well as questions relating to positionality (Macmillan and Scott, 2003). 
Throughout my time as a (participant) observer I kept a field notebook in which I 
recorded my observations. An extract from my field notebook is included in appendix 
D. 
Ethical considerations 
Working alongside people and attending meetings inevitably raises ethical dilemmas. 
These largely relate to confidentiality and the uses to which evidence is put. 
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Questions of confidentiality are relatively straightforward to resolve. Only once was I 
declined access to a meeting that I wanted to attend on the grounds of confidentiality, 
and this turned out to be largely the result of a misunderstanding. Indeed the 
Council's officers were often willing to share confidential information on the 
understanding that it was treated as such. Although this is a pragmatic approach when 
working closely together, it also reflects the relationships of trust which were 
developed during the early stages of the project. 
More complex ethical considerations anse when using material which is not 
specifically identified as confidential but which is either overheard or obtained 
without the explicit consent of the individual concerned. For example, I began all of 
my interviews with an outline of my ethical position and what I intended to do with 
the material once the interview was over. I made it clear to interviewees that I would 
only use the material with their consent, and that they could request that I treat 
anything they said as confidential at any time during or after the interview. It was not 
possible to give such undertakings in the context of less formal engagements. In the 
case of meetings, I have chosen to regard things said during the course of the official 
business which were not explicitly declared 'off the record', and which one could 
reasonably expect to be recorded in the minutes as effectively in the public domain. 
In the case of overheard conversations, i.e. comments which were not addressed to 
me, I have chosen to regard evidence gathered as confidential. Such evidence does 
not form part of this thesis. It has, however, influenced my understanding of the 
issues with which I have engaged and has without doubt directed my lines of enquiry 
in the documentary and interview stages of my work. This has required sensitivity on 
my part, and an awareness that the subjects of my research will have to continue to 
work together long after my project has ended. Consequently, a guiding principle in 
the ethical conduct of my research has been to be particularly careful never to 
undermine any individual or organisation in the eyes of another either through 
reported speech or the nature of my questioning. Finally, my research has been 




Analysing the evidence gathered 
Rigorous empirical research requires not only carefully selected evidence and 
carefully chosen interviewees to ensure a balanced approach to the research questions, 
and thorough preparation to get the most out of interviews, but also a planned and 
structured approach to the analysis of the evidence gathered. There are a limited 
number of techniques for the analysis of qualitative evidence of the type gathered for 
this project, and this heightens the importance of a careful and consistent approach to 
the analysis of the evidence. Firstly, all evidence was analysed in its written form. 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and I took detailed notes at, or 
immediately after, all the meetings I attended. Whilst this should not preclude the 
inclusion of evidence from the more subtle nuances of interpersonal interaction which 
are one of the strengths of the interview approach, it ensured that maximum benefit 
was gained from the interviews and that the analysis was rigorous. Transcribing 
interviews allows the interviewer to gain a certain distance from the action of the 
interview itself, and past experience has shown this to be helpful in terms of formally 
analysing the evidence gathered. A sample interview transcript is given in appendix 
E. Once transcribed, interviews were subject to the same processes of content and 
theme analysis which was used to analyse the documentary evidence and the notes 
taken during observed meetings. 
The first stage in analysing the evidence was to establish a transparent and systematic 
mechanism for identifying themes which were significant in the context of the 
research questions. This was done through a process of emergent coding whereby 
categories are established following the preliminary examination of the evidence. As 
this project did not benefit from a co-worker it was not possible to follow normal 
means of comparing the categories identified by two independent reviews of the 
material to ensure reliability. Instead, emergent coding was combined with a priori 
coding, whereby categories are established independently of the evidence gathered 
based on theory, supporting documents and other work in similar fields. The 
categories identified by these two means were revised and 'tightened up' to maximise 
their mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness. The evidence gathered was coded in 
three groups. Evidence relating to the Task Force and the LSP was coded separately 
and subsequently the evidence was combined and re-analysed in order to theorize the 
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transition between the two institutions. An example of the analytical categories 
established by the processes of coding described above is included in appendix F 
This index formed the basis of a critical, interpretive analysis of the evidence gathered 
which enabled me to compare the opinions, understandings and approaches of 
different individuals and organisations involved in the regeneration of Easington 
District. The coding of the transcripts was done by hand using a highlighting pen and 
is not shown in appendix E. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the methodology which informed the research project, 
namely critical realism. In true critical realist fashion, and following Sayer (1992), 
methodology has been shown to encompasses not only the methods used to gather 
evidence to address the research questions, but also the processes by which the objects 
of the research are conceptualised and the way in which the research questions are 
framed. Critical realism was selected as the most appropriate methodology because 
its model of causation, based on the world having ontological depth, resonated with 
the objects of the research. In particular, the critical realist belief that events arise 
from the workings of mechanisms which derive from the structure of objects and take 
place within gee-historical contexts offers insight into the research questions. A note 
of caution was introduced, however, with reference to complexity theory whereby it 
was noted that there is no necessary proportionality between 'causes' and 'effects' 
and that system effects do not result from the simple addition of individual 
components. 
A series of research questions was developed using the critical realist distinction 
between concrete and abstract research. This enabled a programme of research to be 
developed which simultaneously addresses the practical interests of the CASE partner 
and also contributes to a number of contemporary academic debates in the social 
sciences. The sources consulted and the methods used to gather and analyse evidence 
to answer the research questions were outlined. Quantitative research methods were 
identified as the only way to address the research questions, and semi-structured 
interviews, (participant) observation, documentary research and content analysis were 




The governance of regeneration i1rn Easington District 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the structure and functioning of the organisations responsible 
for developing and implementing regeneration strategy in the District since the early 
1990s. The organisations are analysed in light of the debates on the shift from 
government to governance presented in chapter three. The evidence presented here 
suggests that, in Easington at least, this transition is not as clear-cut or complete as 
some models would suggest. The analysis begins with the East Durham Task Force 
and then examines the East Durham Local Strategic Partnership. The transition 
between these two institutional arrangements is key since, although superficially 
similar in terms of their structure and membership, these two institutional structures 
are fundamentally different. As will be shown below, the East Durham Task Force 
was essentially a local initiative driven by the County and District Councils, whereas 
the LSP is part of a much broader central government project. This has significant 
consequences for the governance of regeneration in the District and has important 
implications for our understanding of governance beyond the District. This chapter 
will interpret evidence collected in East Durham in the context of the literature on 
governance presented in chapter three. Following the approach proposed in chapter 
three, subsequent chapters will examine the mechanisms of the processes of 
governance described here in greater detail and use the insights of the 
governmentality approach to explain how the changes in governance described here 
are articulated in the practices of the organisations involved in the regeneration of 
East Durham. 
The East Durham Task Force 
The East Durham Task Force is an early example of what was to become a popular 
mechanism for co-ordinating economic development activity (Pike, 2000). It shares a 
number of features in common with the Merseyside Task Force established by 
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Michael Heseltine in 1985, in particular its conception as a vehicle capable of 
fostering a proactive approach and working as a catalyst in initiating projects to secure 
economic development. However, whereas the Merseyside Task Force was created 
by central government to replace ineffective local bureaucratic structures, the East 
Durham Task Force was a local government initiative which sought to secure the 
continued involvement of central government in tackling local problems (EDTF, 
1991). The comparison with Merseyside is particularly germane, since a number of 
interviewees who had been involved with the East Durham Task Force contrasted the 
situation in East Durham with that in Merseyside and the absence of direct 
government action in Easington as a result of the absence of urban unrest here. 
Conceptualising the East Durham Task Force: government or governance? 
The debates on the shift from government to governance presented in chapter three 
identify two main features of new modes of governance. The first is the involvement 
of a complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond 
government to tackle social and economic issues (Stoker, 1998). The second feature 
of emerging modes of governance is a qualitative shift in the way organisations work 
together. The key features of the relationships between organisations involved in 
governance rather than government are self-organisation and reciprocal 
interdependence (Jessop, 2003). These themes are used to structure the analysis of the 
East Durham Task Force. 
Actors and institutions. 
Table 11 shows the membership of the East Durham Task Force. It was clearly 
dominated by public sector organisations and in particular by local government 
departments and local government agencies. (The County Durham and the East 
Durham Development Agencies were created by the County and District Councils 
respectively.) Furthermore, the membership of the Task Force is dominated by 
institutions engaged in 'traditional' economic development. Nevertheless, as will be 
shown below, the substantive work of the Task Force was dominated by the County 
Council. What is remarkable, however, is the apparent involvement of so many 
central government departments and agencies, particularly in the early years. 
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Table 1 :!1. Membership oil' the 1Eas11: Durham Task Force 
1991 1993 1997 
County I District 
Durham County Council 2 4 4 
District of Easington Council 2 2 4 
Peterlee College (East Durham Community College) 0 
East Durham Business Leaders Forum 0 0 
NSK Bearings Europe Ltd 0 0 
East Durham Development Agency 
County Durham Training and Enterprise Council 
County Durham Development Company 0 
SUBTOTAL 7 11 12 
Regional 
Northern Development Company 
Recharge North East 0 0 
Government Office NE 0 0 
SUBTOTAL 1 2 2 
National 
Employment Department 1 1 0 
Rural Development Commission 1 
English Estates (later Partnerships) 1 1 1 
Employment Service 1 0 
Department of Trade & Industry 1 1 0 
Department of Environment & Transport 0 
British Coal 2 2 0 
British Coal Enterprise Ltd 0 
British Coal Property 0 0 
Business in the community 0 
SUBTOTAL 10 9 4 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP 18 22 18 
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The Task Force did not engage a significant number of organisations beyond the local 
state. In this sense, it does not match models of governance which stress the 
involvement ofnon-state actors, such as those described by Stoker (1998). 
Organisational relationships 
Although the range of organisations participating in the Task Force does not suggest 
that it represented a shift from government to governance as a mode of organisation, 
the way in which those organisations which did participate interacted with one 
another does show some signs of evolution. These are examined below. 
The operation of the East Durham Task Force did display many of the characteristic 
features of governance as a mode of organisation. Jessop's description of governance 
as "the reflexive self-organisation of independent actors involved in complex relations 
of reciprocal interdependence, with such self organisation being based on continuing 
dialogue and resources-sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to 
manage the contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations." 
(Jessop, 2003: 1) succinctly describes many of the Task Force's activities. Analysing 
Jessop's description, the Task Force was reflexive insofar as it produced the three 
Programmes for Action (EDTF, 1991, 1993 and 1997) which set out its understanding 
of the problems it faced and the solutions it considered necessary to tackle those 
problems. These strategy documents are analysed further in chapter seven. The Task 
Force also practiced the self-organisation of independent actors, perhaps more so than 
subsequent governance structures. In fact, self-organisation is one of the 
distinguishing features of the Task Force. It was essentially a local initiative which, 
although approved by government ministers, was set up by the County and District 
councils. The notion of 'mutually beneficial joint projects' is slightly more 
problematic in the context of public sector organisations, and especially so in the case 
of East Durham where relations between County and District were sometimes strained 
(see below), but nevertheless the Task Force's overarching aim of securing the 
regeneration of the District certainly fits this description. The final element of 
Jessop's description, managing the inevitable contradictions and dilemmas which 
come with these activities, was certainly true of the Task Force. It is worth noting 
that whilst Jessop's description emphasises interdependence and managing 
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contradictions, it says nothing of the balance of power in these relationships. This is 
important because, as will be shown below, although governance is often understood 
in terms of heterarchy, hierarchy (whether internal or external to the structures of 
governance) is a significant feature of governance structures. 
Although the East Durham Task Force displays many of the features identified in 
Jessop's description of governance it requires some qualification. As shown in Table 
11 above, the Task Force was composed largely of public sector organisations from 
local, county, regional and central government. Whilst these organisations conform to 
the paradox of governance that Jessop observed whereby "organisations, institutions 
and systems are both operationally autonomous from each other and structurally 
coupled through various forms ofreciprocal interdependence" (Jessop, 1999a: 1), that 
interdependence was in fact relatively loose, unequal and context-specific. For 
example, whereas the District Council relied heavily on the County Council to divert 
resources away from other parts of the County to fund projects within the District, the 
County was much less dependent on the District to pursue its goals. The County and 
the District were also dependent on partners such as the Department of the 
Environment to deliver resources for major projects. This illustrates the asymmetric 
relations of power and dependence within governance structures which might lead us 
to question where the distinction between government and governance should be 
drawn. 
Asymmetric relations of power and dependence within the Task Force 
Governance is often used to refer to the theorization of partnership structures as forms 
of organisation. This section questions whether the East Durham Task Force can be 
regarded as a partnership and whether it is reasonable to analyse its operation in terms 
of governance. It is misleading to describe the Task Force as a partnership. This is a 
label which has been retrospectively applied to the Task Force as partnership has 
gained credibility in governance and regeneration debates. Whilst the Task Force 
displayed many of the features of a partnership, the balance of power within the Task 
Force and the approach of those individuals and organisations who led it make this 
description problematic. The Task Force's Chairman describes the aims and 
objectives of the first Programme for Action as being "corporately supported by the 
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Task Force" (EDTF, 1991: 1). The language of partnership is absent from the 
programme. Furthermore, the interviews suggested that the Task Force was 
effectively run by the County Council. "The idea came from us here at the County 
Council. .. This particular partnership was clearly driven and funded by the County 
Council, the government and Europe really." (Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03). 
This opinion was mirrored at the District Council: " I honestly don't think that, as a 
District Council, we understood what the Task Force was doing, and what it was 
trying to do ... it was seen as a County driven organisation, and I think to a certain 
extent we didn't understand the implications of it, and we just didn't really know what 
it was about as such." (Smith, interview 14.03.03). 
It is clear from the evidence collected in the interviews that the County Council led 
the Task Force. The reasons for the asymmetric power relations are also interesting. 
The District Council was a small authority which essentially dealt with housing and 
did not have any personnel working on economic development until 1996 (Smith, 
interview, 14.03.03). Even once an economic development unit was established, the 
District's files show that its operation was hampered by understaffing and strained 
relations between senior officers at the council (Scorer, correspondence 1997). This 
situation is in stark contrast to the County Council which had a large budget and a 
well established economic development directorate with significant experience of 
major projects including those following the closures of the steel plant at Consett and 
Shildon Wagon Works (Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03). The County Council's 
size and budget also strengthened its position in relation to other organisations. "The 
District Council is a small District Council. It spends £10 million a year. The County 
Council spends £500 million a year, and we punch our weight hard with government, 
and in the region and we have the resources base to do it. And that will always be the 
case. I mean, the Districts might not like me to say that, but it is true. It is true." 
(Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03). 
Although the County Council clearly led the Task Force it did not appear to actively 
exclude the District Council from participation. In terms of representatives at least, 
there was equal representation on the board of the Task Force from both County and 
District Councils. The capacity of those participating in the work of the Task Force 
seems to have been the deciding factor in sidelining the District Council. John Smith 
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recalled: "I think the people who attended really almost went through the motions 
from the District's point of view. I sat in meetings where some of my colleagues, and 
I'll obviously not mention names, just sat and said nothing when there were some 
very, very important issues being talked about like future road networks. And then 
what you would find was that they would come back to the office and say, 'oh, we 
were browbeaten into this' when they were actually sitting and saying nothing." 
(Smith, interview 14.03.04). 
The role of the other members of the East Durham Task Force is more difficult to 
interpret. Whilst the presence of regional directors of government departments no 
doubt gave the Task Force a high profile, it is not clear how these organisations 
contributed to the work of the partnership. It is likely that their most important 
contribution was related to the Task Force's lobbying role "in order to maximise the 
money that would be available from Europe, from Government and so on." (Kingsley 
Smith, interview 25.04.03). Involving representatives from major funding 
organisations in the work of the Task Force ensured that they were aware of the scale 
of the problems facing the District and the resources that were needed and was 
effective in securing a considerable amount of funding from organisations such as 
English Partnerships who were a member of the board throughout the decade of its 
operation. 
To describe the operation of the Task Force as governance would seem to be an over-
specification of the relationships that existed. Throughout much of its operation, the 
County Council led the Task Force because it was the only organisation capable of 
doing so. In many cases, the projects it pursued were in any case the County 
Council's statutory responsibility (Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03; Lloyd, 
interview 25.04.03). It involved other organisations in a strategic manner in order to 
pursue its goals of regenerating the district as set out in its Programme for Action. 
This suggests that the Task Force was more government than governance. 
Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between the Task Force's two main 
organisations, the District and County Councils, was at times strained and does not 
correspond to the "meeting of minds" (Peck and Tickell, 1994a: 251) which 
partnership and governance would imply. This is explored below. 
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The relationship between the County and District Councils 
The relationship between the County and District Councils is complex. It appears that 
the relationship was significantly undermined by the Local Government Review 
which was initiated as the Task Force was established in 1991. The tensions created 
by the Review remain significant today, and it was clear from the interviews that 
people still feel there are old scores to be settled as the structure of local government 
is once more placed under the spotlight. Whilst the animosity created by the Review 
is barely disguised, it is more difficult to find evidence of the impact this had had on 
the work of the Task Force and the regeneration of the District. Nevertheless an 
understanding of the relationship between County and District does, however, enable 
a more subtle and nuanced understanding of the inter-organisational relationships on 
which governance through the Task Force was founded. 
Initially, the District did not welcome the attention of the County Council. John 
Smith described the feelings in the District Council at the time the Task Force was set 
up: "There was a lot of suspicion. Who are these people telling us what to do? 
They're not telling us what to do! Who the hell are they? This is our District, not their 
District. I think it was mistrust really." (Smith, interview 14.03.03). Although the 
Task Force was described as a partnership, almost all interviewees were clear that it 
had been the County Council's idea to set up the Task Force, and that the County 
Council were the leading organisation driving the Task Force. Given these feelings 
and the lack of capacity in the District to tackle its own problems, it is not surprising 
that the District should perceive the County's approach as "paternal" (Wilding, 
interview 04.04.03). The attitude of the County Council was perceived as "yes, we 
hear what you are saying, but we are the big boys, we'll look after this." (ibid). Two 
factors served to aggravate this relationship. The first was the local government 
review and the second was the difference in professional culture of the two 
organisations. 
The Local Government Review "created huge bad feeling between all of the Districts 
in Durham and the County Council. The eventual outcome was status quo, but there 
had been so many arguments prosecuted for the demise of the County Council, the 
County Council putting alternative view points back that would have led to the demise 
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of the Districts, it all became very personal. I should say that it became regarded 
personally. It never did actually descent to the personal level." (Wilding, interview 
04.04.03). As far as Kingsley Smith was concerned, however, "we tried hard, and I 
think succeeded, to ensure that, you know ... , sort of.. . old wounds of local 
government reorganisations and so on didn't get in the way of this. That was 
definitely put aside." (Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03). There is an interesting 
political dimension to the local government review in which both District and County 
appear to have lost out to wider political concerns. Ken Frankish explained, "If you 
remember, in the local government review, the first solution that the commission gave 
was a County Unitary Authority. That's what they wanted. Oh yes! That was the 
Local Government Commission's first choice. And then that wasn't delivered, 
politically. Because it would have, as they say, tom the Labour Party to pieces and 
therefore they went for the second best which was the continuation of the two-tier 
system." (Frankish, interview 08.04.03). 
The relationship between the County and District councils was further strained by the 
different organisational cultures of the two bodies. The District Council was 
perceived to be a very 'political' authority, with close relations between the elected 
councillors and the council's officers, whereas the County was seen as more 
'professional' with a greater separation between its politicians and officers (Smith, 
interview 14.03.03; Frankish, interview 04.04.03). The Task Force itself was a 
professional organisation which did not have any political representation among its 
membership. 
The animosity between District and County appears to live on, and the feelings are, 
apparently, mutual. This is particularly interesting since the culture of distrust seems 
to have been 'inherited' by newer members of staff who have not worked under the 
arrangements of the Task Force. Perhaps this reflects the persistence of the attitudes 
that led to the creation of such inter-organisational tensions in the first place. Whether 
these too have been inherited or reflect something deeper of the divisions between 
District and County is harder to say. What seems more certain, however, is that older 
members of staff who have worked for each organisation for many years have long 
memories and remain significant influences on organisational culture (compare with 
Schoenberger, 1997). Looking to the future, Paul Wilding explained "I think that the 
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challenge continues to be the two-tier system whereby ... there are some under-
currents ... something approaching resentment that the County Council has lost 
control of this [the LSP] and they are not comfortable about that." (Wilding, interview 
04.04.03) Another local informant described a conversation with a County Council 
representative: "He tried to absolutely flay me alive on a personal basis with the most 
ludicrous stuff he was coming out with ... '89% of what this LSP is going to achieve 
is going to come through County Council funding, and if you think we are going to do 
it with one f*cking representative, then you've got another. .. ' and it was along those 
sort of lines." (local informant, interview). This highlights the significant questions 
that the creation of the LSP raises in terms of power and the nature of the partnership. 
Political representation and the Task Force 
Although the Task Force was dominated by public sector organisations and led by 
local government it was characterised by the absence of any local political 
representation. It was entirely a professional body. For the County Council this was 
the strength of the Task Force. Kingsley Smith observed, "What happened in this 
case, and I admired the members for this ... I mean, this was being run through an era 
of Conservative government. .. the members at the County, and I think it would be fair 
to say at the District, recognised that if politics got in the way of this then we were 
going to have some real serious difficulties. So, they took the view that. .. they would 
accept that this Task Force was, if you like, a professional Task Force." (Kingsley 
Smith, interview 25.04.03). The exclusion of elected members was more contentious 
for the District Council, however, where councillors and officers worked much more 
closely together and there was not the same 'professionalism' as existed at the County 
Council (Smith, interview 14.03.03). Wilding recalled: "It became a huge bone of 
contention. And I have to say there was considerable resistance to the involvement of 
elected members in the work of the Task Force from the County Council. And in fact 
the resistance to it was then an unhelpful feature because it tended to ... it started to 
give the Task Force a bad name." (Wilding, interview 04.04.03). Whilst the District 
Councillors felt excluded from the Task Force, their indignation served to earn them a 
bad name in the eyes of the County Council. "I think there was a professional 
relationship at officer level. I think it [the animosity] was maybe from the District 
Council members if anything. It was that sort of level. You would get outrageous 
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statements and outrageous claims from some of the District Councillors which 
sometimes caused trouble." (Frankish, interview 08.04.03). 
The Task Force did not directly involve local residents or their elected representatives. 
It is probably best understood as an executive function of the County Council. Given 
the District Council's limited capacity for engagement, the Task Force can be 
characterised as expression of local government by the County Council. The next 
section considers the extent to which the Task Force's achievements were influenced 
by central government. 
The Task Force's relation to central government 
The government had a significant impact on what the Task Force was able to achieve. 
This influence operated through mechanisms such as the funding regimes through 
which the government provided resources to the Task Force to achieve its aims, as 
outlined in chapter two. This will have exerted a certain influence on the Task 
Force's approach to its problems. 
The East Durham Task Force did not have a budget of its own. It relied on 
influencing the way in which its member organisations spent their own budgets and 
on attracting funding from the government and from Europe for the specific projects it 
developed. This funding carne from a number of programmes. Some of these were 
relatively straightforward, such as the funding from English Estates (subsequently 
English Partnerships) to remove the dereliction left by the closure of the mining 
industry. Other programmes, such as the Single Regeneration Budget, required the 
Task Force to adjust its priorities more to match those of the government and to obtain 
'match funding' from other budgets to supplement the grant. The Single 
Regeneration Budget provides a good example of the influence of central government 
on the Task Force's strategy and governance of regeneration. The Task Force 
launched an unsuccessful bid in round three of the SRB for the comprehensive 
redevelopment of Seaham town centre. The project placed too great an emphasis on 
physical regeneration to satisfy government funding requirements. The Task Force, 
and the District Council, have nevertheless pursued their desire to redevelop the town 
centre in Seaham through a series of smaller, integrated projects for which they have 
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been able to secure funding from various sources. The Task Force did, however, 
submit a successful bid for SRB funding in round 5, demonstrating that it was capable 
of responding to steering from the centre without being dominated by central 
government initiatives. 
The main argument presented here is that, unlike the LSP, the Task Force did not 
operate in the shadow of hierarchy. This is not to say, however, that the Task Force 
was free from government influence. The point that will be made below, however, is 
that this influence is significantly less than the influence of central government on 
LSPs. In this way, therefore, the Task Force was less a part of a central government 
programme. This allows us to contrast local governance structures with those 
developed 'in the shadow of hierarchy' and assess the impact of meta-governance on 
the governance of regeneration. 
The Task Force: governance or government? 
To describe the Task Force as an emerging governance structure is probably to over 
specify the relationships which existed between the organisations which took part. 
Firstly, participation was largely limited to government departments and government 
agencies at the local, regional and national level. Furthermore the public sector 
bodies involved were largely from the fields of economic development and 
regeneration. The Task Force can hardly be said to have been widening participation 
in the regeneration of the District. It is more the case that it was 'courting' those 
agencies which controlled access to the funds the County Council needed to 
implement its reclamation and economic development plans (EDTF, 1991 and K. 
Smith, interview; see also chapter seven). Secondly, the nature of the relationships 
between the organisations participating in the Task Force bore only superficial 
similarities to the reciprocal interdependence which Jessop identified as a key feature 
of governance. The Task Force was, however, a good example of reflexive self-
organisation, notwithstanding the asymmetries of power identified above. If we 
accept that the Task Force was successful in achieving its aims (although see chapter 
seven for a critique of the Task Force's aims) then the evidence presented above 
suggests that leadership and, implicitly, hierarchy were significant elements of the 
Task Force's approach to governance. The patterns of governance which developed 
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under the Task Force were, then, little different from more traditional forms of 
government. 
The next section examines the governance of neighbourhood renewal through the East 
Durham Local Strategic Partnership. In setting out its proposals for LSPs the 
government has placed great emphasis on partnership and inclusivity. The 
involvement of the central government, however, has significant implications for the 
patterns of governance which emerge, and these are explored below. 
1'be East Durham lLocal Strategic Partnership 
The East Durham Local Strategic Partnership bears a number of superficial 
similarities to the Task Force. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the similarity in 
the structure of the two organisations. This is not surprising, however, since 
organisational structure was one of the few features not prescribed by central 
government when LSPs were initially established. Furthermore, the LSP followed 
directly on from the Task Force, and indeed many of the individuals who had been 
involved in the Task Force were instrumental in setting up the LSP. In particular, 
John Smith, who had been the Task Force co-ordinator, was Head of Regeneration at 
the District Council when the LSP was established and played a central role in 
shaping the partnership. Secondly, the membership of the LSP is very similar to the 
Task Force in its later years and pre-existing relationships had a significant influence 
on the emerging LSP structure. Finally, as will be shown in chapter seven, the LSP's 
approach to the District's problems is very similar to that of the Task Force in its final 
Programme for Action and this necessitated a broadly similar structure. 
Governance in the shadow of hierarchy 
There are, however, a number of significant differences between the LSP and the Task 
Force. The first is that whilst the Task Force was established with the approval of 
government ministers, it was essentially a local initiative driven by the County 
Council. The LSP, in contrast, was established as a direct response to central 
government policy initiatives from the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit. Arguably the 
District had no choice in establishing a LSP since the government made the release of 
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Neighbourhood Renewal Funds conditional on the existence of partnership structures. 
Furthermore, LSPs were subject to a process of accreditation to ensure they met 
certain criteria laid down by the centre. This illustrates Lindberg and Campbell's 
observation that "the state will often have defined (or even created) the groups ... 
whose agreement will be required, and the procedures through which it is to be 
obtained." (Lindberg and Campbell 1991 in Scharpf, 1994: 41). Although the 
government has left considerable freedom for the LSPs in the structures they adopt 
and ways they operate they are nevertheless part of a central government programme. 
This has significant implications for understanding their role in processes of 
governance. The LSP operates "in the shadow of hierarchy" (Scharpf, 1994: 41) and 
this has implications for the form of governance which it pursues. The way in which 
the 'shadow of hierarchy' influences local patterns of governance is explored in 
chapter six. 
Conceptualising the East Durham Local Strategic Partnership: emerging local 
governance? 
This section analyses the East Durham LSP in order to show the extent to which it can 
be understood as an emerging local governance structure. As with the analysis of the 
Task Force presented above, the analysis is structured first using Stoker's 
observations on the nature of the organisations which participate in the Partnership 
and second using Jessop's observations on the nature of the relationships which 
characterise governance. 
Actors and institutions 
The membership of the East Durham LSP is shown in Table 12 below. The East 
Durham LSP is similar to the Task Force insofar as it is dominated by organisations 
from the public sector. The LSP, however, brings together a wider range of 
organisations, including the police, the health service and the local education authority 
in addition to representatives of the County and District councils. A preliminary 
investigation of the participating organisations suggests that the LSP conforms more 
closely than the Task Force to Jessop's description of governance theories as working 
with the paradox of organisations, institutions and systems which are both 
operationally autonomous from each other and structurally coupled through various 
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forms of reciprocal interdependence (Jessop, 1999a: 1). Indeed it is this concept 
which is at the core ofthe LSP's drive to tackle 'cross-cutting issues'. The beliefthat 
greater local co-ordination between service providers will tackle the deep-rooted 
problems of deprivation and disadvantage can be traced back through the Social 
Exclusion Unit and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 1998) to 
the report of Policy Action Team (PAT) 17 - 'Joining it up locally' which initially 
proposed the idea of Local Strategic Partnerships in April 2000 (DETR, 2000). 
The membership of the LSP reflects the shift in emphasis from economic 
development and job creation under the Task Force to a more general and less well 
specified concept of neighbourhood renewal under the LSP. This shift in emphasis 
has been driven by central government and highlights the role of the centre in shaping 
local governance. The mechanisms behind this shift and the role of the centre in 
meta-governance are analysed in chapter six. 
Organisational relationships 
Furthermore, the East Durham LSP corresponds to Jessop's (2003) definition of 
governance insofar as it is reflexive, self-organised and based on continuing dialogue. 
The Community Strategy document embodies the LSP's understanding of the 
problems it seeks to tackle and the meetings of the LSP and its executive group at 
which I have been a (participant)-observer are the fora through which joint projects 
are developed and the contradictions and dilemmas of reciprocal interdependence are 
managed through continuing dialogue. In addition, the LSP involves the local 
community and is currently establishing representation from the private sector. In this 
way it represents a response to the growing dissatisfaction in political economy with a 
rigid public-private distinction in state-centred analyses of politics and its associated 
top-down account of the exercise of state power (Jessop, 1995). This initial outline 
suggests that the LSP displays many of the essential characteristics of governance. 
These practices have, however, largely been imposed on the LSP by central 
government (see chapter six). The next section analyses the way in which the 
processes of governance imposed by the centre have worked out in East Durham and 
their implication for the ability of organisations to deliver regeneration in the District. 
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Table 12 The Membership of the East Durham LSP 
Region 
Government Office for the North East 
One North East 
SUBTOTAL 
County 
Learning & Skills Council 
Business Link County Durham 
County Durham Business & Learning Partnership 
Durham County Councillors 
Durham County Council Officers 
SUBTOTAL 
District 
Easington District Councillors 
Easington District Council Officers 
Groundwork East Durham 
Durham Constabulary 
Primary Care Trust 
East Durham & Houghall Community College 
Easington Action Team for Jobs 





Resident I tenant associations 
Town & Parish Councils 























Self organisation and reciprocal interdependence: the East Durham LSP's 
experience of governance 
The principal ways in which the LSP has practiced self organisation have been 
through the formation of the partnership itself and the development of its regeneration 
strategy for the District. The partnership's structures are examined below. The LSP's 
strategy is examined in chapter seven. 
A key finding of this research which is central to a critical understanding of the 
operation of the East Durham LSP and of its implications for local governance and the 
regeneration of the district is that the LSP is a complex and highly differentiated 
organisation. This is in stark contrast to much of the early writing on LSPs, and 
indeed to much government guidance on the role and operation ofLSPs, which tended 
to view the LSP as a monolithic and relatively simple organisation. The East Durham 
LSP consists of three distinct elements. The Local Strategic Partnership itself, which 
has a membership of 55 and meets quarterly is the partnership accredited by 
Government Office for the North East. The LSP has created six thematic sub-groups, 
known as Implementation Groups, which bring together organisations with shared 
interests and expertise around the themes of education, health, housing, environment, 
community safety and economy. These sub-groups operate independently of the LSP 
and have their own separate agendas and priorities. The third element of the LSP, and 
potentially the most significant, is the Chairs' Group. The Chairs' Group, which also 
meets quarterly, brings together the chairs of the six implementation groups, the chair 
of the Community Network, the Chair of the LSP, the Neighbourhood Renewal Co-
ordinator, an officer post funded by Neighbourhood Renewal Funds and line-managed 
by the District Council, a chief officer from the County Council and a small number 
of District Council officers. These three elements of the LSP operate in different 
ways, fulfilling different roles which are not always apparent from the explicit 
structure of the LSP. They will be considered in more detail below. 
Although the LSP faces a number of significant external constraints, many of the 
problems faced by the East Durham LSP in formulating and delivering regeneration 
strategy in the District are rooted in the weakness of the structure and operation of the 
various elements of the partnership itself which in tum reflect the difficulties 
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organisations face in self-organisation. The influence of these limitations on the 
process of strategy formulation and implementation are considered in chapter seven. 
The main LSP 
During its first three years the main LSP has struggled to make any significant impact 
on the regeneration of the District. One interviewee stated "I don't think the LSP 
knows what it wants. It doesn't have a sense of itself." (IG Chair, interview). Despite 
having a charismatic and committed leader, there is little sense in which the members 
of the LSP, other than the Chairs of the Implementation Groups, act as a unified body 
capable of fulfilling the role envisaged for them. There are three possible reasons for 
this. First, it is unclear at partnership meetings just who is and who is not a member 
of the partnership. The District Council's lead officer on the LSP, for example, was 
uncertain whether certain Implementation Group Chairs were actually members of the 
LSP entitled to vote in its decision making (Johnson, interview, 11.09.03). LSP 
meetings regularly attract a number of invited speakers and observers, and inevitably 
it becomes unclear exactly who the partnership is. Although members may be aware 
that they belong to a partnership, there is little sense in which they act as a partnership 
during meetings. Secondly, the structure of the partnership's meetings militates 
against the active engagement of the members with the issues on the agenda. 
Meetings are dominated by reports from the Chairs of the Implementation Groups and 
presentations from organisations on subjects which are often only tangentially 
relevant to the work of the LSP. The agendas are usually so full that there is little 
time for discussion and little opportunity for members of the LSP to actually engage 
with the issues presented to them. One of the most frequent actions recorded in the 
minutes of the meetings is "the information provided was noted." Third, the LSP's 
method of decision making also militates against informed debate and engagement 
with issues. "Whilst there is provision for votes, the working mechanisms of the 
partnership is in fact to try and have exhaustive discussion and at least in fact have a 
sort of consensus on the direction that we are taking. And so far in the ... I suppose it 
is three and a half years now, I can't actually recall where a vote has been taken." 
(Conway, interview 17.07.03). The reality of this system, however, is different. 
Exhaustive discussion is rare and decisions appear to be taken in caucus and "nodded 
through" giving the appearance of involvement whereas the reality is quite different 
(Bolas, interview 01.07.03). Decisions are usually taken by a few old men muttering 
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"agreed" and there is usually no shortage of people willing to agree simply to move 
through the long agenda. 'Progress', therefore, is achieved at the expense of 
engagement. 
These weaknesses in the operation of the LSP undermine its ability to fulfil the 
strategic role envisaged for it when the partnership was established. Patrick Conway, 
the County Council's lead officer on the LSP, spoke for most of the Chairs when he 
observed, "I think that at the present time the local strategic partnership is probably 
not giving sufficient strategic direction overall as to the relative priorities in relation to 
the implementation group areas. So, the LSP hasn't actually got to the stage yet of 
debating everything and saying... what are the three most important things, we 
haven't got to that stage in the local strategic partnership." (Conway, interview 
17.07.03). Although such discussions are beginning to take place within the Chairs' 
Group, Alan Caygill, Director of Housing at the District Council and Chair of the 
Action for Housing and Communities Implementation Group, believed, "The problem 
is that the conversation should have taken place at the LSP, and there should have 
been a direction that 'these are our priorities, this is what we want to deliver', and 
then the [implementation] groups could have come together and said, well, look, how 
can we do that collectively?" (Caygill, interview 08.07.03). 
It is clear that the main LSP has failed to provide the direction and drive for the 
partnership. "The quarterly meeting is about having our badges on our sleeves ... it is 
about being seen to be working together and in a sense ... it is largely ceremonial." 
(Bolas, interview 01.07.03). The impact of this failure on the partnership's strategy is 
considered in chapter seven. 
The Chairs' Group 
The Chairs' Group brings together the most powerful people involved in the 
regeneration of the District. The group was established to provide "a mechanism by 
which urgent items ... business could be progressed, agenda issues could be looked at 
and also that certain matters could be looked at in possibly greater detail or depth than 
could happen at a full Local Strategic Partnership." (Conway, interview, 17.07.03). 
Its business quickly came to be dominated by the administration of the NRF, however. 
The LSP faced such severe problems in actually spending its allocation of NRF that 
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the work of the Chairs' Group centred almost entirely on managing the £1 million 
underspend so that the District would not lose the money. Lynch observed, "Certainly 
in the very first year it was NRF, NRF and NRF and that was it, because allocations 
came down later in the year and Easington got quite a lot for a small area and there 
was panic to get the money spent. The slippage in the first year was quite enormous 
and Government Office allowed it to be rolled over, but you just create an ongoing 
problem for yourself in the second year." (Lynch, interview, 27.06.03). Conway 
agreed that the work of the Chairs' Group had been dominated by the NRF (interview 
17.07.03). Caygill was pessimistic in his assessment: "Well if you want the truth 
[sigh], I think that it [the Chairs' Group] hasn't done much more than administer NRF 
at the moment, but mind that's because of the need to spend quite a bit of money in a 
short space oftime .. .l think it has just been 'how can we spend NRF, and that's why 
I'm cynical about what happens when NFR goes." (Caygill, interview 08.07.03). 
Others, however, were more optimistic, seeing "shoots of growth in them moving 
more towards what it should be doing, which is really addressing some issues from a 
truly cross-functional way." (Arkley, interview, 02.07.03). 
Analysis of the minutes and observation at Chairs' Group meetings has confirmed this 
perception that the group's business is dominated by the administration of the NRF. 
This has left little time for any critical engagement with the issues facing the District 
and any attempts at new ways of tackling them. This is not to say, however, that such 
efforts have not been made, but rather there has been no systematic attempt to tackle 
these issues within what is arguably the most powerful unit of the LSP. There is some 
evidence that some of the implementation groups are beginning to work together and 
attempt new approaches to old problems. These are examined in chapter eight. 
Despite acting as a de facto executive for the partnership, the Chairs' Group has 
maintained a deference to the authority of the main LSP. As described above, the 
main LSP is ill equipped to exercise this authority, and consequently opportunities for 
progress have been lost. Chairs regularly propose original and creative solutions to 
the problems faced by the partnership, but because there is a tacit assumption that 
leadership and direction are provided by the main LSP these ideas are rarely taken any 
further. This situation reflects the politics of partnership formation and the legacy of 
the East Durham Task Force in the District. The Task Force was vociferously 
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criticised by elements within local government for its failure to engage local 
politicians, and since the main LSP is the body with local political representation 
there is perhaps a reluctance from the District Council and its closest partners to usurp 
this level of the organisation despite its lack of impact. 
The mam constraint on the ability of the Chairs' Group to contribute to the 
regeneration strategy for the District has been a lack of time. The constraints of 
managing the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, discussed in detail in chapter eight, 
combined with the LSP's difficulties in spending its allocation and the resultant 
burden of managing the underspend have left little time for a systematic re-
examination of the partnership's approach to the District's problems. Furthermore, 
the LSP's struggle to spend the resources allocated to it raise interesting questions 
about both the structure ofthe Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and the viability of local 
solutions to the problems of neighbourhood renewal. These issues are addressed in 
chapter eight. 
The implementation groups 
The six implementation groups of the LSP are essentially the "revamped" sub-groups 
of the East Durham Task Force (Lynch, interview 27.06.03) and represent another 
element of continuity in the approach to the regeneration of the District both through 
their membership and through the conceptual framework within which the 
regeneration of the District is undertaken. Norman Mackie, Chair of the Community 
Network, believed that "it is at the implementation groups that the decisions are made, 
and it is at the LSP level that the rubber-stamping takes place." (Mackie, interview, 
25.06.03) Whilst this appears to be essentially the case the interviews have shown 
that the implementation groups operate in significantly different ways and that it is 
difficult to generalise. Three of the implementation groups are considered in tum 
below, but first I examine some of the implications of this method of organising the 
work of the LSP. 
In an era of 'joined up working' and 'cross-cutting issues' the implementation group 
structure of the LSP is open to the criticism that it reinforces a 'silo mentality' in the 
way the LSP addresses the District's problems. This certainly seems to be the case: 
"There is not one big thing that everybody is working towards. There is still a lot of 
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insular thinking around health, environment.. . although we can make links with the 
service improvements, but they go on in isolation and they are not all ... somehow 
they are not quite gelled together." (Lynch, interview 27.06.03). As this quote 
suggests, it is not the case that the implementation groups are working completely 
independently from each other, but rather the nature of their cooperation which is 
problematic. For Charlton, "The implementation groups are for organisational 
purposes only. The fact that the chairs meet together, the fact that you bid for 
additional money jointly and the fact that I can understand the strategy of the Health 
Improvement Group and Anna Lynch and her colleagues can understand the strategy 
for the Learning and Skills Group, that belies the rather cheap jibe about people 
working in silos." (Charlton, interview, 03.07.03). 
The implementation groups are far more deeply implicated in the structure and 
operation of the LSP as a whole than this image of shared understanding might 
suggest. There appears to be a circular [dialectical?] process in operation through 
which the presence of the implementation groups influences the way in which NRF is 
spent and the spending of NRF in tum reinforces the presence of the implementation 
groups. One Implementation Group chair, observed: "at the moment I think we're all 
still in our little silos. I think unfortunately the processes of the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund have probably exacerbated that rather than made it better because they 
have forced different policy groups together, they've said, 'you guys go and look after 
that bit' and they've gone 'oh God, we've got some money, we better look after that 
really carefully and do our own little programmes' rather than 'oh, housing, we need 
your help to do this.' So, it has concentrated policy rather than broaden it out." (LSP 
Implementation Group Chair, interview). This has been reinforced by the 
government's monitoring forms for the NRF which require spending and outcomes to 
be recorded against government floor targets (see chapter six) which are themselves 
divided between functionally separate government departments. Analysis has shown 
that the service improvements implemented in the first three years of the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund were overwhelmingly focussed on a single thematic 
area. A list of the District's service improvements funded through the NRF is given 
in appendix G. 
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The process of allocation of NRF by the LSP is not, however, static. The 
implementation groups, under pressure from certain forward-thinking chairs and the 
general thrust of government policy have begun to look at ways in which their activity 
could be made complementary. This has taken a number of forms which has seen a 
rapid evolution through co-ordinated projects, 'problem sharing', joint programmes 
and finally an emergent spatial targeting. Whilst there has undoubtedly been a 
change in the way the implementation groups, and in particular their chairs, think 
about their approach to the District's problems, there remain questions as to the extent 
to which this has fed back into their practice. Alan Napier, Chair of the LSP and 
Leader of the District Council, described the obstacles to change: "The hardest thing 
was getting chief execs, mind, of.. . was getting people to think outside the box. 
Getting them to think outside this silo and understand that housing, health, education, 
environment, community safety, the economy is all inextricably linked and that you 
cannot just say 'we'll deal with them two and leave them four', because you'll fail, 
you know, you will fail. But they find it. .. although it has come on from strength to 
strength. But I think initially, not only were they finding it difficult to work outside 
the box, but it just stopped at the LSP and it wasn't linking back to their day job, and 
that was one ofthe difficulties we had." (Napier, interview, 30.06.03). 
The structure of the implementation groups has clearly influenced the way in which 
the LSP has approached the process of neighbourhood renewal. Initially the divisions 
between traditional policy domains reflected in the structure of the implementation 
groups resulted in a rigid organisation-centred approach to the problems of the 
District. The shift towards closer engagement between different organisations and 
different 'sectors' which is beginning to emerge, particularly in delivering 
regeneration projects, has significant implications for the governance of regeneration. 
These processes are analysed further in chapter eight using Grabber's concept of 
project ecology (Grabher, 2002a; 2002b). 
The East Durham LSP: government or governance? 
Although the LSP has clearly adopted governance-style structures under pressure 
from the centre it has struggled to adopt governance-style practices. This reflects the 
difficulties in changing the way organisations work and the extent to which ways of 
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working become embedded in organisational culture (Schoenberger, 1997). In 
addition, there are a number of factors which work to limit the ability of local 
organisations to work together in new ways, such as audit and accountability to 
central government departments. These are explored further in chapter six. 
Furthermore, the limited success which the LSP has had in adopting governance-style 
practices has implications for its ability to deliver regeneration strategy. This is taken 
up in chapter eight. Although the LSP is beginning to move in the direction of 
governance, it remains closer to more traditional forms of government. 
Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this chapter has highlighted the similarities and the 
differences between the structure and operation of the East Durham Task Force and 
the East Durham LSP, both ofwhich have been implicated in the purported shift from 
government to governance. In broad terms, the evidence has shown that whilst the 
structures of the East Durham Task Force may have closely resembled governance, 
detailed analysis of its operation suggests that the relationships involved had more in 
common with government than governance. As far as the LSP is concerned, the 
evidence has once again called into question the extent to which the relationships 
between participating organisations have changed from previous government 
arrangements and can legitimately be described as governance. In addition, it would 
appear that central government had a significant role in shaping the emerging patterns 
of governance represented by the LSP. This is examined further in chapter six. 
The research presented in this chapter has also shown that whilst the East Durham 
Task Force was essentially a local initiative, the formation and operation of East 
Durham LSP was driven by central government. This allows us, therefore, to 
compare governance developing from the reciprocal interdependence between 
organisations with governance instigated 'in the shadow of hierarchy'. The 
implications are profound, both for governance theory and for government policy 
which seeks to harness the benefits of governance to tackle other problems. In the 
case of the Task Force, although governance arrangements were initiated without the 
involvement of the central state and between interdependent organisations, hierarchy 
remained important. The Task Force was driven by the County Council which used 
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its authority in terms of its size, budget and experience to control the work of the 
partnership. In addition, the Task Force relied on its ability to engage with the 
hierarchy of central state and European Union - outside the immediate governance 
structures- to secure the resources it needed to implement its regeneration strategy. 
The LSP, in contrast, does not have the same internal hierarchy as the Task Force. 
The internal divisions which characterised the Task Force have been papered over by 
a central government rhetoric of partnership and equality, although tensions clearly 
remain. These were demonstrated by the County Council's insistence that 85% of the 
LSP's achievements will be driven by the County based on its spending in the District 
(Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03), and indeed the establishment of a County 
Strategic Partnership as a counterweight to the Local Strategic Partnerships in an 
attempt to tip the balance of power back in favour of the County Council (Johnson, 
interview 11.09.03). The East Durham LSP does, however, operate in the 'shadow of 
hierarchy' and is subject to close regulation and scrutiny by central government. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the actual operation 
of the East Durham LSP displays few of the characteristics of governance described 
by Jessop (2003), Stoker (1998) and others. Although central government has created 
governance structures, it has failed to create governance processes. This has 
important policy implications. It suggests that organisational cultures are resistant to 
change and need time to adopt new ways of working (Schoenberger, 1997) and that 
local public sector agencies are no exception in this regard. It also suggests that 
although different structures may be imposed these will not necessarily bring about an 
immediate change the way in which organisations operate. This echoes the cautions 
of complexity theory outlined in chapter four which emphasised the importance of 
context in shaping the outcome of (policy) actions. 
Governance theories do not adequately describe the organisational structures which 
have been deployed in East Durham to tackle the problems caused by the decline of 
the mining industry, either when left to its own devices through the East Durham Task 
Force or when incorporated into a larger central government programme through the 
East Durham LSP. This research has shown that although these structures and 
processes may give the appearance of governance the reality of their operation is 
some way from the ideal of successfully managing the contradictions and dilemmas 
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which governance entails. This reflects the widespread normative use of governance 




Meta~governance and technologies of government 
Introduction 
Chapter five examined the governance of regeneration in East Durham and concluded 
that central government played a significant role in shaping the actions of actors 
involved in local governance. This chapter uses the insights of the governmentality 
approach to explore Jessop's (2003) concept of meta-governance as embodied in the 
operation of the East Durham LSP. The chapter presents an analysis of the 
technologies of government deployed by the centre in order to influence the nature of 
regeneration at the local level. In doing so, it provides evidence for the ways in which 
the "shadow of hierarchy" (Scharpf, 1994: 41) influences local governance and the 
processes through which the centre is able to shape the conduct of local actors. 
Meta-governance 
Jessop's (2003) concept of meta-governance was outlined in chapter three. Although 
elements of all four forms of meta-governance (meta-exchange, meta-organisation, 
meta-heterarchy and true meta-governance) were shown to be useful for interpreting 
the changes taking place in the regeneration of East Durham, meta-heterarchy offers 
the greatest potential for understanding the relationship between central and local 
government. The following sections develop this idea by examining the way in which 
meta-heterarchy operates and how the technologies of advanced liberal government 
enable the centre to practice meta-organisation without direct involvement in local 
affairs. 
Metaheterarchy and Neighbourhood Renewal 
The concept of metaheterarchy is central to understanding the way in which the East 
Durham LSP has developed its regeneration strategy. Neighbourhood Renewal is part 
of a central government programme, and the centre has had considerable influence in 
shaping the actions of local actors. It has done this in a number of ways. First, the 
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government has devised an indicator of deprivation to identify the areas which are in 
need of regeneration and the particular problems of those areas which need to be 
addressed. Second, the government has produced a National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 1998) and an Action Plan (SEU, 2001) which outline 
the government's understanding of the causes of deprivation and set out a list of 
national policies to tackle deprivation. It has also specified the improvements it wants 
to see in deprived neighbourhoods by setting a series of 'floor targets' (minimum 
standards for service delivery) in key policy areas. It has charged LSPs in the 88 
areas eligible for Neighbourhood Renewal Funding with the responsibility of 
producing local neighbourhood renewal strategies to translate the centre's vision into 
local actions. It has allocated substantial amounts of unhypothecated Neighbourhood 
Renewal funding to LSPs to deliver their local neighbourhood renewal strategies. 
In addition, the Local Government Act 2000 has also introduced an obligation on all 
local authorities to produce a community strategy. Community strategies cover much 
of the same ground as local neighbourhood renewal strategies, although they place 
much greater emphasis on the engagement of the local community in designing and 
delivering the strategy. The government issued detailed guidance on what was 
expected of Community Strategies, including suggestions as to which organisations 
should participate and the issues with which they should engage (ODPM, 2000). 
Although the guidance for the community strategies did not set a deadline for their 
completion, the government made the production of a community strategy a 
requirement for the payment of neighbourhood renewal funds in 2003. The centre 
has, therefore, shaped local strategy by producing its own framework strategy 
documents, by requiring local actors to produce strategies and by setting guidelines 
for the way in which they are to be produced, their form and content, and finally by 
making their completion a requirement for the payment of neighbourhood renewal 
funds. 
Nevertheless, there remams considerable flexibility in the way local strategic 
partnerships produce their local neighbourhood renewal strategies and community 
strategies. Whilst the government has specified the direction in which LSPs should 
progress and has documented examples of good practice (for example on its dedicated 
website - http://www.renewal.net), it has not specified how LSPs should go about 
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tackling the problems they face. The development of local regeneration strategy in 
East Durham is examined in chapter seven. 
In addition to the measures outlined above, central government also exerts a 
considerable influence on the delivery of regeneration programmes by local actors, 
and a whole range of other public services, through processes for monitoring, audit 
and accountability for public money. Local actors are required to produce (largely 
quantitative) measures of the performance of the programmes they implement to 
tackle deprivation which are monitored by central government. As will be described 
below, the need to monitor shapes the way in which programmes are designed and 
implemented. 
The influence of the centre on local regeneration is, therefore, twofold. First, the 
centre influences local regeneration strategy through the production of its own over-
arching strategy and by setting floor targets. This influences the problems which local 
actors identify and select for action. It does not, however, influence the way in which 
local actors address the problems they face. This has led a number of commentators 
to observe that the centre is devolving the responsibility for tackling local problems to 
local actors without necessarily ensuring that local actors have the resources to tackle 
those problems (see for example Bennett et al, 2000 for a study of regeneration in the 
former coalfields). Second, the centre influences the way in which local actors deliver 
regeneration programmes by imposing monitoring requirements and requiring that 
outputs be measured and reported to the centre. 
The latest tool to be deployed by central government to influence local actions is 
performance management. Performance management brings together strategy 
formation and the monitoring of service delivery into a single integrated process. 
This is perhaps the ultimate advanced liberal tool for shaping the conduct of local 
actors and will be examined further below. 
Meta-heterarchy and the technologies of advanced liberal government 
Having outlined the ways in which central government remains important in shaping 
local regeneration this section presents a more abstract account of the technologies of 
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advanced liberal government which lie behind these measures (Rose, 1999). The 
understanding that this enables is then deployed in subsequent chapters in a more 
concrete analysis of the formation and implementation of regeneration strategy in East 
Durham. 
Numbers 
Numbers play a central role in modem forms of government. Numbers of all sorts are 
collected, computed, compared, used in the identification of problems, the allocation 
of resources, the measurement of performance and the planning of services to name 
but a few examples. The governmentality approach shows the centrality of numbers 
in liberal political reason (Rose, 1999). Numbers operate as diagnostic instruments 
and help to make up the object domains upon which government is required to 
operate. The problems of government, such as deprivation, disadvantage and 
economic decline are made intelligible, calculable and practicable through 
representations that are, at least in part, numerical. Numbers which claim to represent 
states of affairs are indispensable to the complex technologies through which 
government is exercised. In this sense, numbers play a central role in making 
problems visible: "our images... are shaped by the realities of our society that 
numerical technologies appear to disclose" (ibid: 198). Numbers are so seamlessly 
integrated into liberal political reason and technologies of government that numbers 
come to actually constitute the domains they appear to represent. This is reflected in 
the vocabularies of political actors who now seek to reduce claimant counts, cut 
waiting lists and increase the number of pupils staying in education. Numbers are 
integral to the problematisations that shape what is to be governed, to the programmes 
that seek to give effect to government and to the unrelenting evaluation of the 
performance of government that characterises modern political culture (ibid). The 
organisation of political life in the form of the modem 'governmental' state has been 
intrinsically linked to the composition of networks of numbers connecting those 




Numbers and the East Durham Task Force 
Numbers have played a central role in the efforts to regenerate East Durham since the 
closure of the mining industry there. As the collieries were closed through the 1980s 
and into the 1990s the most important numbers were the numbers of jobs lost in the 
pits. The number of jobs lost defined the objectives for early regeneration strategies, 
including the Task Force's Programmes for Action. The first Programme for Action 
details the need to create 8,000 jobs to replace those lost in the mines (EDTF, 1991). 
Numbers had also previously been central to the District's attempts to prevent the 
closure of its collieries. The District had commissioned research to demonstrate the 
cost to the Treasury and impact of job loses in the mining industry and their 
associated multiplier effects on the local economy (Hudson, Peck and Sadler, 1984) 
and this formed the basis of the District's submission to the Trade and Industry Select 
Committee on the future of British energy policy (EDC, 1992). 
There are, however, remarkably few other numbers in the Task Force's first 
Programme for Action. The District's falling population is highlighted as an area of 
concern, as is the small proportion of people employed in professional activities in the 
District compared to the rest of the country. The District's poor health in relation to 
the rest of the Northern Region as recorded by the 1986 Townsend Report is noted, 
and passing reference is made to "a traditionally low rate of staying on at school after 
16" (EDTF, 1991: 3). The Programme also details the area of derelict colliery land to 
"tidy up" and the quantities of waste being deposited on the District's coastline. In 
the case of the Task Force's Programme for Action, numbers are clearly diagnostic 
instruments and play a central role in making up the object domains upon which 
government is required to operate. The work of the Task Force was dominated by 
efforts to create new jobs which operated to a significant degree through the 
redevelopment of derelict former colliery sites. 
It is also worth noting that the numbers the Task Force was using were essentially 
local numbers. This is in stark contrast to the numbers used by the LSP, as discussed 
below. Even the numbers of jobs lost in the pits were local numbers. The 
Programmes for Action rarely mention unemployment rates which would allow a 
comparison with the rest of the UK. Instead, the Task Force uses the absolute number 
of jobs required which, although striking, is not readily transportable (see below). 
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Whilst it is certainly the case that unemployment rates were unreliable indicators of 
the need for jobs (Beatty and Fothergill, 1996) they do at least allow distant policy 
makers to grasp the magnitude of the problem. Knowing that an area needs 8000 jobs 
only has impact if you know that the total working age population is only 48,000. 
Numbers and the East Durham LSP 
Numbers have assumed an even more significant role in the government of 
regeneration under the East Durham LSP. The numbers used here are qualitatively 
different and the context in which they are used changes their operation. Like the 
LSP itself, the numbers used are part of a central government programme. Under this 
new regime, numbers are combined to form indicators. Indicators do not just measure 
something, they allow it to be compared with a normative scale. The principal 
indicator is the Index of Multiple Deprivation which combines measures from a wide 
variety of sources on a number of different themes. The effect of the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation is explored below through the 'political sociology' (Rose, 1999) 
of numbers. 
The Index of Multiple Deprivation 
"Numbers appear to depoliticise whole areas of political judgement. .. by purporting 
to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making judgements, prioritising 
problems and allocating scarce resources" (Rose, 1999: 198). Such appearances, 
however, can be deceptive. Although numbers appear to offer a reduction in 
complexity, this is neither ideologically nor theoretically innocent: the social enters 
the statistical through the interests of those who produce the numbers. Theories will 
either implicitly or explicitly shape what is to be measured and how it is to be 
counted, the systems of classification which are adopted, how measurement is done 
and how often. This is widely recognised, however, and in order to counter the 
negative effect that this might have on an indicator, the government commissioned 
academic researchers at Oxford University to compile the IMD2000. By doing this, 
the government attempted to displace political disputes about the content of the 
indicator into technical disputes about methods. In the case of Easington, there were 
neither political nor technical disputes since the indicator proved highly satisfactory 
for the District - it showed it to be the most deprived outside London. This had 
significance for the District in terms of the allocation of resources. There were, 
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nevertheless, concerns at the time at which the index was compiled. Correspondence 
between the District's Head of Regeneration and the local MP detailed the District's 
concerns that the District's needs should be reflected in the revised index. Such 
concerns were revisited when the Index was revised again in early 2004. 
Furthermore, the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000 has raised a number of political 
questions which the East Durham LSP has had to deal with. Part of the LSP's role 
has been the prioritisation of spending on regeneration initiatives in the District. The 
LSP has faced opposition to its spending plans from a number of community 
representatives from wards ranked as more deprived by the IMD than those wards 
which were seen as the beneficiaries of the regeneration. Therefore, whilst numbers 
may have depoliticised whole areas of political judgement they can be problematic 
when actors wish to take political decisions about resources which appear to go 
against the purported needs revealed by the indicators. The IMD has served to 
depoliticise decision making for central government, which commissioned the 
indicator, but at the same time has added an extra dimension of contestation and 
politicisation to decision making at the local level. 
Numbers have two functions as far as the government of regeneration is concerned. 
First, as described above, they are used in targeting limited resources and subduing 
the political nature of the decisions which have to be taken. Their second function is 
more governmental and is founded on the intrinsic qualities of numbers. The power 
of numbers arises from their ordering capacity (Cline-Cohen 1982 in Rose 1999: 205). 
Enumeration creates a bond of uniformity around the objects counted. It is possible, 
therefore, using numbers to add unemployment to poor health and educational 
underachievement to produce an indicator of deprivation. In this way, numbers can 
sort out the combined effects of several components and hence stabilise a process that 
is in flux (ibid). The power of a single figure is a rhetorical technique for 'black 
boxing', that is to say rendering invisible and hence incontestable the complex array 
of judgements and decisions that go into a measurement or a scale. 
Furthermore, the numbers used in the government of regeneration in East Durham do 
not merely inscribe a pre-existing reality. They constitute it (Rose, 1999). 
Techniques of inscription and accumulation of facts about poverty render visible a 
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domain with a certain internal homogeneity and external boundaries. The collection 
and aggregation of numbers participate in the fabrication of a 'clearing' within which 
thought and action can occur. Numbers here help to delineate 'irreal spaces' for the 
operation of government, and to mark them out by a grid of norms allowing 
evaluation and judgement (ibid). 
Used in this way, numbers have enabled policy makers and politicians to designate 
the District of Easington as deprived. Deprivation as a category and a problem to be 
tackled by the Local Strategic Partnership has been created through the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation. There was considerable debate amongst members of the East 
Durham LSP at one of its early meetings as to whether the partnership should adopt 
the official terminology of 'deprivation'. Local public servants questioned whether 
this was a stigmatising label for the local community, but the members of the 
Community Network took the more pragmatic view that if being labelled deprived 
attracted the resources necessary to tackle their problems, they were 'happy' to be 
deprived. Now that deprivation has been officially identified and quantified by 
incontrovertible numbers, it has become the legitimate object domain of policy. It is 
at this point that the 'black boxing' of the indicator begins to work in reverse, and 
what it means to be deprived comes to be understood in terms of the measures that 
were included in the construction of the indicator. Policy is directed at changing the 
numbers which make up the indicator, since according to the technological rationale 
of government through numbers these are the problems which need to be tackled. 
This is examined in greater detail below in the context of regeneration strategy where 
we will see that strategy is shaped first and foremost to tackle indicators. This was 
particularly clear, for example, in the LSP's deliberations on its priorities for the 
allocation of the second round ofNeighbourhood Renewal Fund monies. Following a 
visit from the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in October 2003 the East Durham LSP 
was shown to be one of 26 which were furthest from the government's floor targets in 
health, education, employment and VAT registrations for businesses. The partnership 
has re-shaped its priorities to reflect these demands (LSP, 30.01.04). The 
partnership's new priorities are: 
• Increasing employment and enterprise 
• Reducing social exclusion and health inequalities 
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• Investing in young people 
• Restoring reassurance 
• Developing sustainable communities for the future 
This is a good example of the 'conduct of conduct' by central government. It is, 
however, more complex than the government using its floor targets to direct the work 
of local strategic partnerships. Members of the LSP are aware that the future of the 
NRU within government depends on its success in delivering the neighbourhood 
renewal agenda and that in order to secure future funding for East Durham it must co-
operate with the NRU to ensure that its priorities are delivered. 
Numbers and the centralisation of power 
In addition to their role in the formation of the object domains upon which 
government operates, numbers are crucial in the formation of centres of government. 
The work of Bruno Latour shows how it is possible to extend government over events 
and things that are distant through 'action at a distance' (Latour, 1987). Numbers 
play a central role as 'immutable mobiles' - they allow distant places to be literally 
re-presented in a form amenable to deliberation and decision at the centre. In the 
process, numbers function in these governmental relays as 'fidelity techniques', as 
means for ensuring the allegiance of those who are distant to decisions taken at the 
centre. The use of numbers by government in this way has been a defining feature of 
regeneration, although the nature of the techniques used has changed. The nature of 
these changes is explored below. 
Numbers were extensively used in the operation of the Single Regeneration Budget. 
In the early rounds, the emphasis was on quantitatively measured outputs. Bidders 
were required to provide details of the expected outputs of their proposals in terms of 
jobs created, qualifications achieved, numbers of homes improved and so on. They 
were then required to submit quarterly monitoring returns to the Government Office 
for the region providing details of the progress achieved against the targets set. In 
Easington, as in many other districts, the monitoring requirements of SRB and other 
Europe-funded regeneration programmes which had similar, but not compatible, 
monitoring requirements were so great that the council employed two dedicated 
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Monitoring Officers to fulfil its obligations. As the SRB evolved, and its emphasis 
shifted towards 'softer' regeneration measures, so the monitoring requirements 
changed from recording outputs to outcomes. 
The monitoring of the SRB by the centre, through the regional offices, represents a 
rather crude attempt to shape the nature of local regeneration. Whilst local areas were 
given the freedom to design and implement their own regeneration programmes, 
notwithstanding the constraints of the bidding guidance described earlier, they were 
nevertheless subject to a crude form of performance management by the centre. 
Having selected the proposals which it considered suitable to receive public money, 
the government then used the threat of withholding payment to ensure that, on paper 
at least, those programmes were delivered as promised. 
Government Floor Targets 
Following the introduction of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, the government's 
use of numbers was reconfigured along more advanced liberal lines. The 
constellations of numbers involved in managing regeneration became increasingly 
complex, and the whole process was closely tied in with the modernisation of central 
and local government. Quantification and new managerialist technologies spread to 
all government departments under the influence of the Treasury following the Public 
Spending Review 2000. The government's concern with the quality of public 
services, particularly in the poorest neighbourhoods, highlighted through the National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, led to the establishment of 'floor targets' across 
all government departments. These floor targets set the minimum standards which the 
government expected public services to meet in all areas. They included a diverse 
range of factors including crime rates, educational attainment and access to services. 
Government departments were committed to achieving these floor targets through 
Public Service Agreements. Through the floor targets and the Public Service 
Agreements, central government effectively defined the problems which local 
government, and other public services, had to tackle. These problems were defined in 
terms of numbers. Whilst the government specified the direction and magnitude of 
change required, it left the means to bring that change about to the discretion and 
imagination of the local level. 
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Central government numbers in the form of the floor targets and PSAs have shaped 
local neighbourhood renewal strategies. The government made it explicitly clear that 
this is what was expected of local authorities. Subsequently, these same numbers 
have been used by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit to assess the progress made by 
local renewal strategies. Unlike the SRB, the government is now assessing the 
progress of renewal against its own numbers. Whether this leads to improved renewal 
programmes will be assessed below. 
The processes by which the NRF has been monitored have evolved as the programme 
has unfolded. Local authorities have been given a significant degree of freedom in the 
ways in which they have managed their allocation. Their actions have nevertheless 
been shaped by the need to be accountable for the spending of public money and the 
ever-present threat of audit. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Easington decided to 
implement a system based closely on the SRB to administer its NRF allocation. The 
District not only based its accounting and monitoring systems on the SRB, it also 
established its own SRB-style competition to allocate the funding to projects within 
the District. The impact of this is considered in chapter eight. 
Performance management 
Performance management is a systems based approach to developing and delivering 
programmes. It is highly quantitative in nature and places great emphasis on the 
identification of baseline positions and setting targets for improvements in indicators 
of performance and outcomes. It is based on a structured approach to programme 
design, evaluation and review. Documentation of these procedures is central to 
effective performance management in order to allow the regular assessment of 
delivery against the targets set. 
The adoption of a performance management system has been made a condition of the 
receipt of NRF by the NRU which imposed a deadline of 31 March 2004 for LSPs to 
adopt an outline performance management system. Performance management does, 
however, pose significant problems for the LSP as there are many unresolved issues 
relating to the roles and responsibilities of the different organisations involved in the 
governance of regeneration through the partnership. This further highlights the 
ambiguous role of LSPs in delivering regeneration. How, for example, should the 
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performance of the LSP in improving educational attainment be managed when this is 
largely carried out by the local education authority? Partnership is too abstract a 
quality to be subject to performance management. 
The East Durham LSP has nevertheless enthusiastically embraced performance 
management and was already exploring the use of its tools when it was first 
announced that LSPs would also be subject to performance management. This 
reflects the enthusiastic engagement of the District Council, and particularly its leader, 
in the local government modernisation agenda (Napier, interview 30.06.03). It also 
provides an excellent example of metaheterarchy insofar as the centre plays a role in 
"modify[ing] the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities and interests of 
individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter[ing] 
their implications for preferred strategies and tactics." (Jessop, 2003: 6). The Council 
transferred its experience of performance management and its understanding of what 
was required by central government to secure continued financial support to the LSP 
before the centre had imposed the requirements from above. 
Performance management is perhaps the ultimate advanced liberal tool for shaping the 
conduct of local actors in regeneration. Its emphasis on self-regulation under the 
guidance of expertise, and of shaping patterns of inscription echoes Miller and Rose's 
(1990) study of the emergence of processes for constituting and governing a national 
economy. Performance management makes the work of LSPs technical and thereby 
governmental. 
Community 
A number of authors have interpreted the increasing involvement of the community in 
regeneration as an expression of the changes in patterns of governance which were 
explored in chapter three. At one level, and in some instances, the involvement of 
local communities in regeneration has broadened the range of actors and extended 
participation beyond the traditional boundaries of local government. But as a number 
of these studies have also shown, the participation of the local community is rarely on 
an equal footing with the more traditional local government actors. This rmses 
questions about the rationale of community participation in regeneration. The 
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governmentality approach, and in particular the writings of Rose (1996, 1999) offer 
an alternative explanation for the trend towards community involvement which 
provides an insight into the reasons for the experience of community participation. 
Community participation in Easington has been beset by numerous difficulties and 
tensions which shed light on the governmental function of the drive for greater 
community engagement. These difficulties are explored below. 
Community engagement: the East Durham Task Force 
The impetus for the engagement of the local community in the regeneration of East 
Durham has come largely from central government. The Task Force was not geared 
towards community participation. It viewed its work as technical and specialised and 
this left no room for community involvement. The Task Force's meetings were not 
public meetings and there was no community representation on any of the Task 
Force's committees. Public participation was limited to a 'road show' which toured 
the District in a converted double-decker bus (J Smith, interview, 14.03.03). 
Although the community were not engaged in the Task Force's processes for tackling 
the District's problems, the Task Force did recognise the need to work with the 
community to begin to address their problems. One of the Task Force's earliest, and 
one of its most controversial, projects was the East Durham Community Development 
Initiative. This project, which was managed by Durham Rural Community Council, 
received over £2 million from the RECHAR I programme and from the County 
Council to employ community development workers across the District. According to 
John Smith, this caused a great deal of tension and resentment between the District 
and the County Councils, since the District saw community development as its role 
and it viewed the involvement of the County Council, and in particular the nature of 
the project, as inappropriate. Even the community were reported to resent the 
initiative: "the first thing that we got back from the community was that they were a 
bunch of loony lefties who used to just sit around drinking coffee and smoking roll-
your-own fags." (ibid). 
The Task Force's Programmes for Action viewed community development largely in 
terms of developing physical infrastructure such as community centres and swimming 
pools (EDTF, 1991; 1993). The community were not seen as active participants in 
the regeneration of the District. Insofar as the community featured at all in the Task 
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Force's programmes, they were the location of a series of poorly understood problems 
which needed to be tackled, and this was done by imposing solutions on them. 
Although the role of the community was gradually expanded through programmes 
such as the Single Regeneration Budget (see chapter two) the Task Force's early 
approach to community engagement has had a profound impact on subsequent 
regeneration activity despite the shift in emphasis in central government policy. 
Community Engagement: the East Durham LSP 
As outlined in chapter two, community has been an increasingly important theme in 
central government regeneration policy since the mid 1990s. The evidence presented 
in this section will show that, although individual regeneration projects in the District 
responded to this shift in emphasis by engaging more with the local community, the 
attitude of key regeneration players in the District towards community engagement 
remained largely unchanged from the early days of the Task Force, so that by the time 
the LSP was developing its Community Strategy there was considerable divergence 
between central government and local actors. 
Chapter three outlined Nikolas Rose's arguments that a shift had taken place whereby 
many of the problems which were previously understood in terms of society were now 
understood through reference to community (Rose, 1996). Rose argued that "many 
programmes of government now operate upon the presupposition of such 
communities, even where the allegiances presupposed do not immediately appear to 
exist." (ibid: 336). This appears to be the case in East Durham. Rose continues, 
"Programmes of urban renewal, for example, imagine the plight of the inner city in 
terms of the loss of a 'spirit of community' with all the capacities of self-reliance, 
entrepreneurship and communal pride which such a spirit evokes. They attempt to 
'empower' the inhabitants of particular inner-city locales by constituting those who 
reside in a certain locality as 'a' community, by seeking out 'community groups' who 
can claim to speak 'in the name of the community' and linking them in new ways into 
the political apparatus in order to enact programmes which seek to regenerate the 
economic and human fabric of an area by re-activating in 'the community' these 
'natural' virtues which it has temporarily lost." (ibid: 336, emphasis in original). 
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The logic of community is central to the government's programme of neighbourhood 
renewal, notwithstanding the government's conflation of neighbourhood and 
community. In addition, there is a whole constellation of peripheral initiatives which 
seek to foster the creation of a community and enable the residents of a locality to 
participate. These include the Community Chests and the Community Empowerment 
Fund. Furthermore, government guidelines state that community participation is 
central to the success of neighbourhood renewal and is a prerequisite for the 
accreditation of local strategic partnerships. Although community representatives 
have one third of the voting places on the East Durham LSP observation at meetings 
has shown that their engagement in the work of the LSP has been minimal. There are 
a number of factors which explain this. First, although the community has a 
significant voting power on the LSP, the partnership has never actually voted on 
anything (Conway, interview, 17.07.03). Instead, decisions are taken 'on consensus' 
and although the community do occasionally seek to hold the executive to account 
they are ultimately powerless to act. Secondly, as Rose has suggested, the 
'community' with which the LSP engages is constituted through those individuals 
which are willing to take part. Although the community has one 'full time' 
representative who works closely with the partnership community representation is 
otherwise somewhat erratic which raises further barriers to the engagement of the 
community. Finally, the 'community' with which the LSP engages has been largely 
created for the purpose of engagement with the partnership. The District's main 
district-wide community organisation, the Council for Voluntary Services, went into 
liquidation shortly after the LSP was formed for reasons which are not altogether clear 
but appear to be as much political as financial (local informant, interview). Faced 
with the need to engage with the community, the LSP was central in shaping the 
Community Network which was developed to replace the CVS. The Community 
Network has at least one representative from each of the 26 wards in the District 
(Mackie, interview, 25.06.03). These members then represent the Network and the 
entire District on the LSP and its subgroups. This raises problems for the Network 
and for the partnership as a whole because, as previous studies have shown, the 
District is made up of a large number of communities with their own strong identities 
and, in some cases, significant antagonism exists between communities which 
increasingly view each other as rivals in the quest for regeneration funding. 
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The evidence presented above suggests that there is a significant mismatch between 
the advanced liberal logic which underlies the government's emphasis on community 
and reality of experience in the District. Central government's reliance on community 
as a governmental technology to secure regeneration has failed despite the 
considerable influence it has had over the governance of regeneration at the local 
level. This demonstrates that although a particular governmental technology may 
successfully shape the way that local actors work it will not necessarily be successful 
in itself in delivering the government's objectives. The success of meta-heterarchy 
can, therefore, be judged on two levels. On one level, the centre has influenced the 
conduct of local actors and meta-heterarchy can be judged to have been successful. 
However, in terms of delivering the centre's aims, namely neighbourhood renewal, 
meta-heterarchy could be said to have ultimately failed. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has presented evidence of the continuing role of the central state in the 
organisation of local regeneration. The evidence presented here counters those 
arguments that suggest that the central state is losing power to a range of local actors. 
Instead, the evidence shows that the central state remains powerful, although the 
nature of its power is changing. This insight is based on Foucault's distinctive 
conceptualisation of power as something positive and technical, rather than more 
traditional definitions which see power as negative and juridical (Foucault, 1982). In 
particular, the centre has been shown to influence local regeneration through the 
processes of meta-heterarchy. This chapter has analysed the technologies through 
which central government has been able to "modify the self-understanding of 
identities, strategic capacities and interests of individual and collective actors in 
different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies 
and tactics" (Jessop, 2003: 6). The evidence presented above suggests that the centre 
has achieved considerable success through the use of numbers, but that its reliance on 
the community as a technology of government has met with considerable resistance 
and faces significant challenges in shaping local regeneration. Although 
metaheterarchy may shape the way in which local actors work, by involving the 
community as members of the LSP for example, it does not necessarily shape the 
motivation behind their actions. This has implications for the outcome of 
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metaheterarchy and echoes the warnings of complexity theory presented in chapter 




Formulating regeneration strategy 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the formulation of regeneration strategy in the District in order 
to understand why the problems faced by the District remain so acute despite the 
concerted efforts of the Task Force and the Local Strategic Partnership over the last 
15 years. The two principal regeneration strategies on which the analysis is based are 
the East Durham Task Force's Programmes for Action (EDTF, 1991; 1993; 1997) and 
the East Durham LSP's Community Strategy (EDLSP, 2003). Other strategies will be 
examined in terms of their relationship to these documents. 
Developing a conceptual approach to strategy 
Strategy remains an under-theorised concept in the regeneration literature. The 
interviews with members of the LSP, for example, showed that although most were 
relatively senior members of organisations which produced strategies and claimed to 
act strategically, relatively few had given much, if any, consideration to the process of 
strategy formulation, at least in terms of the work of the partnership. This was 
reflected in the LSP's Community Strategy which, in large parts, reads more like a 
vision statement or a 'wish-list' of desirable outcomes than a strategy to influence the 
activity of a wide range of organisations. 
The concept of strategy which I deploy in this chapter is based on an understanding of 
strategy as a process, the goal of which is to shape the action of individuals and 
organisations in particular ways to produce specific desirable outcomes. Strategy as 
process, then, involves three key stages: 
1. the identification of problems which the strategy is to address and the 
preferred state of affairs which the implementation of the strategy is to create 
2. the devising of solutions, programmes or actions to move from the current 
undesirable situation to the desired state of affairs 
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3. the implementation of the strategy to deliver the solutions 
Each stage will potentially involve a range of stakeholders and actors representing 
different interests and organisations at different scales. Governance and 
metagovemance are essential concepts in understanding how these scales and interests 
relate to one another. 
The regeneration literature contains numerous examples of studies which have 
investigated whose needs and aspirations are addressed by particular regeneration 
strategies. There is also a rich body of evidence on who devises and who implements 
regeneration strategy (for example Raco and Flint, 2001 in Scotland, Raco 2000 in 
Cardiff, McCulloch, 2000 in Newcastle, Meegan and Mitchell, 2001 in Merseyside). 
Much of this literature is concerned with the (potential) conflict between professionals 
and local residents, or between different local interest groups in the identification of 
whose problems should be tackled and which groups are seen to be the beneficiaries 
of regeneration strategy. These debates are particularly pertinent in the District of 
Easington where deprivation is widespread and needs far exceed the limited resources 
available. Competition between villages for scarce regeneration resources is intense. 
This 'parochialism', as it is known amongst regeneration professionals in the District, 
has been a feature of numerous early LSP meetings where members ofthe community 
have objected to the allocation of resources to one village rather than their own. 
Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to the way in which problems are 
identified and the way in which policy makers devise solutions to those problems. 
This chapter seeks to uncover the ways in which regeneration policy makers devise 
solutions to the problems they have identified in order to move towards the desired 
outcome. This is done here in a critical-realist informed manner by seeking to 
identify the mechanisms which underlie particular policy prescriptions designed to 
tackle the problems identified. These mechanisms are identified through a process of 
retroduction from the policy documents themselves, and from interviews with the 
individuals involved in producing the policies. 
Although the District expenences many different problems strategy formulation 
inevitably involves a process of abstraction. This involves policy makers adopting 
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simplifying models of causation of the complex phenomena with which they want 
their strategy to engage. These processes are examined below for the Task Force's 
Programmes for Action and the LSP's Community Strategy. Identifying the 
organisational level at which these process of abstraction are undertaken has 
significant implications for understanding the governance of regeneration. 
The East Durham Task Force's Programmes for Action 
Identifying problems 
The Task Force was established in response to the closure of the coal mining industry 
in the District (EDTF, 1991 ). Although it recognised that the District faced "a 
complex mix of economic, social and environmental problems" (ibid: 1) its primary 
concern was to create jobs to replace those lost following the closure of the mines. 
Kingsley Smith, chair of the Task Force throughout the decade of its operation was 
unequivocal: "to be perfectly honest, what we wanted the partnership to do was to be 
focussed on achieving something significant, and we started off by saying 'we are 
creating this East Durham Task Force with the objective of creating 8000 jobs by the 
millennium'. We subsequently revised that to 10000. And if you are asking what 
made the Task Force successful, it is that clarity of focus on what it is that you are 
trying to achieve." (K Smith, 25.04.03) The Task Force defined the problems it 
sought to tackle first and foremost in terms of unemployment statistics and job losses 
from the mines. Almost everything the Task Force did, particularly in the first seven 
years of its operation, was directly linked to creating employment opportunities for 
local people. 
Devising solutions 
The Task Force's first programme stated that "the closure of collieries effectively 
requires the transfer of industrial jobs from underground to the surface. Hence the 
need to create sufficient factory floorspace to accommodate the number of jobs 
required to offset those that have been or will be lost." (EDTF, 1991: 9). The 
powerful imagery and simple logic of this approach make it instinctively appealing, 




The Task Force's approach had two main elements. First, the Task Force sought to 
provide the space and premises for manufacturing employment on serviced industrial 
estates. This necessitated the construction of a number of major new east-west road 
links to address the problems of inaccessibility in the District, the reclamation of 
derelict former colliery sites and the development of industrial land and premises. 
Secondly, the Task Force sought to remove the dereliction associated with the former 
mining industry in order to "make the District a more attractive place to live" (ibid: 
6), both for existing residents and the managers of the branch plants the Task Force 
hoped to attract. This included a major programme of environmental improvements 
for the District's coast and a rolling programme of settlement renewal. A number of 
subsidiary and less well developed proposals were also outlined for developing 
tourism, business support, training for the unemployed and 'community 
development'. These proposals take the form of assertions of what needs to be 
achieved rather than what needs to be done to achieve the desired goals. 
Implicit mechanisms 
The mainstay of the Task Force's approach to tackling the problems caused by the 
decline of mining in the District was to create new jobs for redundant miners as 
quickly as possible. The mechanism by which those jobs were to be created was 
through inward investment in the District by footloose manufacturing branch plants. 
The Task Force was clear that "the greatest potential for new investment and jobs 
must come from outside the region." (EDTF, 1991: 9). John Smith recalled, "I think it 
was hoped in those days that you would get a large manufacturing company coming 
into the North East. .. and we would accelerate and be fairly relaxed on the planning 
side to allow those big developments to establish themselves, look to the sort of 
funding they would require to set themselves up. Bearing in mind that the Task Force 
was also a lobbying organisation ... there was talk about Toyota coming to the North 
East. There was talk about one or two major industries, maybe a Bosch, some major 
international blue chip companies coming to the North East." (J. Smith, interview 
14.03.04). The Task Force's strategy centred on "getting the area's economic 
infrastructure right for revitalisation" (EDTF, 1991: 4). In other words, the Task 
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Force sought to develop the District's infrastructure in order to make it an attractive 
location for this type of investment. 
Reasons for the failure ofthe Task Force's Strategy 
Inappropriate mechanisms 
Where the strategy fails is m its understanding or appreciation of the economic 
circumstances of the contemporary world in 1991. First, although many miners were 
highly skilled men, many of their skills were specific to the mining industry and could 
not easily be transferred to modem manufacturing jobs of the type that the Programme 
sought to attract. In addition, many of the new jobs which were created preferred 
female labour. Pride Valley Foods, which located on the Enterprise Zone in Seaham, 
is typical in this regard. Mr Hossain Rezaei, founder and managing director of Pride 
Valley Foods, told the Financial Times, "Females are more reliable, more punctual, 
more loyal, neater and easier to train in repetitive jobs. Males are usually not so 
tolerant of boredom." (Financial Times, 26 September 1995). Second, whilst 8,000 
new industrial jobs on the surface, either in the District or, as the strategy 
acknowledges, "outside the area", would indeed go a long way towards solve the 
problems caused by the run down of the collieries, the likelihood of the District 
attracting those jobs was extremely small. Indeed the likelihood of the District 
attracting any net manufacturing employment growth was very small. Evidence for 
this is not hard to find. Indeed just six pages earlier in the same document, the Task 
Force outlined the bleak unemployment situation across the whole of the North East 
Coast region. The Task Force was aware of the challenge it faced in attracting inward 
investment on this scale. The first Programme states that "the competition for such 
projects is fierce and in order to compete there must be large advance factories 
available or the OPPORTUNITY to bid is lost" (ibid: 9, emphasis in original). 
Clearly the Task Force was aware that it was pursuing a high risk strategy. The 
following sections attempt to explain why the Task Force adopted this strategy and 
why, when it was clearly failing to work, the Task Force failed to change its approach 
and continued to pursue manufacturing inward investment. 
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The origins of the Task Force's approach 
Although the Task Force was heralded as a new initiative to tackle the District's 
problems, the solutions it proposed were not new and were incorporated from a 
number of existing sources to form the Task Force's Programme for Action. The 
Programme states that "Durham County Council and Easington District Council have 
worked together in partnership since 1985 to actively lobby both the European 
Commission and the UK Government for additional support for the area. As part of 
this process an ERDF supported study was commissioned in 1988 to examine the 
problems and opportunities of the area and its potential for new investment. The 
resulting report highlighted the initiatives needed to effect regeneration of the area -
"A NEW FUTURE FOR EAST DURHAM"." (EDTF, 1991: 2, emphasis in original). 
This report, produced by Ecotec Research and Consulting Ltd, strongly influenced the 
District and County Councils and has clearly shaped the Task Force's Programme for 
Action. 
Although the Task Force's Programme for Action is based on the report produced by 
the Ecotec consultants, large parts of the consultants' report were themselves based on 
documents produced by the District and County Councils themselves in the early 
1980s. This is clearly acknowledged in the report which states that "[T]he study 
follows the Programme for Action jointly prepared by Durham County Council, 
Easington District Council and Sunderland Borough Council in response to 
accelerating colliery closures and employment loss in the East Durham Coalfield." 
(Ecotec, 1988: 1). Indeed the Ecotec report reproduces the councils' own 1985 
programme in an appendix. In this sense, what the consultants were working with 
were the already expressed understandings and preferences of the local authorities in 
the District. Although they clearly earned their fee by producing a wide range of 
imaginative proposals, even if some look over-ambitious with hindsight, they were 
nevertheless developing and reproducing the local authorities' existing understanding 
of the problems. Once their findings had been published as an independent 
consultant's report, however, the ideas were able to re-enter local authority thinking 
bearing the added status and authority of having been produced by consultants. 
Therefore, rather than serving to open up a wider and deeper level of understanding, 
the use of consultants merely cemented the councils' thinking in a position it occupied 
in 1985. The lineage from the ECOTEC report through to the Programmes for Action 
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can be seen in a summary of the report produced by the County Council in 1988 
which is not only pictured in the first Programme for Action, but has a very similar 
structure and, on a more trivial level, bears striking similarities in its layout and 
illustration. The use of consultants by the District and County Councils in 1988 and 
the consultant's use of the councils' own documents from 1985 goes a long way 
towards explaining how a particular understanding of and approach to the District's 
problems became embedded in the Task Force's first Programme for Action. 
The 1985 "Communities in the East Durham Coalfield: a Programme for Action", 
produced by the county and district councils, sets out both the councils' understanding 
of the problems they face and the programmes that they were pursuing to tackle them. 
Much of the analysis is based on 1981 census data and other statistics from the late 
1970s. The Programme outlines plans for road building, the provision of industrial 
units, settlement renewal and environmental improvements. Although these plans 
have been elaborated and further developed by the Ecotec consultants in their 1988 
report, the solutions adopted by the Task Force in 1991 and re-stated in 1997 are 
grounded in an understanding of the problems and the solutions designed to tackle 
them which are rooted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The use of consultants and 
the independent status of their report goes a long way towards explaining how these 
proposals could be incorporated largely unchanged in the Task Force's Programme 
for Action. Other explanations are needed, however, to understand why, once 
incorporated in the Programme for Action, this approach remained largely unchanged 
throughout the 1990s despite significant changes in the political and economic context 
in which the Task Force operated which rendered its programme largely ineffective. 
Failure to change 
The Task Force's second Programme produced only two years after the first 
Programme states "In terms of future job prospects, it is not expected that new 
industrial development (either inward investment or local business) will fully bridge 
the unemployment gap. The wider experience of the Region suggests that the 
manufacturing sector is unlikely to be a major net contributor to employment up to the 
end of this decade." The Programme continues, "whilst welcoming new industrial 
development, there must also be an emphasis on non-industrial employment, tourism 
being a particular case in point." (EDTF, 1993: 7). The 1997 Programme opens with 
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a report of the closure of the Mattei factory in Peterlee and the growing "competition 
from other locations world-wide" for this type of inward investment (EDTF, 1997: ii). 
There is, however, little change in the Task Force's Programme, and the provision of 
industrial land and premises remain central in both the 1993 and 1997 revisions of the 
Programme. This raises interesting questions about why the Task Force failed to 
respond to these changing circumstances. 
Stability at the top 
Although the Task Force's Programme 'softened' to some extent by 1997, its central 
focus remained the attraction of inward investment into the district through the 
provision of infrastructure in order to create jobs to replace those lost in the mining 
industry. As outlined above, the Task Force was aware that this strategy was 
becoming less credible as inward investment in the North East as a whole fell 
throughout the 1990s, but it failed to respond with changes in its approach. One 
possible explanation for this comes from the culture and, in particular, the 
personalities which dominated regeneration at the County Council, and consequently 
the work of the Task Force, throughout a large part of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Interviewees observed that the Task Force was virtually single-handedly driven by 
two men - Kingsley Smith, the Chief Executive of the County Council, and Ken 
Frankish, the County's Director of Economic Development (Figure 16 below). The 
commitment, energy and enthusiasm which these two men devoted to the Task Force 
and the District is beyond question. Their level of involvement and dedication was 
widely admired from both the county and the district councils. Their strong 
leadership from the front did, however, leave its mark on the operation of the Task 
Force and could perhaps be one of the reasons why it was slow to respond to the 
changing political and economic circumstances of the 1990s. This echoes research 
conducted by Schoenberger (1997) into the leadership of some of America's largest 
companies which also failed to respond to changing circumstances as a result of the 
domination of their management structures by individuals who had been in post for a 
long time. 
The direction taken by the Task Force closely reflected the interests and experience of 
its two main leaders. Kingsley Smith was, and still is, the Chief Executive of the 
County Council and had a background in finance, whereas Ken Frankish had a 
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background in planning (J Smith, interview, 14.03.03). Both men had considerable 
experience of implementing regeneration programmes to deal with the consequences 
of economic decline. These included the closure of Consett steelworks and Shildon 
wagon works, as well as the closure of a large number of mines across the county. 
Both men also brought qualities to the Task Force which were instrumental in its 
successes but also militated against the adaptation of the Task Force's strategy. For 
the chairman, this was "an absolute clarity of focus on what you are trying to achieve" 
(Kingsley Smith, interview 25.04.03), namely 8000 new jobs. One member of the 
Task Force observed that "Ken Frankish, he was bullish. But we wouldn't have a link 
road down to Seaham if it wasn't for Ken. He would take on the world and still come 
back for another fight. A tremendous powerhouse. He wouldn't be fobbed off by 
politicians ... he wouldn't be fobbed off by arguments from individuals." (J Smith, 
interview, 14.03.03). 
Figure 16 Ken Frankish and Kingsley Smith launch the Task Force's first 
Programme for Action, September 1991 
(Source: The Newcastle Journal, 17 September 1991) 
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It is not my intention to suggest that Ken Frankish and Kingsley Smith were in any 
way autocratic leaders. It appears to be more the case that they had vision and 
determination and that there were few other people in the District at the time who 
were able to exercise such authority or influence. For example, the District Council 
did not have an economic development team until 1996 and even today it is limited by 
its small size in its ability to commit the resources it would wish to policy 
development (Wilding, interview 04.04.03). 
The District was ill-prepared for colliery closure 
The inability of the District of Easington to deal with the problems created by colliery 
closure was not, however, a simple lack of capacity or resources, although both these 
were significant elements. The politics of pit closure also influenced the District 
Council's ability to plan for the run-down of mining in the District before the Task 
Force was established. By the late 1980s the future of mining in the District was in 
the balance and the national political context was hostile. Relationships with British 
Coal in the late 1980s were delicate, so that in their attempts to end the tipping of 
colliery waste on the District's beaches, for example, "local politicians were faced 
with the dilemma of 'do we put pressure on British Coal at the risk of closing the 
collieries down?"' (Smith, interview 14.03.03). 
The District Council was also heavily involved in campaigns to save the local mining 
industry from closure. This political activity had repercussions for the Council's 
ability to plan for the consequences of colliery closure. Paul Wilding, who was 
District Planning Officer in Easington in the early 1990s and a member of the Task 
Force, described the colliery review procedure whereby Trades Unions and local 
politicians would attempt to argue the case for the continuation of mining in the 
District's pits against the National Coal Board, supported by expert mining engineers, 
who sough to prove that the collieries were already unproductive, unprofitable and 
ready for closure: "Now, in that context, it was anathema locally to accept that the 
case for the continuation of the pit wasn't sustainable. So, I think it is fair to say that 
the local politicians had to work on the basis that their arguments were going to be 
successful through the colliery review procedure." (Wilding, interview 04.04.03). 
Planning for colliery closure was not totally neglected, however. "I can remember 
working on a reclamation scheme for Horden Colliery, and it was practically done 
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under the table because the review process was still gomg on. We didn't have 
confidence that it was going to be won, and we knew that we had to start work, had to 
start doing something." (ibid). Nevertheless, the way in which collieries were closed 
and the implication of local politicians in efforts to save mining jobs placed the local 
authority in a difficult position. The District of Easington found it difficult to 
reconcile the contradictory tasks of campaigning to save coalmining jobs whilst at the 
same time planning for their demise. This difficulty is thrown into sharp relief when 
considered alongside the close relationship between local politics and the mining 
industry in the District, with several prominent local politicians also serving Trades 
Union representatives and numerous others former miners (including the District's 
Member of Parliament, John Cummings). Consequently, "that led to the fact that the 
local authorities couldn't officially tum their minds to 'what are we going to do when 
these pits are gone' because that would ... you couldn't believe that they weren't 
going to be there. That wasn't allowed!" (ibid). 
The problems of planning locally for the impact of colliery closure, according to Ken 
Greenfield, former Chief Environmental Services Officer at the District Council, were 
compounded by the absence of planning and preparation by central government. He 
drew comparisons with the District's twin town in Germany where government 
initiatives had been put in place and colliery closures announced up to a decade in 
advance and consequently much had been done to mitigate the negative impact of 
colliery closure (Greenfield, interview 01.04.03). This was corroborated by Paul 
Wilding:" ... there was no concept of planning for closure as there was in Germany ... 
That is something I believe was a failure of national government at the time." 
(Wilding, interview 04.04.03) This underlines the significance of the national 
political context in Britain and the tensions between the conservative central 
government and a labour local authority dominated by unionised mining interests. 
The County Council was in a much stronger position to respond to the demise of 
coalmining in the District. The County had the advantage of being one step removed 
from the political struggle between the District and the government over the future of 
the mines. Furthermore, the County Council had four decades of experience of mine 
closure. The County Council's approach, therefore, was "to say, look, the coalmines 
have gone. If they don't go this year, they'll go next year or the year after. They've 
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gone, lets focus our attention on East Durham whilst central government might be 
focussing their attention on East Durham because in five years time it will have all 
closed and everybody will have forgotten about East Durham." (Frankish, interview 
08.04.03). The creation of the East Durham Task Force, which was unanimously 
acknowledged to have been driven by the County Council, can be seen as both 
politically astute and a pragmatic response to the threat to the closure of the collieries, 
but one which was made significantly easier by the County's distance from the 
immediacy of the threat of closure. To say that the "County Council took the broader 
view. . . the more strategic view" (ibid) should not distract attention from the 
constrictions placed on the District Council by the national political context in which 
the mines were closed. 
Turmoil in the District Council 
The District Council's ability to engage with the Task Force was further undermined 
by political turmoil in the District. The 1990s was a turbulent decade for the District 
Council, and this had a number of impacts on efforts to regenerate the District. 
Perhaps the most dramatic impact was the failure of the SRB round 3 bid for the 
regeneration of Seaham which was widely attributed to the influence of one man -
Bill Scorer. The District's capacity to engage with regeneration was further 
undermined by a series of disputes, personal rivalries and tense professional 
relationships within the council. 
Trouble for the District Council started early in the life of the Task Force. Ken 
Frankish observed from the County: "you get a small authority where members and 
officers, you know, their roles become blurred, and you are heading for disaster if you 
do that. And I think that is what happened. And, obviously, there was lots of trouble, 
lots of turmoil. There was Peter Innes going, who was Chief Executive. He was 
brought in, actually, he was brought in to sort things out and then he went as well! 
And there was all sorts of in-fighting, some chief officers getting on with some 
members, and others getting on with other members and rivalry within the District 
Council. A right mess! A right mess!" (Frankish, interview 08.04.03). Another local 
informant explained Peter Innes' departure: "at the time, within the District Council, a 
split developed politically within the Labour Party, and that was largely on the basis 
that Peter Innes, the General Manager in the early 1990s had essentially fallen out 
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with the political leadership and was subjected to attempts to oust him and that took a 
long time to resolve." (local informant, interview). 
Paul Wilding related the failure of the District's SRB round 3 bid to the turmoil in the 
District: "these things didn't go unnoticed at regional level. The disharmony between 
the District Council and the County Council was noted, the internal strife within this 
council was noted ... they couldn't see the stability that was necessary, the political 
stability to make that a success. And I could well understand that they got the jitters 
about that. And it took us a year or so to get over that, to regain that stability and to 
get the funding streams coming through to make that [the regeneration of Seaham] a 
reality." (Wilding, interview 04.04.03). Another local informant specifically named 
Bill Scorer as the reason that the District's SRB round 3 bid was rejected. This is in 
stark contrast to the bids for European RECHAR funding which were made through 
the Task Force mechanisms and "found a load of favour with Government Office" 
(Smith, interview 14.03.03). 
Within the District Council rivalries were apparently commonplace and there appears 
to have been little common purpose or team spirit. This clearly influenced the 
District's engagement with the Task Force. "I always got the feeling that it [the Task 
Force] was seen as Ken [Greenfield]'s baby by certain other chief officers ... I felt 
Ken [Greenfield] was often maligned, as was Paul [Wilding], by some fairly powerful 
officers who have influence and maybe fed that message back to councillors." (Smith, 
interview 14.03.03). The scale of the problems at the council were such that the Local 
Government Ombudsman, in an investigation of the way the council handled a 
planning application by Bill Scorer1, was reported as saying that "in all her experience 
she had never encountered 'such feuding and ill-feeling within a council"' (Northern 
Echo, 03.10.01) 
1 Bill Scorer, an executive director of the council and head of economic development, was granted 
planning permission to extend a cottage he owned despite it being in a conservation area and running 
counter to the council's local development plan. When the council's legal officer advised members of 
the planning committee to declare a non-pecuniary interest in the application, Mr Scorer made a formal 
complaint and the officer was suspended. Neighbours lodged a complaint of mal-administration with 
the Local Government Ombudsman and the fraud squad were called in (ibid). Bill Scorer subsequently 
took early retirement. 
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The work of the economic development directorate of the Council was also made 
more difficult by the high rate of staff turnover it experienced throughout the late 
1990s and during the period I was a (participant) observer. During a five year period, 
the directorate lost 10 members of staff, including two directors, a head of unit and six 
officers. This was particularly significant given the small size of the directorate. Of 
the staff who left, Bill Scorer 'retired' (see footnote above), another took early 
retirement on health grounds, one was dismissed for misconduct, and the remainder 
moved on to better paid jobs elsewhere. Although it is not possible to say why 
turnover was so high one informant referred to the poor working environment and a 
lack of support from senior colleagues as factors in their decision to leave, and the 
fact that the council had advertised a vacancy before the informant had formally 
resigned. 
The East Durham Local Strategic Partnership 
The East Durham Task Force had a clearly defined purpose. It was a force assembled 
to perform a specific task. The role of the East Durham LSP, in contrast, is much less 
clear-cut. It was established as part of a government programme designed to improve 
the coordination between local public sector service providers which in turn was 
supposed to address the intractable problems of deprived neighbourhoods. The East 
Durham LSP is not, therefore, a local initiative, but forms part of a central 
government programme to tackle deprivation. LSPs have subsequently become 
entangled in the margins of the government's local government modernisation 
agenda. 
The East Durham LSP has produced two strategy documents, both at the direction of 
central government. 
published in 2002. 
The first, the Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy was 
This was followed less than 12 months later by the LSP's 
Community Strategy. These documents are considered in turn below. 
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The Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy 
The East Durham LSP produced its Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy for the 
District in July 2002. The strategy "seek[s] to improve services in six key areas ... 
closely linked to the Government's national floor target areas." (EDLSP, 2002: 1). 
The Strategy has chapters which address crime and community safety, employment, 
environment, health, housing and lifelong learning. Each chapter begins with a 
statement of the national floor target set by central government. The strategy then 
presents summary statistics for each thematic area which compare Easington with the 
rest of England. The local neighbourhood renewal strategy largely translates the 
national strategy into local language rather than developing a local approach to local 
problems. This is true for all areas except crime and disorder, where recorded crime 
in the District is actually substantially lower than the national average, and the 
environment. In relation to crime and disorder, the LNRS outlines the existing 
District of Easington Crime and Disorder Strategy 2002-2005, a statutory strategy 
produced by the District's Community Safety Partnership. In relation to the 
environment, the government's floor targets relate to air quality and the recycling of 
household waste whereas the District's environmental concerns relate to derelict land 
and buildings and settlement renewal and the LNRS sets out its proposals for these 
areas. 
The Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy has been largely sidelined by the 
Community Strategy. The guidelines for the production of community strategies 
stated that where deprivation was a local issue it should be addressed through the 
community strategy even though it acknowledged that this would involve significant 
overlap with the LNRS (ODPM, 2000). The analysis presented here focuses on the 
Community Strategy as the primary strategy of the Local Strategic Partnership, 
although it must be acknowledged that some of the detail is contained in the LNRS. 
The Community Strategy 
The East Durham LSP published its Community Strategy in summer 2003 in order to 
comply with a deadline imposed by the government. The District Council, as the 
body with the statutory responsibility for the production of the community strategy 
(Local Government Act, 2000), took the lead in producing the strategy. The strategy 
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contains contributions from each of the six Implementation Groups of the LSP and 
was formally approved by the partnership at a meeting on 16 April2003. 
Identifying problems 
The broad terms of the LSP's remit and the issues it should address through the 
Community Strategy are set out by central government in the National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal. The need to improve coordination between public services, 
to "tackle the root problems of unemployment, crime and poor services" and "new 
ideas to empower communities" (SEU, 2001: 24) are all outlined in the National 
Strategy. The issues that LSPs should address are further specified in the 
government's floor targets (see chapter six). The role of the LSPs is to devise a 
strategy to tackle these issues that is sensitive to the local context and responds to the 
needs and wishes oflocal people. 
The East Durham LSP's Community Strategy addresses a complex range of problems 
which relate to the responsibilities of its six thematic sub-groups. The Community 
Strategy is in fact a hurriedly 'cut and pasted' amalgam of six separate strategies 
which have somewhat confusingly been reduced to four thematic areas. The six 
strategies which form the basis of the Community Strategy were produced by the six 
Implementation Groups of the LSP. Many of the inadequacies of the Community 
Strategy can be explained in large measure by the tight timescale for its production 
imposed on the LSP by the government which made the production of a strategy a 
requirement for the payment ofNeighbourhood Renewal Fund money in 2003. 
In broad terms, therefore, the LSP's approach to the District's problems is shaped by 
the partnership's structure. The six implementation groups have shaped the way in 
which the partnership has approached regeneration. The divisions between traditional 
policy domains reflected in the structure of the implementation groups resulted in a 
rigid organisation-centred approach to the problems of the District. The shift towards 
closer engagement between different organisations and different 'sectors' which is 
beginning to emerge has significant implications for the governance of regeneration, 
and these are considered in chapter eight. The problems identified by the LSP which 
its Community Strategy is designed to tackle are listed in Table 13 below. 
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Table 13 The problems identified irn the IL§P's ComrmJnitv Strategy 
Economy 
Business sites across the district are of varying ages and quality. 
Many businesses are in manufacturing with a small number of high-technology 
employers, a high proportion of small businesses and low business start up rates. 
There continues to be a steady loss of jobs from manufacturing and textiles, in 
addition to those lost from mining. 
The majority of the communities within the district need support to improve their 
local economies. 
Communities and businesses in the district are disadvantaged because they are 
unable to access Broadband technology. 
There is a current mismatch between employer skill requirements and resident 
skill levels. 
Childcare and transport provision are poor, and there are high levels of poverty 
which limit opportunity and access to jobs. 
Environment 
There are high levels of derelict land and property, presenting a poor image, some 
land may also be contaminated through industrial usage. 
There is an oversupply of houses and properties in poor condition in both the 
public and private sector. 
The district is restricted m the s1ze and type of land available for housing 
developments that people want. 
There is a need to reduce energy consumption and save resources to provide a 
cleaner and healthier quality of life for now and the future. 
There are a lack of open spaces and leisure opportunities. 
The district has low levels of car ownership and some communities are isolated 
making it difficult for people to get to work, go shopping or access leisure 
facilities. 
Lifelong Learning Culture 
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There are significant numbers of parents I carers of young children within our 
community who are unable to take up learning, training, development and 
employment opportunities. 
There is still a big difference between the achievement in our schools and those in 
the region and nationally. 
There are low levels of interest throughout our communities to engage m 
educational, vocational and learning for fun. 
There is no co-ordinated approach to the provision of information, advice and 
guidance for those wishing to take up learning opportunities. 
Levels of literacy and numeracy skills are low when compared with other parts of 
the region and national levels and this affects the quality of life of residents. 
Strong, safe and healthy community 
Many people in the district do not actively take part in community life. 
At present young people are excluded from involvement in decision making, and 
are powerless in influencing the future of the district. 
Crime, drugs and disorder and the fear of crime, drugs and disorder impact on the 
quality of visitors, residents, employers and employees within the district. 
There are some serious health problems within the district, death rates due to 
coronary heart disease are 40% higher than the rest of the country and mental ill 
health is 33% higher than the national average. 
The quality of life of many children in the district is poor. 
(Source: EDLSP, 2003) 
The LSP's Community Strategy identifies a wide range of problems faced by the 
District. These range in their specificity from very general, such as the low levels of 
aspiration of the District's residents, to the very specific, such as the quality of 
business premises available in the District. The nature of the problems which have 
been identified reflect both the broad remit set for the LSP by the government and the 
way in which the LSP went about identifying local issues. The way in which the LSP 




The statutory guidance issued alongside the Local Government Act 2000 governing 
the production of community strategies sets out the requirement for local authorities 
to involve the local community in the production of community strategies (ODPM, 
2000). The East Durham Community Strategy was nominally drawn up on the basis 
of a series of community appraisals (EDLSP, 2003). This is, however, slightly 
misleading since, although community appraisals were undertaken across the District, 
they were carried out in 2001, two years before the Community Strategy was 
produced, and in connection with a European Social Fund project (EDC, 2002). It 
was, however, politically expedient for the LSP to harness the connotations of 
consultation associated with the community appraisals when it came to produce the 
Community Strategy. In reality, the community consultations bear little relation to 
the Community Strategy. Indeed the Community Strategy has little to do with 
community at all. 
Furthermore, community 'appraisal' is not without problems, as Mackie observed, 
"They did community appraisals through Roger Tym and Partners [consultants], and I 
think that sort of directed them to where they were going to allocate NRF. The only 
trouble with the community appraisals was, depending on who you talk to in the 
community ... and I had conversations with people who said 'when did they do them, 
like, nobody asked me?' That kind of thing. I'm not saying that Roger Tym did a bad 
job ... " (Mackie, interview, 25.06.03). Napier, however, considered the consultants 
sample of between 8 and 10% of the District's population to be more than adequate 
(Napier, interview, 30.06.03). The problem here is not the size of the sample or the 
quality of the consultants work, both of which appear adequate, but the way in which 
community consultation informed the work of the LSP. The selection and use of 
consultants through competitive tender by the council will have undoubtedly 
influenced the nature of the feedback it received from the community consultation. 
Furthermore, the process of consultation will have influenced the community's 




Influence of the partnership's structure 
The Community Strategy was produced whilst I was a (participant) observer at the 
District Council. The Chairs of each of the LSP's six implementation groups each 
contributed a separate section which the Council then synthesised to produce the 
strategy. The structure of the partnership was, therefore, reproduced in the structure 
of the strategy. Since the strategy was not produced as a complete document in its 
own right by the LSP acting as a single organisation, it is necessary to consider how 
each of the implementation groups identified the problems which they sought to 
address through their contribution to the strategy. This question is addressed below. 
Partners ' existing priorities and strategies 
Member organisations of the LSP have simply brought their existing strategies to the 
partnership to be incorporated into the Community Strategy. Public sector 
organisations such as the District Council, the Primary Care Trust, the Local 
Education Authority and voluntary sector organisations such as Groundwork East 
Durham have each brought their existing strategies and corporate plans to the LSP and 
elements of them all can be seen in the Community Strategy. So, for example, the 
Community Strategy contains the distilled essence of the Housing Directorate's 
Housing Strategy (Caygill, interview 08.07.03) and reflects Groundwork's 
longstanding commitment to environmental improvements in the District (Richards, 
interview, 27.06.03). The Community Safety Partnership's Crime and Disorder 
Strategy has also been integrated into the Community Strategy (Arkley, interview 
02.07.03). 
Indeed the logic behind the government's proposals for local strategic partnerships 
and community strategies was that they should integrate the strategies of a wide range 
of organisations in order to secure better coordination. What this logic doesn't allow 
for, and what the hype surrounding the introduction of LSPs masks, is that the 
strategies which individual organisations bring to the table for incorporation in the 
umbrella community strategy may in themselves be flawed and inappropriate. 
Furthermore, rather than taking the opportunity to develop a new and holistic 
understanding of the District's problems and the potential solutions, the production of 
the community strategy has simply been an exercise in fitting together existing 
strategies. Whilst this has served to raise awareness amongst partner organisations of 
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the joint challenges they face it has produced very little that is new in terms of 
tackling the District's problems. 
The working of the partnership has done little to break down the barriers between 
sectors and organisation in terms of understanding the problems faced by the LSP. 
These barriers have been reinforced by the structure of the implementation groups. In 
the first three years of its operation at least, although the formal institutional 
arrangements put in place by the LSP suggested that inter-organisational 
arrangements were being re-configured along the lines of governance, the reality in 
terms of the way in which the new organisation identified the problems its strategy 
was to target was little different from more traditional forms of organisation. 
Furthermore, many of the priorities of the organisations which contributed to the LSP 
are driven by central government and are not even local. These are addressed below. 
Influence of the East Durham Task Force 
Many of the problems identified in the Community Strategy are familiar from the 
Task Force's Programmes for Action. This is significant for a number of reasons. 
First, it draws attention to the fact that many of the problems the Task Force set out to 
tackle remain. This could reflect the scale and intractability of the problems, but it 
could also point to the inadequacy of the Task Force's approach to tackling these 
problems. Second, the continued emphasis on projects such as road building, 
industrial land and settlement renewal suggests that the same conceptual approach to 
the District's problems that structured the work of the Task Force remains in the LSP. 
Given the failure of the Task Force's overall approach, this raises concerns about the 
ability of the LSP to tackle these issues. 
The main reason that many of the Task Force's priorities have re-appeared in the 
LSP's community strategy is that the same organisations were involved in devising 
and implementing both strategies. In a number of cases, the same people were 
involved in both the Task Force and the LSP. This is particularly the case in relation 
to the District and County Council's economic development directorates and the 
District Council's housing directorate. 
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The LSP's approach to developing a "thriving economy in 2010" in particular 
identifies a number of problems which are familiar from the Task Force's 
Programmes for Action. The first problem raised, although without any explicit 
prioritisation, is the varying age and quality of business sites and premises across the 
district (EDLSP, 2003) and the need to "ensure a good choice of industrial and 
commercial land and premises are available" (ibid: 12) (Figure 17). Similarly, 
unemployment remains a significant concern, especially given the continuing loss of 
jobs from manufacturing and clothing and textiles in addition to those lost from 
mining in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although greater prominence is given to the 
mismatch between employer skill requirements and residents' skill levels in the 
Community Strategy than in the Task Force's Programmes the LSP's emphasis 
remains on job-related skills. The LSP also reiterates the Task Force's emphasis on 
developing the tourism sector within the District, in particular in relation to the 
coastline. 
Figure 17 New premises to let, Whitehouse Point, Peterlee 
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The section of the Community Strategy which deals with the environment also 
contains a number of familiar themes from the Task Force's Programmes for Action. 
The first problem raised, again without any explicit prioritisation, is the "high levels 
of derelict land and property presenting a poor image" (EDLSP, 2003: 13) echoing the 
concerns of the Task Force (EDTF, 1991). The poor condition of the District's 
housing stock, both public and private, and the oversupply of poor quality houses was 
an issue faced by the Task Force and remains a challenge for the LSP. The 
Community Strategy also outlines the need to build new roads in order to improve 
access to the District and counts among its future measures of success the completion 
of road building projects first outlined in the 1985 "Communities in the East Durham 
Coalfield" programme. The fact that these issues are still being addressed in the 
LSP's community strategy reflects the scale of the problems and the resources needed 
to tackle them. 
The Community Strategy also outlines measures relating to community safety in its 
proposals to secure "a strong, safe and healthy community in 2010." Although the 
strategy provides virtually no details, community safety was an element of the Task 
Force's final Programme for Action (EDTF, 1997). 
The influence of the centre 
The role of central government in shaping the neighbourhood renewal agenda through 
its National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and in further directing the work of 
local public services through its floor targets for service improvements in the most 
deprived areas has already been clearly spelled out above and in chapter six. The 
influence of the centre has been particularly significant in defining new fronts on 
which LSPs are to tackle deprivation. The lifelong learning agenda is one example. 
As a result of the government's lifelong learning agenda, the East Durham LSP now 
employs a full time Lifelong Learning Co-ordinator, funded through the NFR, and has 
produced a Lifelong Learning Strategy (EDLSP, 2003). The engagement of 'the 
community' in service planning and the development of the Community Strategy is 
another central government agenda. The East Durham LSP has struggled to meet the 




The influence of central government in local public services extends far beyond 
neighbourhood renewal. Central government targets, monitoring and policy heavily 
influence the work of the police, health service and local education authority as well 
as the District Council. This in turn feeds back into neighbourhood renewal and the 
Community Strategy. The Community Safety Partnership's Crime and Disorder 
Strategy is a prime example. Government policy requires the local authority and the 
police to work together in partnership and produce a strategy to reduce crime and 
disorder. In East Durham, this Crime and Disorder Strategy feeds directly into the 
Community Strategy (Arkley, interview 02.07.03). The inclusion of the District 
Council's Housing Improvement Plan similarly reflects the incorporation of central 
government policy into local regeneration strategy (Caygill, interview 08.07.03) 
The role of central government in shaping the contents and approach of the 
community strategy to the problems of the District highlights the importance of the 
central state in the project of neighbourhood renewal. There is no suggestion that the 
issues raised by the central state are not significant or should not be included in the 
Community Strategy, but they serve as a reminder that a serious reading of local 
governance should at least consider the national political environment. 
Devising solutions 
Turning to the measures proposed in the Community Strategy, there is a distinct lack 
of detail in the actions outlined to tackle the District's problems. This could reflect 
the fact that the Community Strategy was written as a summary document with the 
intention of producing a number of subsidiary action plans where the details are 
worked out. This is not the case however, and no action plans have been produced to 
date (with the exception of the Community Safety Implementation Group whose 
contribution was based on the pre-existing statutory plans of the Community Safety 
Partnership, and the Action for Housing and Communities Implementation Group 
which is taking forward the District Council's Housing Strategy). The lack of detail 
in the Community Strategy reflects the fact that the Strategy was produced to meet a 
requirement imposed by the centre and in a short timescale to comply with the 
government's requirements for the payment ofNeighbourhood Renewal Funds. The 
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LSP had spent the first three years allocation of its Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
money before it had produced the strategy. The strategy was not, therefore, part of 
the LSP's own processes of tackling the District's problems. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the strategy does not contain the logical working through of problems 
and solutions that might be expected. Although the Community Strategy has 
subsequently been 'adopted' as the LSP's guiding document, its significance is more 
symbolic than material. This leaves the question of the origin of the LSP's solutions 
to the District's problems, and especially those implemented before the strategy was 
produced, unanswered. Evidence from observation at the LSP's meetings is presented 
below to address this question. 
An outline of the LSP 's solutions to the District's problems 
Although the LSP's strategy has significant weaknesses as outlined above, and the 
partnership relies on rather arbitrary processes for the identification of solutions to 
implement its strategy (see below), it is nevertheless possible to deduce its general 
approach to tackling the problems it has identified in the District from the strategy. 
The Community Strategy outlines four priority areas: the economy, the environment, 
the lifelong learning culture, and strong, safe and healthy communities. In order to 
create a "thriving economy in 2010", the LSP proposes a strategy based on creating 
the physical infrastructure to attract inward investment, measures to diversify the 
economy, providing training for employees, business support and measures to tackle 
barriers to employment for the unemployed. The strategy's proposals for the 
environment include reducing the amount of derelict land and buildings, 
improvements to social housing, improved transport links, improved public spaces, 
and some generic improvements in air, water and wildlife. The partnership's strategy 
to create a "lifelong learning culture" by 2010 includes measures to address the basic 
skills needs of the District's adult population, provide learning opportunities for pre-
school children and their parents, improve the performance of the District's schools 
and provide educational and vocational training for 16 - 19 year olds which will meet 
the needs of local employers. 
The LSP's proposals for "a strong, safe and healthy community in 2010" are so 
general as to be almost meaningless. The strategy proposes "improving crime and 
disorder preventative measures" and "promoting healthier lifestyles" and "improving 
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the quality of local health services". These proposals are based on the plans of the 
local Primary Care Trust and the Community Safety Partnership, but their inclusion 
unaltered in the Community Strategy raises questions about the role of the Local 
Strategic Partnership in the process. 
Taking an overall view, therefore, the approach of the Local Strategic Partnership to 
tackling deprivation in the District appears to be based on improving public services, 
remedial work to tackle the dereliction which is a legacy of mining in the District and 
a number of questionable (and fashionable) economic development ideas. 
How the LSP identified solutions 
Initially, the LSP did not advance any solutions of its own to the problems faced by 
the District. Indeed the idea that the partnership as a whole should devise solutions 
and seek appropriately qualified organisations to implement them is one that the LSP 
is still trying to work through in mid 2004. Even the general approach outlined above 
was not formalised until the Community Strategy was written in 2003. Upon 
receiving its allocation of Neighbourhood Renewal Funds from the government, the 
LSP instigated a Single Regeneration Budget style competition for projects to receive 
funding in the District. Applications were invited from organisations in the District 
who could 'bid' for funds to carry out their projects. Before inviting bids, the LSP 
divided its total NRF allocation between the six thematic implementation groups. 
After much discussion, the LSP divided the money equally between the six groups 
and thereby avoided any form of prioritisation. Bids were received from a wide range 
of organisations, including statutory service providers such as the local authority, the 
primary care trust and the local education authority, private sector training providers 
and charitable organisations. In most cases these bids were made by organisations 
which had considerable experience in sourcing funding for projects to pursue their 
own strategies. There was, therefore, very little change in approach under the early 
LSP from the way in which regeneration was carried out under the SRB and the Task 
Force. The bids were evaluated by the individual implementation groups, further 
reinforcing the sectoral divisions in the LSP's approach to tackling problems. 
Preferred bids were then recommended to the LSP which awarded them funding. 
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The allocation of funding through a competition meant that in the first three years the 
LSP was not so much pursuing its own strategy as responding to the strategies of the 
wide range of organisations which submitted bids for funding. This is not to suggest 
that the LSP was totally without control over the way in which its money was spent 
because, as with the SRB before it, the neighbourhood renewal agenda of which the 
LSP was a part was well known among the potential recipients of funding who were 
able to tailor their bids accordingly. It does mean, however, that the LSP was at the 
mercy of the organisations in the District to provide solutions to the District's 
problems. As will be shown in chapter 8, this raises issues about the ability of local 
public services to tackle the District's problems. By relying on local public services 
and organisations to devise solutions to the District's problems, the LSP focussed its 
efforts on managing the competition it had created and monitoring the processes by 
which the money was distributed. This proved to be a significant challenge in itself 
for the LSP. The business of the Chairs Group of the LSP was dominated by the 
administration of the NRF during the first three years, and in particular by the failure 
of a number of projects to spend the money allocated to them. The LSP was so 
preoccupied with these monitoring arrangements that it simply did not have time to 
develop its own solutions to the District's problems. However, following criticism of 
the way in which the partnership was operating by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 
the LSP is now moving towards new ways of allocating its NRF based on 
commissioning work to tackle the problems it has identified. Whether the LSP will 
identify the solutions it wants to be implemented, or whether it will continue to leave 
this to potential tenderers remains to be seen. 
The implications of the LSP's approach, both past and present, to formulating strategy 
to tackle the District's problems are profound. In many ways the LSP could be said to 
be working without a strategy at all. The Community Strategy is effectively a vision 
document which sets out the LSP's goals. The LSP itself does not have a plan as to 
how those goals are to be achieved. This reflects one of the profound problems that 
the LSP faces. The resources which the LSP has directly at its disposal are relatively 
modest. The LSP itself is an additional layer of organisation which is added to 
participating organisations existing roles and responsibilities. The scope of 
neighbourhood renewal is so wide that practically nothing can be ruled out of the 
remit of the LSP. When all of these factors come together, it is easy to see the 
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problems that the LSP faces in developing a strategy. The role of the partnership 
becomes indistinct from the role of the organisations which the partners represent, and 
far from furthering the work of the partnership, it undermines its ability to act by 
denying the partnership a distinctive role. 
Implicit mechanisms 
The mechanisms by which the East Durham Community Strategy seeks to tackle the 
District's problems of deprivation and disadvantage are determined by central 
government and set out in the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. Two of 
the mechanisms, improving public services and bending mainstream programmes, are 
typically new managerialist and have nothing to do with measures that might actually 
tackle problems of deprivation. Instead, they simply devolve the responsibility for 
tackling problems to local actors. The third mechanism, which can be broadly termed 
'workfare', involves the now dominant Schumpeterian approach to economic 
development. The final mechanism involves measures to diversify the local economy. 
These mechanisms are considered in turn below. 
Improving public services 
The central mechanism ofthe government's programme of neighbourhood renewal is 
the improvement of mainstream public services in deprived areas by providing a small 
amount of additional funding to harness the benefits of a joined up approach to 
tackling problems (SEU, 2001). There is an implicit criticism in this approach that 
public services are somehow under-performing and in need of modernisation and 
reform. Such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this study. What this research has 
shown, however, is that public services in the District have been operating in a 'fire-
fighting' mode for many years. The housing directorate of the District Council, for 
example, faces a backlog of repairs to bring the council's extensive housing stock up 
to acceptable standards which exceeds £300 million. The Primary Care Trust has a 
£10 million shortfall in funding every year. Whilst there is no doubt scope for 
improvements in public services, and local public service providers accept this, it 
seems unlikely that public sector reform alone will solve the problems of the district 
which stem from years of under-funding and the problems caused by massive 
industrial decline and its associated social consequences. 
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Bending mainstream programmes 
The second core mechanism of the government's programme of neighbourhood 
renewal is 'bending' mainstream programme spending to target particular problems 
and particularly disadvantaged areas. This poses obvious difficulties in a district such 
as Easington where deprivation is so widespread. Indeed bending mainstream 
spending makes little sense in East Durham where 20 out of 26 wards fall in the 1 0% 
most deprived wards in the country and many mainstream services are themselves 
chronically under funded. It is not surprising in this context that the LSP has used its 
NRF allocation to fund projects rather than to attempt programme bending. This 
highlights the key weakness of the government's approach to neighbourhood renewal. 
The resources allocated through the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund were supposed to 
provide a small amount of additional 'pump priming' to bring about significant 
changes in the ways a number of public sector organisations spend their (considerably 
larger) budgets in deprived areas. This mechanism failed to take into consideration 
the fact that public services in poor areas are often under funded and overstretched 
and do not have the option of bending their spending to focus on particular areas. In 
addition, bending mainstream funding in response to the demands of a local strategic 
partnership raises numerous problems of legitimacy and accountability which remain 
to be addressed if, and when, LSPs adopt this approach. 
Workfare 
The other core elements of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal -
tackling unemployment and crime - are addressed by characteristically advanced 
liberal and Schumpeterian workfare mechanisms. The Community Strategy contains 
measures to help prepare the unemployed for work, but it is not clear exactly what 
that work will be. Improved education and training along with a range of measures to 
facilitate the transition of the unemployed into work are central to the LSP's efforts to 
tackle unemployment. The implicit mechanism of 'job-readiness' is by no means 
unique to East Durham. Criticism is particularly pertinent in this case, however, 
given the scale of the regional unemployment problem, especially in manufacturing 
and low-skilled jobs, to which the strategy makes no concessions. The strategy could 
be criticised, therefore, for seeking to make people ready for jobs which simply do not 
exist. Whilst the presence of an educated and highly skilled workforce might, on the 
- 175 -
James Wadwell 
other hand, attract inward investment and jobs, the strategy pays no attention to how 
such mechanisms themselves might work. In the meantime, the community strategy 
seeks to encourage local pupils and residents to train and acquire skills for jobs which 
don't exist. The strategy has to deal with problems of low aspiration, disengagement 
and apathy. The District is then left in a position where those who do succeed and 
gain skills and qualifications leave the District to find work elsewhere creating further 
problems of 'residualisation' (Coe, interview, 11.06.03). 
Diversifying the economy 
The strategy recognises that the district is over-reliant on manufacturing employment 
and proposes the diversification of the economy, although there is no explicit 
mechanism by which this is to be achieved. The strategy advocates developing a 
thriving retail, leisure and tourism sector and attracting high technology business such 
as nano-technology and bio-sciences. This echoes the approach to economic 
development set out in the County Durham Economic Development Strategy 
(CDEDP, 1995; CDEP, 2002) and the North East Regional Economic Strategy (ONE, 
1999, 2002). The LSP's emphasis, however, continues to be on industrial land and 
premises. 
The District, if not the LSP, has had a limited amount of success in diversifying the 
local economy. The retail outlet development at Dalton Park, for example, is the only 
example of planning guidelines being set aside in order to secure economic 
development as recommended by the Coalfields Task Force Report (1998). The 
District has also attracted a number of call centres, including Orange and the 
Department for Work and Pensions. The LSP has funded a number of ad hoc 
programmes to provide tailored training for retail and call centre workers, but there 
has been little systematic attempt to develop a 'service' economy. Furthermore, many 




Figure 18 Modern industrial units awaiting tenants, Whitehouse Point, Peterlee 
The Community Strategy - not a strategy at all 
The LSP, through its community strategy and through its use ofNRF money, is trying 
to tackle all of the Districts problems at once. Napier observed candidly, "It's like 
they say, 'what is your priority?' Everything' s a priority, just some things are more 
important than others." (Napier, interview, 30.06.03). This approach is perfectly 
understandable in light of the scale and extent of the problems facing the District. It 
creates problems, however, for the design and implementation of a strategy to 
overcome those problems in the context of scarce resources. As Napier observed, the 
NRF money available to the LSP is "a drop in the ocean" (ibid) when compared to the 
scale of the problems facing the District. "The only way really for us to make strides 
as a council is for mainstream funding, so that is why this has got to be worked in 
partnership with all of the other partners that we work with." (ibid). This is the logic 
that underlies the policy of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit. Although this may be a 
valid approach, notwithstanding the chronic underfunding of mainstream services in 
the District, the way in which the LSP has used its NRF allocation has undermined the 
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partnership's ability to bend mainstream spending in this way. The impact of NRF 
was limited by the LSP's inadequate strategy which in tum was weakened by the 
LSP's failure to agree priorities. The result has been in effect complete paralysis. 
Although the LSP has appeared busily engaged in supporting a wide range of projects 
the result, for the early years at least, has been more heat than light (see chapter eight). 
The LSP claims that its priorities are directed by the community. "The first thing that 
we did was to carry out community appraisals and see exactly what the community 
wanted." (Napier, interview, 30.06.03). This approach poses a number of problems 
which potentially undermine the strategy. The first concerns whether or not the 
community can be expected to know and articulate the problems that it faces in a way 
which makes them amenable to solution. This is in no way to suggest that the 
residents of the community are not the best placed people to know the problems they 
face on a day-to-day basis. A strategy, on the other hand, needs to be based on an 
understanding of the causes of those problems and their likely solutions. A strategy 
also needs to operate in domains outside those in which most people live their lives. 
There needs, therefore, to be an additional step between consulting the community 
and formulating the strategy and priorities whereby a coherent programme is formed 
to tackle the problems identified. It is not clear whether this has been successfully 
undertaken in the case of East Durham. 
Charlton illustrated these tensions with an example from the Harden Community 
Appraisal: "Harden is one of the most deprived areas in East Durham, and the 
community appraisals majored on the needs of local people in terms of poor local 
environment, physical environment, and there was a huge wish for fairly low level 
environmental improvements - tidying up waste ground, demolishing a building that 
had been vandalised, putting in grass, flower beds and a play area for the kids, re-
furbishing shop fronts. Yet Harden has one of the highest levels of unemployment, 
and nobody mentioned jobs, and nobody mentioned training, but if you asked the 
professionals, the youth workers, the social workers, the teachers, the economic 
development officers and so on what were the two key things to make a difference in 
Borden - jobs, training and education. You've got that stark contrast between the 
community view and the professionals' view. The danger is that a professional such 
as myself ... will say, actually, we know best, we're the professionals, you're actually 
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wrong to say you want these low level environmental improvements. Now of course 
you don't say that. Ideally what you want is both, but to actually get that, we're not 
there yet in the Easington LSP. We don't have that shared understanding and the 
comfort of both of those agendas coming together." (Charlton, interview 03.07.03). If 
the views of the community solicited through the community appraisals informed the 
strategy and priorities of the LSP they did so through a process of interpretation and 
translation by the chairs of the implementation groups. 
Ultimately the chairs side-stepped the issue of setting priorities. "How do you 
separate issues of, well, health is underfunded by £26 million in any given year, the 
housing stock needs £100 million spending on it to bring it up to reasonable living 
standards, community safety, a statutory responsibility, needs lots of money in to it. 
So, all of those are priorities and there was no agreement... it was never discussed 
that we should focus on one of the floor targets, but that the NFR would be spread 
across all. And as an indicative amount to get things moving, then I think that there 
was an agreement that it would be roughly split." (Lynch, interview, 27.06.03). The 
result of this is central to an understanding of why the LSP has failed to make a 
significant impact on the problems faced by the District. "There haven't been any 
priorities established. There haven't been any hard decisions made by the LSP. What 
they'll do is they'll listen to reports from each of the implementation groups and 
they'll say yes, we agree with that and then move on, but there is nothing coming 
down to say, look, we've taken that information on board ... these are our top 
priorities for this year. We want to deliver on that. What can the partners do to help 
us deliver?" (Caygill, interview, 08.07.03). 
The result of the LSP's failure to establish priorities is that "the implementation 
groups are coming up with ideas and putting them to the LSP for approval." (ibid). It 
is not surprising that some service providers appear to be participating in the LSP 
solely for what they can get out for their own organisations, leading one chair to 
conclude "I don't think the commitment will be there when the money goes." A 
combination of the lack of a strategy and priorities and the way in which the LSP has 
chosen to allocate its NRF through a process of competitive bidding have resulted in a 
series of largely small-scale disjointed projects with only a modest impact on the 




Whereas the East Durham Task Force's strategy was clearly focussed on creating jobs 
and there were clear implicit mechanisms linking all of its actions to this goal, the 
aims of the LSP are much less clearly defined. The LSP's aims are summed up neatly 
in its 'tag line' which proclaims "East Durham 2010 - a great place for everyone". 
The LSP's emphasis on settlement renewal, for example, is now justified by the 
community appraisals which found that most people wanted improvements in the 
appearance of their local environment. Whilst this may be perfectly reasonable, it 
does undermine the 'strategic' aspect of the local strategic partnership. It is difficult 
to see how the partnership will be able to tackle the complex problems it faces if its 
approach is driven by a desire to make things better according to the wishes of the 
local population. This places the LSP in a difficult position, trying to reconcile the 
needs of the district's residents, often caricatured as 'dog mess and grass cutting' 
(unemployment features low in local priorities) with the council's statutory 
responsibilities to secure economic development. These difficulties are exaggerated 
by the status of the LSP as supplementary to the partners' 'day jobs' and the 
comparatively modest levels of resources it has at its disposal. 
In addition, the extensive influence of central government in the operation of local 
public services and in the formulation of regeneration strategy outlined in this and 
previous chapters undermines the Local Strategic Partnership's claim to be local. 
Furthermore, the difficulties which the partnership has experienced in fulfilling its 
requirements to engage with the local community and the dominance of its business 
by public sector service providers raise questions about what the community strategy 
has to do with the community. 
The analysis presented above has shown that the regeneration strategies of both the 
Task Force and the LSP are seriously undermined both by their failure to adequately 
specify the problems they seek to tackle and in their conceptualisation of the 
mechanisms by which the solutions they propose will address those problems they 
have identified. Furthermore, governance structures amplify the problems that 
organisations face in designing regeneration strategy. Under the Task Force, 
governance structures were relatively simple. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
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the Task Force was relatively successful in achieving the core projects of its 
programme. This reflects the fact that in devising the strategy, the Task Force only 
had to have regard to a small number of organisations, namely the County and District 
Council and the government departments and programmes from which it sought 
funding. It was relatively straightforward for the Task Force to integrate the priorities 
of these organisations into a seemingly coherent strategy, albeit that the strategy was 
undermined by its inadequate theoretical foundations. The LSP, in contrast, brings 
together a much wider range of organisations and faces significant challenges in 
integrating their numerous approaches and priorities into a coherent strategy. Indeed 
the LSP has largely avoided any systematic attempt to integrate the strategies of its 
partner organisations, instead pasting together those strategies which already existed. 
The result has been that the LSP effectively has no overall strategy, and certainly not 
one that identifies problems, solutions and the mechanisms through which they 
operate in any systematic way. 
In conclusion, the East Durham Task Force's Programme for Action had an overall 
coherence and focus which the LSP's Community Strategy lacks. This reflects the 
fact that the Task Force's Programme was effectively written by one man - Ken 
Frankish (Newcastle Journal, 17 September 1991). It reflects one man's ideas about 
how economic development on a large scale should be undertaken. The LSP's 
Community Strategy, in contrast, was produced by the six implementation groups of 
the LSP. Each of these groups is a 'partnership' of at least half a dozen organisations 
each with their own priorities and agendas to pursue. These have been 'integrated' 
through the imperfect processes of partnership which have developed over the 
previous two years. In addition they are mediated by the influence of the dark shadow 
of central government. It is not surprising, therefore, that the LSP's Community 
Strategy does not have the same coherence of the Task Force's Programme for 
Action. The Task Force's Programme ultimately failed to have a significant impact 
on the District's problems perhaps because its clarity and the resulting coherence was 
simply too far abstracted from reality. The LSP's complex and chaotic strategy, on 
the other hand, reflects the 'messy' reality of the inter-connected problems which 
make the District deprived, but it remains to be seen whether it has abstracted 





From regeneration strategy to regeneration projects 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the processes through which regeneration strategy is translated 
into regeneration projects. Regeneration projects are undertaken by a wide range of 
organisations from the public, voluntary and community sectors, with grant funding 
from a government programme, to deliver the improvements identified in regeneration 
strategies, although, as will become apparent below, the link between regeneration 
strategy and regeneration projects is not always straightforward. This chapter 
examines the way in which governance and strategy interact to produce regeneration 
projects designed to tackle the problems identified in the strategy. The analysis 
begins with the East Durham Task Force and the implementation of its Programmes 
for Action and then turns to the East Durham Local Strategic Partnership's 
Community Strategy. 
The East Durham Task Force 
Unlike the LSP, the East Durham Task Force did not have a budget of its own to fund 
the implementation of its regeneration strategy. Instead, it relied on influencing the 
spending plans of its partner organisations and attracting funding from outside 
organisations to fund the implementation of projects designed to fulfil its strategy. 
The ways in which these projects were devised and funded are the focus of the first 
halfofthis chapter. Some ofthe Task Force's regeneration projects were specified in 
detail in the strategy itself. This corresponds to the ideal model of strategy 
formulation proposed at the beginning of chapter seven in which strategies set out 
proposals to achieve the strategies' aims. This is particularly the case of the Task 
Force's major 'flagship' physical development projects, especially the road building, 
colliery reclamation and industrial land development projects. The Programmes for 
Action also contain a second tier of measures to tackle the District's problems which 
are outlined in much less detail. These measures, which are most prominent in the 
1997 Road to Success, are generally the 'softer' measures to address training and 
education, community development, and the engagement of the business community. 
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These two tiers of measures are implemented m different ways, and they are 
considered in turn below. 
Implementing major physical development projects 
The major physical development projects formed the core of the Task Force's 
programmes to tackle the District's problems. They were predominantly funded by 
the County Council and English Partnerships with additional funding from the 
Department of Transport (for road building) and British Coal (for colliery 
reclamation). As the previous chapter has shown, many of these projects were already 
at the planning stage in 1985 when the District and County Councils prepared their 
first strategy to tackle the problems of the declining coalfield. These major physical 
development projects are set out in considerable detail in the Task Force's strategy. 
This reflects the fact that they were devised by the County Council, the same 
organisation that produced the strategy. The major physical development projects 
undertaken by the Task Force were driven by the County Council. The County 
Council took the lead on these projects because, according to its Chief Executive, it 
benefited from connections and influence in Whitehall which enabled it to secure 
resources on the scale necessary for such major projects (K Smith, interview, 
25.04.03). Furthermore, many of these projects were in any case the statutory 
responsibility of the County Council. 
Implementing second tier regeneration projects 
In addition to the large scale physical development projects, the Task Force's strategy 
was also implemented through a large number of smaller projects which were not 
specified in any detail in the Programmes for Action. These projects were funded 
through a range of European and government programmes, including RECHAR, the 
ERDF I ESF and the Single Regeneration Budget. The processes by which these 
projects were elaborated are analysed below. Although these smaller, second tier 
projects are overshadowed by the Task Force's major flagship projects they are 
arguably more important since the processes which led from the regeneration strategy 
to the regeneration projects have been central to the way in which the LSP has 
developed its own regeneration projects. 
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The delivery of regeneration projects through programmes such as the SRB and 
ERDF I ESF is a two stage process. In the first stage strategic bodies, such as the 
Task Force, outline a general package of measures to tackle a clearly defined set of 
problems in a bidding document. The bidding document typically describes the 
problems which the measures are designed to tackle, proposes measures to address the 
problems and describes plans for the monitoring and evaluation of the outcome. As 
was shown in chapter two, these bidding documents are usually written with the 
bidding guidelines issued by the funding body in mind so they are a hybrid of local 
priorities and government, or European, preferences. If the bid is successful, funding 
will be paid to an accountable body which can then begin the second stage of the 
process. 
The second stage involves the accountable body identifying specific projects, along 
with organisations capable of delivering them, to implement the measures outlined in 
the bidding document. It is unusual to find specific projects outlined in the bidding 
document. It is this process of identifying projects to deliver regeneration strategy 
which is the focus of attention in this chapter. The funding procedures for 
programmes such as the SRB reproduced the weaknesses outlined in chapter seven in 
regeneration strategy whereby strategy identifies outcomes but not the mechanism or 
projects to deliver them. 
Single Regeneration Budget Round 1 
The District secured £4.6 million in the first round of the SRB in December 1994. 
The money was used to fund 26 separate projects which "feed directly into the aims 
and objectives of the overarching Task Force Strategy rather than constituting a 
coherent programme in their own right." (DEC, undated c. 2001). Given the 
weaknesses in the Task Force's strategy outlined in chapter seven, this raises 
questions about the ability of regeneration projects based on it to deliver significant 
improvements in the District. Indeed an evaluation of the SRB round 1 schemes 
found the results to have been mixed with few of the projects achieving even the 
majority of their original objectives (ibid). 
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Single Regeneration Budget Round 3 
The Task Force's next bid for SRB funding was in round three in September 1996 
when it submitted a proposal for the comprehensive redevelopment of Seaham town 
centre. This was one of the Task Force's flagship projects, but the bid was rejected. 
Although this has delayed the redevelopment of Seaham it has not prevented the 
District Council and its partners from undertaking much of the work outlined in the 
round three bid. Many of the projects have subsequently been undertaken on an ad 
hoc basis when funding has been available. This shows that regeneration is not solely 
driven by funding programmes, although the regeneration of Seaham, as one of the 
Task Force's flagship projects, may be the exception rather than the rule. 
Single Regeneration Budget round 5 
The District secured further funding in round five of the SRB as part of a county-wide 
bid, Integrated Regeneration in County Durham and Darlington, which "provid[ed], 
for the first time, integration between strategic and local approaches to regeneration, 
together with effective community participation." (DCC, 1999: 2). In Easington, the 
projects funded included the selective demolition and refurbishment of public and 
private sector housing in Dawdon and Parkside and large-scale environmental 
improvements around the town of Seaham. These projects were led by the District 
Council's housing department and Groundwork East Durham respectively. Two other 
projects, a credit union and an intermediate labour market scheme, were also funded 
but these experienced considerable difficulties. 
The striking feature of the SRB round five regeneration projects is the continued 
overwhelming emphasis on physical regeneration and the dominance of the two local 
organisations. Furthermore, despite being produced by the County Council, the East 
Durham Task Force is not even mentioned in the SRB round five bid, and there are 
clear indications in the bid of the County's impending shift in emphasis to the rural 
west of the County. This reflects the fact that by 1999 the Task Force was beginning 
to run out of steam. 
Although improving housing conditions was a strategic objective of the Task Force's 
1997 Programme for Action the only measures proposed in the strategy were the 
production of a comprehensive housing strategy and a detailed assessment of housing 
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need. This reflects the distinction drawn above between first and second tier 
regeneration projects. Although the Task Force recognised the scale of the problem it 
did not put forward any solutions. Housing is a statutory responsibility of the District 
Council and did not form part of the Task Force's county council-led approach to the 
economic regeneration of the district. Rather, the Dawdon and Parkside projects 
reflect a convergence of interests between the District's housing directorate and its 
regeneration unit. What this shows is that, beyond the core of major economic 
development projects pursued by the County Council, the Task Force relied on other 
organisations to devise projects to implement its strategy. In the late 1990s, the 
District Council and Groundwork East Durham were the main organisations in the 
District with the resources and ability to bid for regeneration funds. Both these 
organisations had been involved in the work of the Task Force. The convergence of 
interests between the Task Force's strategy and the corporate priorities of the 
participating organisations underline the role of those organisations in shaping the 
strategy and suggest that strategy is not only related to needs but is also shaped by the 
abilities, interests and priorities of the organisations taking part. This theme is 
explored further below in the context of SRB round six and subsequent regeneration 
programmes. 
Single Regeneration Budget round 6 
The District received further funding in round six of the SRB, again as part of a 
county-wide bid. This bid, submitted in May 2000, clearly shows a transition that was 
taking place in regeneration at that time. For the first time, the bid is couched in the 
language of neighbourhood renewal and makes extensive reference to the recently 
published National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. Although the LSP had not 
yet been established, the government's new localism agenda was clear. Furthermore, 
the East Durham Task Force was effectively defunct, its future sealed in a dispute 
between the County and the District over the secondment of staff. Although the 
measures outlined in the bid lack detail, their origins can be traced to three sources. 
First, the bid outlines plans to tackle the District's housing problems which build on 
the projects developed in round five of the SRB. Secondly, the bid outlines a number 
of plans to tackle community safety issues. These proposals are clearly derived from 
the Crime and Disorder Strategy recently produced by the District of Easington 
Community Safety Partnership. Finally, the bid outlines measures to improve the 
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health of the population although these are much less clearly specified. Their 
inclusion appears to be a response to issues raised in the National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal. 
Again, regeneration projects appear to be driven by 'project sponsors' seeking funds 
rather than an overall strategy to secure the regeneration of the District. Both the 
District Council and Groundwork East Durham secured a considerable amount of 
funding under SRB, underlining their success as organisations in securing grant 
funding. This does not necessarily detract from the validity or usefulness of the 
individual projects but it does result in the fragmentation of regeneration activity. 
The balance was tipped further in the direction of project sponsors and away from 
regeneration strategy by the SRB partnership's approach to allocating the resources 
which remained unspent once the initial projects were underway. The partnership 
issued a call for projects which, although they were evaluated with reference to the 
original SRB bid, shifted the responsibility entirely to project sponsors to devise 
solutions to the problems identified in the strategy. Furthermore, local management 
of the SRB programmes was combined with the management of existing European 
funded programmes which was also allocating resources in a similar way (see below). 
This institutionalised the 'call for projects' approach to implementing regeneration 
projects to deliver regeneration strategy. As will be shown below, this approach 
influenced the way in which the LSP allocated its first round of neighbourhood 
renewal funding. 
European RECHAR II funding 
The District received significant amounts of regeneration funding from the European 
Commission through the RECHAR programmes which were designed to provide 
support to former coalfield areas. The second round of the RECHAR programme 
funded projects between 1994 and 1999. Once again, the funding of regeneration 
projects was a two stage process. The European Commission allocated funding to 
each of the nine measures targeted by the RECHAR programme and the Task Force 
identified projects which would fulfil the requirements of the programme and also 
contribute to its own strategy. The nine measures are shown in Table 14 below. 
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Table :i.4 Tlhe measures addressed by the RIECHAR Ill programme 
1 Development and improvement of .. mmmg 
degraded and derelict land 
2 Coalfield image improvement 
3 Mining community economic development 
4 Business development and support 
5 Infrastructure for economic Diversification 
6 Tourism development 
7 Coalfield economic conversion bodies 
8 Coalfield human resources development 
9 Technical assistance 
(Source: EU Inforegio, 1995) 
The projects funded through RECHAR II are dominated by the District and County 
Councils and Groundwork East Durham. The pattern of projects funded suggests that 
rather than strategy driving regeneration projects, project sponsors are driving 
regeneration. The relationship between regeneration strategy and regeneration 
projects is, therefore, only loose. In the same way that government guidelines 
influenced the preparation of SRB bids through bidders' perceptions of what was 
required to secure funding, regeneration projects appear to be shaped by local project 
sponsors interpretations of what local regeneration strategy requires rather than them 
being part of the strategy itself. The relationship between the Task Force's 
regeneration strategy and the projects implemented with RECHAR II funding is, 
therefore, mediated by two factors: the programme guidelines issued by Brussels and 
the reliance on local project sponsors to design and deliver projects. 
The projects implemented with RECHAR II funding are dominated by the 'big three' 
players listed above. Furthermore, RECHAR II funding is almost uniquely used for 
the 'second tier' regeneration projects identified in the Task Force's Programme for 
Action. As described in chapter seven, the Task Force's second tier projects are not 
outlined in any great detail in the programme. Indeed they feature most prominently 
in the 1997 Programme for Action as 'progress to date' rather than as part of the 
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strategy itself. This adds further weight to the suggestion that (second tier) 
regeneration strategy was driven by projects rather than strategy driving the projects. 
EU Objective 2 Priority 4 
The District received almost £3 million from the EU under Objective 2 Priority 4 for 
community economic development targeted at 17 priority wards in the District. 
Although it may have become a cliche, it is nevertheless true that the processes for 
allocating Objective 2 funding were extremely complex and bureaucratic. Again, the 
funding was allocated by a two stage process which first saw the EU allocate 
resources to the North East of England Objective 2 Programme to implement a 
general programme to tackle the problems of industrial decline. Regeneration 
projects were subsequently devised to address the issues identified and published in 
local delivery 'packages' (ECEDP, 1999). Once again, regeneration projects were 
designed by project sponsors and selected by local partnerships on the basis of their 
contribution to the aims of the North East of England Objective 2 Programme as a 
whole and other local priorities. Again, the District's big players in terms of 
obtaining grant funding were some of the largest recipients of funding, including 
Northern Training Trust Ltd, East Durham College and Groundwork East Durham. 
Unusually, there were a significant number of projects proposed by local 'settlement 
based' partnerships, although these were generally much smaller then the projects 
proposed by the District's professional organisations. 
The regeneration projects implemented with funding from the Objective 2 Priority 4 
programme are first and foremost related to the objectives of the programme itself. 
Their link with local need is established through the community appraisals which 
were themselves funded by the programme. The Task Force and its regeneration 
strategy are conspicuous by their absence from documents and projects relating to the 
Objective 2 Priority 4 programme. 
Implementing the Programmes for Action: conclusions 
The evidence presented above shows clearly that the Task Force's Programmes for 
Action took an implicit two-tier approach to implementing regeneration strategy. 
This approach was shaped by the processes through which the regeneration strategy 
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was funded. The Task Force's first tier of regeneration projects, which formed the 
core of its strategy, were largely funded through direct negotiation with government 
departments and government agencies. Projects included the redevelopment of 
former colliery sites with funding from the Derelict Land Grant and English 
Partnerships and the construction of new roads with resources from the Department 
for Transport. This approach was particularly suited to the style of the two men who 
drove the Task Force, Ken Frankish and Kingsley Smith, who saw their role as one of 
lobbying the government on behalf of the District and using their contacts in 
Whitehall to secure extraordinary commitment from the government to tackle the 
District's problems. The Task Force's strategy outlined the first tier projects even 
though the details had been largely worked out before the Task Force was formed. 
The second tier regeneration projects implemented under the Task Force were not 
driven by the Task Force's strategy. These projects were funded from a range of 
government and European programmes, and the aims of these programmes were more 
important in shaping regeneration projects than the Task Force's strategy. Unlike the 
first tier regeneration projects, the Task Force does not outline the second tier 
regeneration projects in the Programmes for Action. Instead, it reports on their 
achievements in its progress reports. The reliance on project sponsors to devise 
solutions to the District's problems, even when these are devised in the context of 
regeneration strategies such as the Programme for Action and programme guidelines 
issued by funding bodies, raises a number of issues about the ability of projects to 
tackle the problems of the District. These are addressed below in relation to the 
implementation of the LSP's community strategy since, as will be shown below, they 
remain significant issues in contemporary regeneration practice. 
The East Durham Local Strategic Partnership 
In what could be seen as an implicit recognition that regeneration through 
programmes such as the SRB had failed to address the problems of disadvantaged 
areas the government introduced the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund in 2001. Unlike 
programmes such as the SRB, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund was allocated to 
deprived districts on the basis of need, as measured by the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 2000, rather than through a competition. The second major change was 
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that the NRF was, in theory at least, unhypothecated. In other words, Local Strategic 
Partnerships were free to spend the money on whatever they chose to tackle any 
problems they wished. In reality, however, the National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal and the government's floor targets set the framework within which LSPs 
were expected to deliver results. The importance of these central government drivers 
has subsequently been reinforced by guidance from the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit 
which accompanied the second round of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund in 2004. 
In terms of local regeneration strategy, the East Durham LSP had already allocated 
the first three years of its Neighbourhood Renewal Fund money before it published its 
Community Strategy. Although the Task Force had produced a succession strategy, 
this was never published. The development of a Local Neighbourhood Renewal 
Strategy was an early priority of the Chairs of the LSP's Implementation Groups, 
although the final document was not published until autumn 2002 and remained a 
peripheral document (see chapter seven). This section analyses the processes by 
which the LSP identified and funded projects to bring about regeneration during the 
first three years of its NRF. 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 2001 - 2004 
The LSP faced two challenges in allocating the resources it had received through the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. First it had to decide how the money was to be split 
between the different problems that the LSP faced, and second, it had to identify 
projects and organisations to deliver them. The first decision was difficult for the 
LSP. Spatial targeting would have required the LSP to take some politically very 
difficult decisions, and despite the participation of local politicians in the partnership 
spatial targeting was ruled out in favour of projects which would on the whole benefit 
the entire District. Equally, the partnership could have chosen to target resources 
thematically, but this was always unlikely given the presence of representatives from 
all of the District's main service providers on the Chairs' Group. Ultimately, the LSP 
chose to divide the NRF equally between all of the Implementation Groups, although 
subsequently a small amount of re-allocation occurred in order to resolve problems 
created by the inability of the Economy Implementation Group to spend its share of 
the resources in time. 
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The second challenge, identifying projects to spend the money on, was relatively 
straightforward for the LSP. As outlined in chapter seven, the LSP issued a 'call for 
projects' and instigated its own competition to allocate the resources. This reflects the 
dominant role of the District Council in running the LSP and its experience with the 
processes for allocating SRB and European funding. The regeneration team at the 
council is small, and given that the same people who were involved with previous 
funding regimes were actively involved in shaping the evolving LSP, it is 
unsurprising that they chose to replicate the same allocation mechanisms, especially 
given the lack of time to develop a new approach. Furthermore, the LSP relied on 
many of the systems which were already in place at the Council for handling public 
money and dealing with accountability which had considerable influence on shaping 
the way in which the funding was allocated. 
The LSP 's approach to allocation 
The competition which the LSP initiated to allocate its NRF was highly bureaucratic 
and time consuming. It is open to all of the criticisms of competitive bidding levelled 
at national regeneration policy in the 1990s outlined in chapter two. Furthermore, the 
administration of such a system by the LSP and its small secretariat based at the 
District Council completely overwhelmed the partnership during the first three years. 
This is particularly unfortunate given the intention behind the LSP that it should be 
flexible and allow local actors greater freedom to tackle local problems. The main 
problem the LSP faced in administering its NRF was its inability to spend the money 
sufficiently quickly. As a number of the Chairs pointed out, the East Durham LSP 
received a relatively large amount of NRF compared to the amount of regeneration 
funding that the District had received in the past. In addition the government, keen to 
see a rapid return from its investment in neighbourhood renewal, imposed limits on 
the amount of funding that the partnership was able to carry over from one financial 
year to the next. This move, imposed during the second year of the first round of the 
neighbourhood renewal fund, was designed to ensure that the partnerships spent their 
money quickly and got projects underway. This posed serious problems for the East 
Durham LSP, however, which were exacerbated by the partnership's £1 million 
underspend in the first year which was carried into the second year of the NRF. The 
combination of the need to manage the partnership's large underspend and running 
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the competition to allocate the funding left the newly formed LSP with little time for 
developing a coherent strategy to tackle the problems it faced. Meetings of the 
Chairs' Group during the first three years were dominated by the continuing battle to 
spend money. One Implementation Group Chair observed, "Certainly in the first year 
it was NRF, NRF and NRF and that was it. .. there was panic to get the money spent." 
(Lynch, interview 27.06.03). The large underspend became a political embarrassment 
to the LSP at a number of its meetings where members of the community expressed 
their surprise that the partnership had been unable to spend the money on regeneration 
despite the scale of the problems the district faced. Furthermore, some members of 
the community expressed their frustrations at not having access to the money for their 
own projects and the apparent reluctance of the Chairs to relinquish control. 
The LSP's approach to allocating its NRF during the first three years of the 
programme is summed up by the criteria for assessing the proposed service 
improvements (the official terminology for what were in effect bids for project 
funding) agreed by the partnership at a meeting in May 2002. The three principles 
which were to guide the LSP in spending its NRF to tackle deep seated problems of 
deprivation in the district are: 
1. does the service improvement reinforce partnerships? 
2. is the service improvement sustainable? 
3. can the requested resource be spent within the timescale? 
(EDLSP, 28 May 2002, item 3) 
It should be remembered that the LSP had not produced a strategy when it devised 
these assessment criteria. The criteria show a partnership that had little idea of what it 
wanted to achieve, no idea of how it was going to achieve that and was in the not 
unusual position of having a large amount of money at its disposal and being under 
intense pressure from central government to spend it quickl;. 
2 The District's European Partnership faced similar problems in spending its allocation of Objective 2 
Priority 4 funding despite the exhaustive application procedure for EU funds. Half way through the 
programme, £835,771 (21%) of the District's funding had not been allocated to projects, and the 
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The LSP's large underspend raises a number of questions about the partnership's 
approach to allocating resources and about the whole concept of neighbourhood 
renewal. The majority of the partnership's problems originated in delays in a small 
number oflarge projects, including a number funded by the Economy Implementation 
Group and a joint project to tackle substance misuse. All of these projects involved 
organisations outside the partnership and beyond the District. This raises questions 
about the capacity of a small organisation such as an LSP to tackle large and complex 
projects. Although the delays could have been the result of misfortune, a comparison 
with the Task Force here is instructive and suggests that the LSP does not carry the 
same weight when it comes to negotiations outside the LSP. This is unsurprising, 
however, given the changed governance context in which the LSP is operating. 
During the 1990s the East Durham Task Force was largely unique as a governance 
structure and therefore commanded greater attention. Today all seven Districts in 
County Durham have their own Local Strategic Partnership and East Durham is one 
voice amongst many with little claim for special attention. 
The East Durham LSP's inability to spend the resources allocated to it and its 
subsequent reliance on large scale, capital intensive projects in order to rid itself of the 
embarrassing underspend highlight a number of tensions in the whole concept of 
neighbourhood renewal. The first relates to scale. There is very little that is 
'neighbourhood' about the projects implemented by the LSP. As mentioned above, 
the LSP chose to fund projects which would have an impact across the whole district 
and all of its neighbourhoods. This is understandable given the scale and the scope of 
the problems faced by the District. It also reflects the fact that many of the problems 
which the projects set out to address are faced by all neighbourhoods. It seems 
unlikely, however, that these problems are specifically 'of neighbourhoods'. 
Unemployment, poor health, crime and disorder, poor quality housing and so on are 
found in neighbourhoods but their causes lie elsewhere. Attempting to tackle these 
problems at the neighbourhood level suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
mechanisms behind the problems. In this sense, the mechanisms implicit in the 
partnership issued a desperate 'call for projects' to the LSP to avoid losing the money. (EDLSP, 17 
January 2003, item 13) 
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government's approach to neighbourhood renewal are flawed. This is particularly the 
case in East Durham where deprivation is so widespread. Although the LSP is 
funding projects which operate at a scale above the neighbourhood it is unlikely, 
however, that this is appropriate given the mismatch between the scale of the 
resources available and the problems faced by the District. The whole concept of 
neighbourhood renewal assumes that the mechanisms to tackle severe problems of 
deprivation lie within deprived neighbourhoods themselves. This appears ambitious 
to say the least given the root of many problems in factors such as structural 
unemployment. 
This mismatch between the scale of problems and their solutions underlines a further 
tension in the concept of neighbourhood renewal. Neighbourhood renewal assumes 
that the capacity to improve public services and the quality of life in general in 
deprived areas lies in deprived neighbourhoods themselves. This suggests two 
possible interpretations of the East Durham LSP's approach to neighbourhood 
renewal. The first is that the government's concept of neighbourhood renewal is 
implicitly based on alternative, third sector approaches to tackling the problems of 
deprived neighbourhoods such as those documented by Amin et a/ (2002) rather than 
more mainstream approaches to economic and social development in which case the 
LSP is using inappropriate mechanism to deliver the government's programme of 
neighbourhood renewal. This seems unlikely, however, given the emphasis on 
mainstream service providers and the quality of local services in the National Strategy 
for Neighbourhood Renewal and in the work of LSPs. The second interpretation 
acknowledges the explicit focus on service providers and suggests that service 
providers in deprived areas do not have the capacity to deliver neighbourhood 
renewal. This seems to be the most likely explanation of the problems faced in East 
Durham in implementing neighbourhood renewal and is examined in greater detail 
below. 
Analysis of the project proposals and monitoring reports for the projects receiving 
NRF in 2003 revealed the great variety in the nature and scale of the work being 
funded by the LSP. Some of the projects, such as those proposed by the Community 
Safety Partnership, were clearly linked into the mainstream agenda of service 
providers and contributed to the delivery of existing strategies. Other projects, 
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however, were not so clearly related to the existing work of service providers and 
appeared to be speculative bids triggered by the availability of funding rather than by 
strategies in search of funding. The allocation of resources to these funding-driven 
bids suggests that there is a lack of capacity in the District to tackle the problems the 
District faces. Closer analysis of these 'funding-led' bids casts further doubt on the 
ability of local organisations to deliver solutions to local problems. On first 
examination, many of the proposals appear to be carefully worked out proposals 
which target specific problems by addressing particular mechanisms. For example, 
introducing children to basketball increases their level of physical activity which has a 
positive effect on their health. It also occupies their time after school and prevents 
them from becoming engaged in anti-social behaviour or crime. Better still, healthier 
children perform better at school and obtain better qualifications, thereby improving 
the economic future of the District. Whilst all of these observations are no doubt true, 
linking them together in such a long chain of causal mechanisms expressed with such 
confidence leaves little room for contingency which a critical realist reading would 
say was an inevitable part of such processes. What these project proposals reflect is 
the institutionalisation of a particular bidding language in which the suggestion of a 
critical realist inspired solution is given by the theoretically empty use of a critical 
realist vocabulary. 
Analysis of the implementation of projects funded with the NRF raised further 
questions about the ability of local organisations to deliver solutions to local 
problems. The monitoring forms for one project, delivered by East Durham and 
Houghall Community College, detailed the 209 hours of administration required by 
the project to deliver an hour long basketball taster session to 40 school children at a 
total cost of £3223. Numerous other projects were composed of management costs 
and capital expenditure in almost equal measures. In an environment in which many 
public and voluntary sector bodies receive substantial proportions of their revenue 
from the state through contracted out services (Rose, 1996) it is not surprising that 
these same organisations should approach the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund as 
another opportunity to increase their turnover. It is an indictment of the lack of 
strategy and critical judgement at the LSP that it chose to fund such programmes. It is 
not surprising, however, given that those responsible for allocating the funding were 
in many cases themselves members of organisations which worked in very much the 
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same way. This is not to suggest that they were in any way misappropriating 
neighbourhood renewal funds, but rather that they were so closely involved in a whole 
system that such an approach seemed natural. 
Many of the projects funded with NRF employed staff. A common problem 
experienced by these projects was delays in recruiting staff so that by the time the full 
complement ofworkers was in post a substantial proportion of the project had passed. 
Not only did this result in delays in delivering regeneration, it also contributed to the 
underspend problems which occupied so much of the LSP's time. This shows the 
incompatibility of this approach to funding regeneration projects with projects that 
seek to improve service provision through deploying extra staff. It also reflects the 
proliferation of this type of NRF funded project work and the competition between 
areas for a limited pool of qualified personnel. This has had an impact on the 
recruitment of staff for regeneration projects and also within the District Council itself 
where staff turnover has been significant as individuals leave for better paid jobs in 
other authorities. 
Although the East Durham LSP allocated its first round of Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund resources before it had developed its Community Strategy and with apparently 
little reference to the Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy, some of the projects it 
funded were related to existing strategy. The Community Safety Partnership, for 
example, is a statutory partnership between the local authority and the police and had 
its own Community Safety Strategy. The Community Safety Partnership sought 
money from the NRF to implement parts of its existing strategy. The same is true of 
the Housing directorate at the District Council which had its own Housing 
Improvement Plan (DEC, 2002) for which it too sought money for implementation. 
In slightly different circumstances, Groundwork East Durham, a voluntary sector 
organisation, had a clearly developed business plan and a well known approach to the 
District's environmental problems for which it too sought NRF money. The 
education and economy implementation groups, on the other hand, did not have such 
clearly identifiable pre-existing strategies which they could seek to implement 
through the NRF. As described above, the economy group was initially dominated by 
the District Council which had relatively little experience in economic development 
having played a secondary role to the County Council under the Task Force. The 
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Lifelong Learning Implementation Group brought together a wide range of partners 
from the field of education and one of their early tasks has been the production of a 
Lifelong Learning Strategy. In the first three years of the NRF, however, the tensions 
and lack of co-ordination in this sector were highly visible and were frequently 
manifested at LSP meetings in bitter public disputes between members of the same 
implementation group (especially the LEA and the FE college). Where no pre-existing 
strategy was available to shape the work of an implementation group the selection of 
projects and their ability to tackle problems appears to have been all the more 
arbitrary and open to funding-led opportunism on the part of project sponsors. 
Neighbourhood Renewal in spite of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
During the first two years of its operation, the East Durham LSP was preoccupied 
with "bureaucratic processes rather than positive outcomes for communities". (LSP 
Implementation Group Chair, interview). The work of the LSP has been dominated 
by the allocation and administration of the partnership's Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund allocation. This has been particularly evident at the level of the Chair's Group 
where there have been numerous meetings where the NRF has been the only item on 
the agenda. The LSP's difficulties in administering the NRF have been compounded 
by the significant amount of money which was unspent at the end of the first year of 
the programme and the need to put in place arrangements to ensure that it was spent in 
the second year. This 'slippage' amounted to almost £1 million, or a third of the first 
year allocation. 
Although most of the chairs interviewed agreed that the administration of the NRF 
had dominated the work of the partnership some went further and suggested that this 
domination had been to the detriment of the real business of the LSP - tackling the 
District's deep seated problems. Roger Bolas summed up the problems of managing 
regeneration funds: "inevitably there has been a pull to say 'what is the best use of 
Neighbourhood Renewal Funds?' And inevitably when you've got a funding stream 
people will concentrate on that ... but there is a danger that it becomes the raison 
d'etre of why we are there, when actually it is about how do we pool our collective 
wisdom and skills to make Easington great." (Bolas, interview, 01.07.03). 
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The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund also clouded the process of the engagement of the 
community with the LSP. Mackie observed "One of the things that clouded the issue 
in the beginning was the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, and my colleagues in 
Derwentside, Weardale and Sedgefield, they've termed this sometimes that the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund was more of a curse than a help because people tended 
to focus on the money. They tend to focus on the money and say 'where's the money 
going? Who's spent the money? How can I get my hands on the money?' So, NRF 
did cause a lot of ... quite a bit of confusion." (Mackie, interview, 25.06.03) 
If the NRF money was a significant factor behind the participation of some members 
ofthe community in the LSP then its influence on some of the 'professional' partners 
was even stronger. One chair observed "I think it is just like pigs in a trough at the 
minute. And when the trough's empty, that's when we'll hit problems. God knows 
what will happen when NRF goes. I have serious concerns about some of the partners 
who are alleged partners but don't really want to contribute. I don't think there is a 
commitment from the partners and I don't think the commitment will be there when 
the money goes." (interview). Another chair stated: "Would people have come round 
the table in the first place if there wasn't any money? I think not." (interview). 
Conway also identified the competitive element in the distribution of NRF within the 
LSP as a potential barrier to a new partnership approach to the problems facing the 
District (interview, 17.07.03). 
The early experience of the partnership suggests that the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund money was actually serving to undermine the very process of closer partnership 
working which it was supposed to stimulate. Furthermore, the partnership became so 
involved in the administration of the NRF that it had neither the time nor the resources 
to systematically engage with the problems of the district and critically evaluate its 
approach to the district's regeneration which in tum served to undermine the 
development of its strategy. 
Evolving forms of governance 
Although the Local Strategic Partnership as a formal structure may not constitute a 
radical departure from previous forms of governance, the way in which its partners 
operate does show signs of an evolutionary change. This section aims to theorize this 
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transition and uses Grabher's concept of project ecology as a model (Grabher, 2002a; 
2002b ). This has significant implications for the governance of regeneration in the 
district which are considered below. 
As an organisation the Local Strategic Partnership, with its quarterly meetings and six 
implementation groups, is very similar to the East Durham Task Force. The 
similarities were outlined in chapter five. The way in which the organisations 
implement their regeneration strategies is, however, significantly different. These 
changes have implications for our understanding of the governance of regeneration. 
Under the Task Force, partners largely sought resources to implement their own 
projects. The unity and coherence ofthe governance structure occurred at the level of 
the Task Force itself which held together the various partners in a single structure 
with unified aims. The patterns of implementation developing under the LSP, 
however, show signs of greater reflexive self-organisation and reciprocal 
interdependence amongst partners in developing and implementing regeneration 
projects. The embedding of these essential characteristics of governance identified by 
Jessop (2003) in the interactions between partners suggests that the East Durham LSP 
may be taking steps, however tentative, in the direction of governance. 
The forms of governance developed by the Task Force were limited to co-ordination 
between projects and between service providers. This continues to be an important 
factor in the work of the LSP and reflects the need to deliver the maximum benefit 
from limited resources by aligning the priorities and activities of different 
organisations. An example would be the work undertaken by the Environment 
Implementation Group to improve the gateways to housing estates in Thomley and 
Parkside where the Housing Implementation Group had spent a considerable amount 
of money improving the housing stock (Caygill, interview 08.07.03). There are, 
however, limits to the effectiveness of new modes of governance operating under the 
logic of co-ordination. Co-ordination ultimately results in frustration and 
dissatisfaction that nothing has really changed and that the potential for making a 
significant impact on the District's problems is severely limited (ibid). Within the 
LSP, this model of co-ordination has begun to be superseded by more advanced forms 
of inter-organisational working in which organisations begin to work beyond their 
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traditional boundaries. These new patterns could be crudely described as co-
operation, and they are examined below. 
The new forms of governance are closely linked to the implementation of individual 
regeneration projects. They reflect the first signs of the breakdown in the rigid 
distinction between sectors and organisations which was reproduced in the structure 
of the implementation groups. One of the earliest examples was the 'Handyman 
Scheme' funded with resources allocated for health improvement. This project 
recognised that accidents in the home amongst the elderly could be avoided by having 
a rapid-response handyman employed by the council to undertake minor repairs. The 
reasoning behind the project appears sound: accidents in the home were responsible 
for a large number of hospital admissions amongst the elderly, the elderly tended to 
require longer stays in hospital and higher levels of aftercare, so preventing accidents 
would be an efficient way of managing resources (Lynch, interview 27.06.03). This 
form of limited inter-organisational co-operation is equally subject to limits. Co-
operation results in frustration when one organisation sees itself funding services 
which should be provided by another organisation, as was the case with the handyman 
scheme (ibid). 
This initial form of co-operation conforms closely with Grabber's initial analysis of 
project ecology in the advertising industry in which the distinctions and 
interdependencies between projects and firms (or their public sector equivalents) 
remain pertinent (Grabber, 2002a). Grabber identifies the increasing demands for 
customised 'packages' of products and services and a deepening division of labour 
between organisations due to outsourcing and concentration on core competencies as 
becoming increasingly influential on organisational practice and fuelling the shift 
towards project based organisation (ibid). 
Subsequent projects have taken joint working further. Examples are as yet limited, 
but the substance misuse initiative led by the Police and the Primary Care Trust is a 
prime example. The Young Persons' Substance Misuse Initiative is driven by a 
strategic alliance between the chair of the Health Implementation Group of the LSP, 
in his role as chief executive of the Primary Care Trust and chair of the Drugs Action 
Team, and the chair of the Community Safety Implementation Group who was also 
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the Police Divisional Commander. The project is funded from the budgets of both 
organisations as well as the NRF. It involves staff from both organisations in both the 
design and the implementation of the project. The project will ultimately contribute 
to the efforts of both organisations to deliver their services and meet their government 
targets. The project is, however, quasi-autonomous. It has its own director and its 
own budget. The Police and the Primary Care Trust have a central role as the parent 
'commissioning' organisations, but the project itself ultimately operates on new 
territory opened up between them. 
Grabher's work on project ecologies in the new media is particularly useful for 
interpreting these changes in the governance of regeneration projects since it "yields 
insights of more general relevance for understanding organisational forms and 
processes in turbulent environments" (Grabher, 2002b: 1911). Regeneration operates 
in an increasingly turbulent environment. This turbulence stems from a number of 
sources, including a reliance on unpredictable sources of funding, an evolving 
organisational context and changing government programmes which can reqmre 
organisations to re-align their priorities. Grabher observes that the central 
organisational arena of these practices is the project - a 'temporary system' with 
'institutionalised termination'. Furthermore, projects are a long established routine in 
industries organised around 'one-off activities. Most regeneration has been pursued 
through one-off activities as a result of the way in which such projects are funded. 
Regeneration continues to be dominated by the project as an organisational form 
under the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund despite the government's emphasis on 
improving services and mainstreaming, reflecting the continuing turbulence in the 
environment. Furthermore, Grabher observes that the diffusion of traditional project 
ecologies has been accelerated by codified formulas and routines of planning, 
budgeting and managing projects as distinct organisational units (ibid). This 
resonates with the LSP's use of the systems for managing regeneration funding 
developed at the Council under previous regeneration programmes and its reliance on 
the Council's own systems of financial management and audit described above. 
Grabher's concept of project ecology can, with subtle modification, be applied at two 
levels to the governance of regeneration by public sector organisations through a body 
such as the LSP. On one level, public sector organisations such as the Primary Care 
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Trust and the Police correspond to the firms which work together on projects in 
Grabher's model. The Substance Misuse Initiative is a good example of the type of 
project on which Grabher's work is based. On another level, however, the LSP itself 
could be considered as a project, the aim of which is to secure neighbourhood 
renewal. This has particular resonance with Grabher's (and others') studies of the 
new media since like the new media, the LSP is a 'self-organised project' reflecting 
the emergent character of this field. Grabher notes that in 'self-organised projects' 
neither the division of labour between team members nor the coordination of team 
activities follows traditional management principles. This has been clearly visible at 
the Chairs' Group meetings where, for example, non-local authority members have 
provided an extensive and imaginative range of suggestions about how the partnership 
should tackle the regeneration of the District. As Grabher observes, in project 
ecologies "knowledge, responsibility and accountability are distributed across 
professional domains and across organisational boundaries." (ibid: 1911). However 
Grabher also points out that "project ecologies are also populated by firms [or their 
public sector equivalents] and nurtured in their evolution by lasting place-bound 
institutions." (ibid: 1911 ). These organisations and institutions are particularly 
important in the context of governance as they place limits on the development of 
project ecologies. 
Grabher's work is important, then, because it provides a framework for the study of 
collaborative practices in transient social and organisational domains. It provides an 
insight into how new processes of governance operate between organisations. It also 
reminds us of the limitations to governance in the form of the enduring boundaries 
between institutions and the impact of these boundaries on project working. These 
are considered in the context of the LSP below. These limitations combine with the 
influence of meta-governance outlined in chapter six to shape the outcome of 
governance. 
The limits to 'project ecology' governance 
Grabher's observation that project ecologies are populated by firms [or their public 
sector equivalents] and nurtured in their evolution by lasting place-bound institutions 
is particularly significant in the development of governance through the LSP. One of 
the most influential organisations populating the East Durham LSP's project ecology 
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was the District Council itself. The development of governance was limited in the 
first three years of the LSP by the District Council. The council is widely 
acknowledged to be "an old-style council ... being dragged into the 21 51 century not 
always happily" (Lynch, interview 27.06.03). This was particularly true of a number 
of the council's officers who were responsible for creating the LSP's structures and 
procedures. As a result, the LSP developed as a highly bureaucratic and overly 
formal organisation closely modelled on the council's own procedures (ibid). 
Furthermore, since the council took the early lead in establishing the LSP it has 
remained 'in charge' and the implicit arbiter of changes in direction. Discussions at 
the LSP Chairs' Group, for example, regularly propose new and sometimes radical 
approaches to the District's problems with many ideas coming from health, 
environment, community safety and education. Rarely are these ideas taken any 
further, however. This reflects the control of the District Council over the LSP. The 
council leader chairs the LSP and its Chairs' Group (the partnership's de facto 
executive). The council's officers provide the partnership's secretariat. The agenda is 
set by the council leader and his officers (Lynch, interview 27.06.03). Whilst these 
people all undeniably do a good job, like everybody else the LSP is only a small part 
of their responsibilities. Consequently, they have neither the time nor the inclination 
to alter the LSP's course. Although the LSP is a partnership, the division of power 
between the partners is not equal. 
Furthermore, the other organisations which populate the LSP bring their own 
organisational cultures which shape the work of the LSP and in particular the work of 
the Implementation Groups. The Health Implementation Group, for example, is based 
on a partnership which existed before the LSP was established which brought a 
commitment to public engagement in its work (Lynch, interview 27.06.03). There 
were also significant working relationships which existed before the LSP and which 
remain significant in the work of the LSP. The relationship between the Director of 
Groundwork East Durham and the regeneration team at the District Council, for 
example, has brought great benefits to the working of the Chairs group through their 
ability to engage in open and frank discussions about the operation of the LSP. 
Institutions beyond the District also influence the project ecology of the LSP. The 
role of the government through meta-heterarchy imposes further limits on the 
-204-
James Wadwell 
development of governance at the local level. Ironically, these limits have been 
exposed by a central government drive to subject LSPs to performance management 
systems. Performance management systems are crude governmental systems to make 
visible the way in which LSPs are tackling the problems they face and the impact they 
are having. Essentially they require the collection of baseline data to enable the 
monitoring of change in key indicators, such as unemployment, educational 
attainment and death rates form heart disease. The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 
under pressure from the Treasury, has required LSPs to introduce performance 
management frameworks so that the impact of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund can 
be measured. Attempts to performance manage the LSP, however, have thrown into 
sharp relief the difficulties and contradictions of governance approaches to tackling 
regeneration. 
The government's attempt to performance manage local strategic partnerships 
highlights the contradictions involved in attempting to improve public services 
through governance mechanisms. They show the salience of Grabher's observation 
that even in the most advanced form of 'self-organised' projects firms (or their public 
sector equivalent) and lasting place-bound institutions remain central (Grabher, 
2002b). For example, although the East Durham LSP has stated its commitment to 
improving the educational attainment of the District's children by increasing the 
number obtaining A to C grade GCSEs, education remains the statutory responsibility 
of the Local Education Authority. It is true that the LSP has spent some of its NRF 
allocation on improving educational attainment, by providing electronic whiteboards 
and laptops to secondary schools, for example. Nevertheless the majority of the 
funding for the District's schools comes through the LEA and the majority of the 
decisions which shape local education are, for the time being at least, taken by the 
LEA. The LEA, not the LSP, is ultimately responsible for educational attainment in 
the District's schools. The LEA is subject to a wide range of demands, particularly 
from central government, and the LSP is only one factor in its decision making 
processes. How then can the LSP be performance managed on its efforts to improve 
educational attainment? The same is true of health and housing. Performance 
management serves to highlight the structural limitations on the LSP and the 
importance of meta-heterarchy in shaping what it is able to achieve. 
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Performance management also reveals the contradictions in the government's 
approach to neighbourhood renewal. The organisational drive for performance 
management originates in the Treasury which is concerned with value for money in 
public spending. Although the Treasury is concerned with public spending across the 
board, it is particularly keen to monitor the impact of the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund. Performance management is an advanced liberal technology which allows the 
Treasury to monitor, and ultimately to govern, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
(Miller and Rose, 1990). Local Strategic Partnerships, however, were intended to be 
concerned with much more than administering the NRF. Through its attempts to 
introduce performance management, the Treasury risks marginalizing any of the 
benefits of governance which the LSPs promised to bring and instead shifting the 
focus to the NRF as yet another central government regeneration grant. 
Delivering neighbourhood renewal- the role ofthe community 
The government's approach to neighbourhood renewal attempts to harness the powers 
associated with the concepts of neighbourhood and community in order to tackle the 
problems of deprivation. Rose (1996: 335) noted that "community is not simply the 
territory of government, but a means of government: its ties, bonds, forces and 
affiliations are to be celebrated, encouraged, nurtured, shaped and instrumentalized in 
the hope of producing consequences that are desirable for all and for each." (emphasis 
in original.) The agency of the community is sidelined, however, by the 
government's explicit emphasis on improving the quality of public services. Rather 
than part of the solution to the problems of deprivation, the community is reduced to a 
crude instrument of spatial targeting and neighbourhood renewal is simply another 
example of area-based regeneration policy. 
Conclusions 
The analysis of regeneration projects presented in this chapter has shown that projects 
are largely driven by project sponsors and not by regeneration strategy. Indeed 
regeneration strategy has been shown to be largely irrelevant in influencing 
regeneration projects. Regeneration projects have been shown to fall into two groups 
or tiers. First tier regeneration projects, which tend to be large scale, capital intensive 
projects, are usually implemented by 'core' project sponsors. These tend to be the 
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same individuals who devise regeneration strategy. Consequently, these core 
regeneration projects are often outlined in the regeneration strategies themselves. A 
typical example would be the road building projects and industrial sites developed by 
Durham County Council which are set out in detail in the Task Force's Programmes 
for Action. 
Second tier regeneration projects, in contrast, do not feature in regeneration strategy. 
They are produced in response to the availability of regeneration funding (ie they are 
'funding-led') by 'peripheral' project sponsors. These projects tend to be on a smaller 
scale and are more likely to employ staff and provide services than the core 
regeneration projects. Because they are produced in response to the availability of 
funding, the guidelines which accompany the funding programme are the most 
significant factor in shaping the regeneration projects. Regeneration strategy is 
relegated to a secondary role and is often only referred to insofar as it contextualises 
the projects and demonstrates the need which the project is to address. 
Most of the East Durham LSP's regeneration projects fall into this second category. 
This reflects the fact that Neighbourhood Renewal Funding was available for projects 
before the LSP had developed a strategy and the government's National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal was, therefore, the only framework within which projects 
could be developed. The LSP and the District's complement of project sponsors had 
considerable experience of working in this way, however, since the Task Force's 







This thesis began by outlining the social and economic deprivation which followed 
the complete run down of coalmining in the District of Easington. It has analysed the 
efforts of a wide range of individuals, organisations, agencies and partnerships over 
the last 15 years to tackle the problems left by the rapid closure of the mines and to 
deliver social and economic regeneration in the District. It has engaged with the 
policies of local and central government and numerous other organisations. The 
picture that has been presented has strong resonance with other similar work in 
different former coalfield locations (for example Bennett eta/, 2000). This research 
contributes to the growing understanding of the factors that influence the outcome of 
regeneration strategy in places that have been subjected to similar social and 
economic changes. The engagement with government policy and the processes of 
government more generally mean that this research has relevance not just in formerly 
mono-industrial places such as the former coalfields, but in other areas experiencing 
severe social and economic dislocation. This is reflected by the thesis' contribution to 
wider debates in the social sciences, in particular those on governance and the role of 
the state. This chapter synthesises the findings of the research presented above. 
The shift from government to governance 
Chapter three presented an outline of academic debates on the changing role and 
geometry of the state. These debates suggested that the boundaries of the state were 
being redrawn, with a new geometry emerging in which a 'hollowed out' central state 
had relinquished power upwards to supranational organisations and downwards to the 
local level (Jessop, 1997). This transformation was paralleled by the destatisation of 
the political system (ibid) which is often characterised as a shift from government to 
governance. This trend has seen a relative decline in the state's direct management 
and sponsorship of socio-economic projects and an analogous engagement of quasi-
and non-state actors in a range of public-private projects. Chapter five used these 
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debates to interpret the changes which had taken place in East Durham in the field of 
regeneration over the last 15 years. 
The analysis presented in chapter five centred on a distinction which was drawn 
between the origins of the East Durham Task Force and the East Durham Local 
Strategic Partnership. The evidence presented showed that the East Durham Task 
Force was a local initiative. It was conceived, designed and run by local actors, 
principally at the County Council although it also engaged with a range of other 
organisations, including the District Council. The East Durham LSP, in contrast, is 
part of a central government initiative. Although it is ostensibly run at the district 
level, engaging a wide range of participants from across the public, community and 
voluntary sectors, the LSP is deeply implicated in a central government programme. 
This has significant implications for its operation. 
The shift from government to governance implies a broadening of the range of actors 
participating to include organisations beyond the traditional institutions of 
government, and a qualitative change in the way those organisations interact. The 
evidence presented showed that whilst both the Task Force and the LSP had indeed 
widened participation m regeneration, the 'new' actors involved were 
overwhelmingly from the public sector and, in the case of the Task Force, from within 
government. Furthermore, the way in which the Task Force operated suggested that 
there had not been significant changes in the way in which organisations worked 
together. The Task Force was led from the front by the County Council which 
engaged other organisations only to the extent it needed them to deliver its 
regeneration strategy for the District. 
Whilst neither the Task Force nor the LSP appeared to correspond to the structural 
characteristics of the emerging patterns of governance described in the literature, their 
purpose and the ways in which they went about fulfilling it did suggest that some 
changes had taken place in the traditional order of government. Jessop's description 
of governance as "the reflexive self-organisation of independent actors involved in 
complex relations of reciprocal interdependence, with such self organisation being 
based on continuing dialogue and resources-sharing to develop mutually beneficial 
joint projects and to manage the contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in 
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such situations." (Jessop, 2003: 1) was used to interpret these changes. This way of 
conceptualising governance, in contrast to those which emphasise structural 
transformations, matched more closely the activities of both the Task Force and the 
LSP.. It was noted, however, that Jessop's description made no reference to the 
balance of power between the independent actors involved in such relations of 
interdependence. In the case of the Task Force it was concluded that although the 
County Council relied on the support of other organisations to deliver its strategy, the 
participation of those organisations was driven more by self-interest than by any 
mutual interdependence. In addition, whilst performing the rituals of interdependent 
self-organisation, the County Council was essentially drawing on its power, reflected 
in its superior connections, large budget, previous experience and expertise, to lead 
the Task Force. This raised questions about the use of the concept of governance to 
analyse the organisation of predominantly public sector structures. These were 
addressed through the investigation of the East Durham LSP. 
The introduction of the LSP followed the re-specification of regeneration by the 
government in terms of neighbourhood renewal. The government's National Strategy 
for Neighbourhood Renewal set out its understanding of the complex and interrelated 
causes of deprivation and the need for solutions which cut across traditional 
organisational boundaries in order to tackle them (SEU, 1998). This approach was 
given an institutional form in the Local Strategic Partnership. The interdependence 
between organisations participating in the LSP is qualitatively different and 
significantly deeper as a result of the new way in which the problems of deprivation 
are understood in public policy. The influence of the way in which the problems of 
government were thought on the action of local actors implied by the shift to 
neighbourhood renewal was a cue for the use of the governmentality approach in 
subsequent analysis to develop a more profound understanding of the processes of 
governance. This proved to be one of the most significant contributions of this part of 
the research since it responded to the criticism of much of the work on governance 
that it was largely descriptive (for example Stoker, 1998). Nevertheless, the analysis 
of the operation of governance in the public sector through the East Durham LSP 
further questioned the extent to which institutional arrangements had changed. 
Consistent with the insights of complexity theory (chapter four) the actual operation 
of the LSP was shown to be considerably different from the model of governance on 
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which the government's proposals were based. The East Durham LSP experienced 
considerable difficulty in breaking down the barriers between organisations and 
sectors and indeed it initially reproduced these barriers in the structure of the 
partnership. 
In conclusion to chapter five it was noted that theories of governance do not 
adequately represent the forms of inter-organisational cooperation that characterised 
either the Task Force or the East Durham LSP. In part this stemmed from the 
domination of these structures by public sector organisations. The breakthrough in 
terms ofunderstanding how they operated came from Fritz Scharpfs (1994) work on 
game theory and his analysis of policy making in the German ministerial bureaucracy. 
Scharpf observed that "many of the limitations of negotiated coordination will be 
overcome, or at least extended, when negotiations are in fact embedded within 
hierarchical or network structures." (Scharpf, 1994: 37). Scharpfs 'shadow of 
hierarchy' thesis suggested that in order to understand local governance we should 
look further up the hierarchy and consider the influence of central government. This 
strikes a chord with Jessop's recent work on metagovernance and metaheterarchy. 
Chapter six explored the influence of the central government in shaping the actions of 
local actors through the processes of metagovernance and metaheterarchy. The 
central conclusion of this chapter was that the state was not hollowing out as earlier 
analyses had suggested, but that its power was being re-configured along advanced 
liberal lines. This chapter used Foucault's (1982) distinctive conceptualisation of 
power as something positive and technical, rather than more traditional definitions 
which see power as negative and juridical, to understand the changing role of the 
state. Jessop's (2003) definition of metagovernance was presented and its resonance 
with the governmentality approach was noted. In particular, the role of governments 
in attempts to "modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities and 
interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence 
alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics." (ibid: 6) was singled out 
as particularly significant in understanding the reconfiguration of the state. The 
analysis then considered the ways in which the centre influenced local regeneration 
strategy. The centre was shown to have had relatively little influence on the strategy 
of the East Durham Task Force which largely operated on its own terms. The East 
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Durham LSP, in contrast, was heavily influenced by central government. This 
influence extended from the creation of the partnership itself, through the 
identification ofthe problems it set out to tackle, the formation of a strategy to address 
those problems, to the implementation of the strategy. 
A number of advanced liberal technologies of government were explored and the way 
in which they shaped the conduct of actors involved in regeneration was analysed. 
Numbers were shown to have been of central importance in identifying problems, 
through the Index of Multiple Deprivation, and in shaping the formation and delivery 
of programmes to tackle those problems through processes such as audit, 
accountability and, most recently, performance management. It was concluded that 
although the centre did not exercise direct control over local regeneration it 
nevertheless remained important in shaping what was possible at the local level. In 
true governmental fashion, this influence extended from shaping the ways in which 
local actors thought about the problems they faced through to the way in which they 
tackled them. 
By reframing the way in which central government's power is conceptualised 
following the insights of Foucault (1982) it was possible to show that the state 
remained vitally important in shaping the conduct of local actors in regeneration. 
Whilst this runs counter to early writing on governance which stressed the declining 
role of the state, it nevertheless finds support in more recent work on metagovernance 
and, in particular, metaheterarchy. The understanding of advanced liberal 
technologies of government developed using the conceptual tools of the 
governmentality approach by Rose and Miller (1990), Rose (1996, 1999) and others 
provided a means to understand how government power in its positive and technical 
forms was exercised by the centre. The empirical work undertaken for this thesis 
suggested, however, that these two factors - metaheterarchy and advanced liberal 
government- were not sufficient by themselves to explain the changes taking place in 
the organisation of regeneration through the East Durham LSP. Patterns of inter-
organisational coordination and cooperation were observed which were not 
adequately described by the governance approach. Grabher's concept of project 
ecologies was shown to provide insight into the emerging forms of inter-
organisational cooperation occurring through the East Durham LSP. 
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Grabher's work on project ecology was undertaken in the dynamic sectors of the new 
economy and focussed on the interactions between firms in advertising, new media 
and software production in cities such as London and Munich. It is equally useful for 
interpreting the emerging patterns of governance in the regeneration of places 
formerly dominated by old heavy industry. The principal reason for the salience of 
Grabher's approach is its engagement with organisational forms in turbulent 
environments (2002b ). In the field of regeneration, the main source of turbulence is 
the government and its influence on the constantly evolving policy context in which 
regeneration takes place. Jessop (2003: 8) observed that 'policy churning' was 
evidence of governance failure as the government was forced to constantly innovate 
in order to deal with the problems it faced. Project ecologies, therefore, can be seen 
as an organisational solution to the problems of governance in a turbulent 
environment in which there is insufficient stability to develop the kinds of deep 
organisational trust and mutuality which are features of 'true' governance. 
Furthermore, Grabher notes that projects - temporary systems with 'institutionalised 
termination' - are a long established routine in industries organised around one-off 
activities (Grabher, 2002b: 1911 ). This research showed that regeneration in East 
Durham continues to be organised around projects despite the government's emphasis 
on mainstreaming. 
The concept of project ecology can be applied at two levels to the East Durham LSP. 
The most obvious example is the projects on which the District's NRF allocation has 
been spent. Although the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit intended that the NRF would 
be used to fund 'service improvements' rather than one-off projects, "there's very 
little of the NRF gone on bending mainstream services. We say 'service 
improvements' and I say it tongue in cheek because its projects. How many of them 
are going to be sustainable? Very few, because they rely totally on NRF." (Lynch, 
interview 27.06.03). Project working was shown to have evolved through three stages. 
Initially, partners sought to achieve coordination between discrete projects. This 
approach was developed in order to secure maximum benefit from limited resources. 
An example includes the landscaping funded by the Environment Implementation 
Group at the gateways to housing estates in which the Housing Implementation Group 
was investing in the housing stock. Subsequent projects saw the development of 
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cooperation between different service providers, for example in the funding of a 
handyman scheme by the Health Implementation Group to reduce the number of 
accidents in the home amongst elderly residents and hence reduce hospital 
admissions. Coordination and cooperation represented only minor changes in the way 
in which organisations worked together. Recently, however, the LSP has begun to 
invest in projects which are quasi-autonomous and more truly inter-organisational. 
The Young Persons' Substance Misuse Initiative is one example. It is funded by the 
Primary Care Trust, the Drugs Action Team, the Police and with NRF from the LSP 
and yet it has its own director and its own business plan. 
In addition, the LSP itself can be understood as a project with its own organisational 
ecology. The 'project' in which the LSP is engaged is the regeneration of the District 
and the partners correspond to the firms in Grabher's analysis which bring their 
various skills, talents and resources to work on the project. The work of the Chairs' 
group in particular reflects Grabher's observation that in project ecologies, 
"knowledge, responsibility and accountability are distributed across professional 
domains and across organisational boundaries." (Grabher, 2002b: 1911). This lies at 
the heart of the problems the LSP has experienced in applying performance 
management systems to the partnership. Equally significant, however, is Grabher's 
observation that "project ecologies are also populated by firms and nurtured in their 
evolution by lasting place-bound institutions." (ibid: 1912). This is central to 
understanding the evolution of the East Durham LSP during the first three years of its 
operation. The rhetoric of partnership, and indeed many evaluations of the workings 
of partnerships, focus entirely on the operation of the partnership itself and relations 
internal to the partnership structure. Grabher's work, and the empirical evidence 
collected for this thesis, serves to remind us that partners are also embedded within 
organisations which they represent at the partnership, and that these organisations 
must also be considered ifwe are to fully understand the working of the partnership. 
The influence of the culture as well as the corporate plans of these organisations on 
regeneration partnerships was demonstrated. 
Schoenberger's writing on the cultures of large organisations, and in particular on the 
failure of large organisations to respond to change, was particularly influential in 
interpreting the influence of some of the organisations participating in the governance 
- 214-
James Wadwell 
of regeneration in East Durham (Schoenberger, 1997). The evidence collected 
showed that the East Durham Task Force, for example, was led by two men who had 
dominated economic development and regeneration in County Durham for over two 
decades. Furthermore, many of the organisations and individuals who had 
participated in the work of the Task Force were instrumental in setting up and running 
the East Durham LSP so that elements of the LSPs approach to regeneration could be 
traced back almost 20 years. 
In seeking to refine our understanding of the concepts of governance this thesis has 
highlighted the importance of considering the role of both central government and the 
parent organisations from which partners are drawn. The empirical evidence has 
demonstrated the influence of the central government in shaping local regeneration 
strategy through its role in processes of metaheterarchy. The governmentality 
approach and the technologies of advanced liberal government have been used to 
demonstrate the means by which central government exerts influence over local 
regeneration without direct involvement. This has involved the reconceptualisation of 
power as positive and technical rather than negative and juridical (Foucault, 1982). 
Finally, Grabber's work on project ecology has reasserted the importance of the 
organisations and lasting place-bound institutions which populate project ecologies on 
shaping the emerging patterns of coordination and governance. The role of the centre 
is pre-eminent, however, since it casts its shadow over those organisations and 
institutions as well as the new governance structures in which they engage. 
Explaining the persistence of deprivation 
This research project had its origins in the District Council's desire to understand why 
the problems of social and economic deprivation it faced remained so severe despite 
the concerted efforts of numerous organisations over the last fifteen years to deliver 
regeneration. The research questions set out in chapter four addressed the ability of 
these organisations, and the regeneration strategies they developed, to tackle the 
problems faced by the District. The conclusions are presented below. 
Chapter seven presented a detailed analysis ofthe formulation of regeneration strategy 
in the District. It noted that strategy was an under-theorized concept in the 
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regeneration literature. A three staged model of regeneration strategy was proposed 
which conceptualised strategy as a process leading from the identification of problems 
through the devising of solutions to the implementation of the strategy to secure the 
desired outcome. The process of abstraction was seen as central to strategy 
formulation as policy makers produced simplifying models of reality in order to 
identify the problems they faced and the mechanisms by which they could be tackled. 
This model was used to analyse the regeneration strategies of the East Durham Task 
Force and the LSP in tum. 
The Task Force was shown to have had a clear but very narrow focus on economic 
regeneration. It did little to address the social problems caused by the run down of 
mining in the District, and even its economic development measures were 
overwhelmingly focussed on physical infrastructure at the expense of developing the 
potential of the District's workforce. Analysis of the Task Force's Programmes for 
Action showed that the mechanisms which underpinned the Task Force's approach to 
tackling the District's problems were flawed. The Task Force's strategy essentially 
centred on creating the environmental conditions to attract mobile inward investment 
to the District in order to create jobs for redundant miners in manufacturing branch 
plants. The mainstay of the Task Force's strategy was the provision of serviced 
industrial sites and premises. The Task Force achieved significant physical success in 
clearing the dereliction left by the decline of the mining industry and developing 
industrial estates. The Task Force's strategy was, however, based on a dated 
understanding of the District's problems and a misplaced belief in the viability of 
economic development through inward investment and this was ultimately a 
significant factor in shaping its limited impact on the District's problems. The model 
of the District's problems and their solutions on which the Task Force's strategy was 
based was too simple and did not correspond sufficiently with reality to enable the 
Task Force to deliver change. 
The Task Force's programme was shown to have its origins in an analysis of the 
District's problems produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the use of 
consultants by the County and District Councils to develop a regeneration strategy for 
the District was shown to have been the mechanism through which the approach to 
the District's problems became cemented in an out-of-date understanding of the 
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problems and their solutions. In addition, the Task Force failed to change its strategy 
even when it became clear that it was not working and, indeed, that there was little 
chance that it could ever succeed. Following Schoenberger (1997), the dominance of 
two men, Kingsley Smith and Ken Frankish, in the operation of the Task Force was 
proposed as an explanation for its failure to adapt its strategy to reflect the changing 
circumstances in which it was operating. 
A two tier model of the Task Force's regeneration projects was developed to 
understand the way in which the Task Force approached the delivery of its strategy. 
The Task Force itself did not have a budget of its own and relied on influencing the 
way in which its partner organisations spent their budgets and on 'winning' 
competition funding from a range of government and European programmes to 
deliver its strategy. The 'top tier' of regeneration projects delivered by the Task Force 
were large-scale, physical reclamation and development projects which the County 
Council pursued with money from central government agencies and in particular 
English Partnerships. The 'second tier' projects were on a smaller scale and oriented 
towards housing and smaller scale environmental improvements. These projects 
tended to be pursued by the District Council with funding from programmes such as 
the government's Single Regeneration Budget. These programmes were more 
susceptible to the influence of central government bidding guidelines and this was 
reflected in a 'softening' of the projects pursued towards the end of the Task Force 
and their preliminary engagement with some of the District's social problems. These 
second tier projects were not part of the Task Force's core strategy and were driven by 
project sponsors in response to the availability of funding. 
The East Durham LSP's regeneration strategy proved considerably more difficult to 
analyse. This reflected the fact that the work of the LSP was largely driven by the 
government's neighbourhood renewal programme which broadened the scope of 
regeneration to include a wide range of public, voluntary and 'community' sector 
interests. In addition, the newly formed LSP replaced the East Durham Task Force as 
the organisation responsible for the regeneration of the District and in doing so it 
inherited the Task Force's legacy. This included the Task Force's conceptual 
approach to the District's problems, its structure, large parts of its membership and, 
less positively, its politics. The LSP agenda was welcomed by the District Council 
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since it offered it the opportunity to take the lead after a decade of being largely 
beholden to its "big brother" (Frankish, interview 08.04.03). Indeed the LSP arrived 
at just the right time since the County Council was already turning its attention to the 
problems of the rural west of the County (Smith, interview 12.03.03) and the District 
was becoming restless to take on the full responsibility for tackling its problems. It is 
significant that John Smith, the former Task Force coordinator and head of economic 
development at the District Council produced a 'Task Force succession strategy' early 
in 2001, and although this formed the basis of the LSPs approach to the District's 
problems, the Council never published the document (DEC, 2001). 
The most significant feature of the East Durham LSP's approach to the District's 
problems during the first 30 months of its existence was that it operated completely 
without a strategy. Although the Task Force's approach to the District's problems 
was implicit in the work of the partnership, and the LSP took up many of the projects 
which had been initiated under the Task Force, the Task Force's narrow focus 
outlined above was wholly inadequate for guiding the LSP's approach to the new 
neighbourhood renewal agenda. The East Durham LSP cannot, however, be held 
wholly responsible for its lack of a strategy and the consequent allocation of its entire 
first round of Neighbourhood Renewal Fund money before it had the opportunity to 
produce a strategy. Central government must take responsibility for the limited 
impact of LSPs in the first two years following their introduction given its lack of 
foresight in introducing the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and allocating significant 
amounts of money to LSPs without first giving them the opportunity to plan how they 
would use the money, especially given the pressure exerted by the centre on LSPs to 
spend the money quickly. Although the LSP did produce a Local Neighbourhood 
Renewal Strategy in 2002 this was shown to be largely a translation of the 
government's National Strategy into local language rather than an attempt to engage 
with the causes of and potential solutions to the specific problems faced by the 
District. In addition, the LSP's Community Strategy, published in 2003, was shown 
to be similarly inadequate and contain little more than a 'wish list' of improvements 
in the District without any serious consideration given to how they could be achieved. 
In any case, the Community Strategy could not be said to have been part of the LSP's 
approach to the process of regeneration since it was produced after the event and 
following a demand from central government. It was reassuring to observe the 
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widespread and vocal dissatisfaction with the strategy expressed by the community 
and public sector at a 'development day' held by the LSP in July 2003, although the 
Partnership is yet to formally respond beyond tasking a small group of officers to take 
the issues forwards. 
The LSP's operation effectively without a strategy had a significant impact on its 
ability to deliver regeneration in the District. This was demonstrated by the projects 
on which the partnership spent its NRF. First, the LSP failed to prioritise either 
particular problems or particular places in the District. This position was adopted by 
the partnership since it avoided the need to take politically difficult decisions, and it 
also reflected the widespread nature of the problems the District faced. Although the 
District received a considerable amount of money from the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund when compared to previous regeneration programmes, the broadening of the 
scope of regeneration under the neighbourhood renewal agenda meant that those 
resources were very thinly spread. This raises questions about whether the resources 
allocated by the centre were ever likely to be sufficient to achieve a significant impact 
on the District's problems. 
The second major problem caused by operating without a strategy relates to the 
absence of any systematic link between the identification of problems and the projects 
which were funded with NRF. The East Durham LSP's approach to allocating its 
NRF relied completely on service providers and 'project sponsors' to put forward 
ideas for projects which they would undertake using the partnership's resources. This 
was effectively a continuation of the approach to regeneration pursued by the District 
Council under the Single Regeneration Budget. As a number of the Implementation 
Group Chairs observed, the LSP effectively continued a funding-led approach to 
regeneration. The District has a stock of project sponsors who have considerable 
experience of composing funding applications and are well versed in the language of 
mechanisms and outcomes. Questions remain, however, about the viability of some 
projects and the ability of some sponsors to deliver the outcomes promised. The 
bankruptcy of the Northern Training Trust, a large training provider which relied 
entirely on regeneration funds, is a case in point. 
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The intense pressure exerted by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit on partnerships to 
spend their NRF allocation quickly exacerbated the problems faced by the LSPs. As 
with the Task Force, the projects undertaken by the LSP can be divided into two tiers. 
The top tier projects were large scale, high value projects undertaken largely by public 
sector organisations and corresponded most closely to the model of service 
improvements envisaged by the government. As a result of their size and complexity 
a number of these projects experienced difficulties in spending the resources allocated 
to them sufficiently quickly. This increased the problems the LSP faced in spending 
its funding since it had to identify projects to fund using the 'underspend' from other 
failed projects. This led to the LSP being relatively indiscriminate in the projects it 
funded and ultimately adopting a project sponsor's ability to spend money quickly as 
the deciding factor in evaluating their project proposals and allocating its resources. 
This tended to favour capital projects which tended to mean physical regeneration, as 
opposed to revenue based projects which might employ people to deliver services. 
The second tier of regeneration projects tended to be smaller and more opportunistic 
and reflect the interests of the project sponsors more than the needs of the District. It 
is likely that these projects were funded because the LSP had resources it needed to 
spend rather than because it believed they would have a significant impact in 
delivering neighbourhood renewal. Delivering basketball taster sessions to school 
children is a case in point (chapter eight). In addition, the LSP did not have any 
mechanisms in place to judge whether project sponsors were qualified to deliver what 
they promised in their proposals. 
The result of the problems the LSP has experienced in delivering the government's 
neighbourhood renewal programme is that £9 million of Neighbourhood Renewal 
Funds has been spent on the regeneration of the District and yet there is relatively 
little to see by way of improvements (Implementation Group Chair, interview). 
Although the more optimistic Implementation Group Chairs were keen to point out 
that the LSP was about more than just the NRF, all agreed that the NRF had 
dominated the work of the partnership in the first three years almost to the exclusion 
of any deeper engagement with the District's problems. However, the responsibility 
for the limited impact of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund cannot be placed solely 
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on the LSP. Central government is deeply implicated in a number of the structural 
weaknesses of the neighbourhood renewal agenda, and these are considered below. 
On an operational level, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund was supposed to represent 
a new 'light touch' approach to the monitoring of local spending by central 
government. It was noted in chapter eight, however, that the District Council, as the 
accountable body for the NRF, had implemented an exhaustive and bureaucratically 
cumbersome system for monitoring the spending of NRF by projects which was 
almost identical to the system administered by the Council for the SRB. The adoption 
of this system followed a highly critical audit of the District Council by the Audit 
Commission (Scott, interview 29.05.03). Whilst one branch of government, the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, might have envisaged greater freedom for local 
partnerships in the way they handled the money and instructed government offices not 
to get involved in the way partnerships chose to spend their NRF (Hanley, interview 
27.02.04), the practices of another part of government sent a contradictory message. 
The result was that the LSP became so heavily engaged in managing its resources to 
the level it believed was expected by government audit that it had little time to engage 
with the problems of deprivation that the District faced. This echoes Sennett's (1998: 
56) observations on the management of the modem firm which is too preoccupied 
"doing the accounting on its own demands" to address the real challenges that face it. 
Chapter eight also illustrated the limitations of local solutions to the problems faced 
by the District. This raises a number of questions about the whole concept of 
neighbourhood renewal. First, there is a fundamental scalar incompatibility between 
some of the problems faced by the District and a neighbourhood approach to finding 
solutions. This is particularly pertinent in relation to the LSP's efforts to regenerate 
the District's economy and deliver job opportunities for the District's residents. 
Although the District may not have had to compete with other disadvantaged places to 
secure neighbourhood renewal funding, it is nevertheless engaged in a costly 
competition with the same locations for an increasingly scarce number of jobs. Just as 
the Task Force spent large amounts of money on environmental improvements and 
infrastructure developments so as not to lose the opportunity to compete with other 
locations for inward investment (EDTF, 1993), so too the LSP is investing large 
amounts of NRF in increasing the 'employability' of the District's residents in the 
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hope that this will attract the elusive jobs. The concept of neighbourhood renewal 
does not allow for causes of problems that lie beyond the neighbourhood level, and 
there is little sign that other branches of government are tackling these problems. This 
is particularly significant since bodies from the Coalfield's Task Force to the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit itself in its national strategy have emphasised that the 
root cause of deprivation is unemployment and the poverty that this creates. 
Government has had plenty of time to reflect on this since it was also the central 
conclusion of the 1977 Department of the Environment White Paper Policy for the 
Inner Cities (DoE, 1977). 
The concept of neighbourhood renewal is also optimistic in hoping to find the 
solutions to deprivation in deprived neighbourhoods themselves. Where deprivation is 
as longstanding and deep-seated as in East Durham it seems unlikely that 
neighbourhoods will be able to solve their problems on their own. In addition, one of 
the central mechanisms of neighbourhood renewal outlined in chapter seven was the 
improvement of local public services. The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund was 
intended to provide small amounts of money to try new ways of providing services 
which could, if successful, be 'mainstreamed' (Bright, 2003). There is, however, a 
fundamental mismatch between the scale of the resources available through the NRF 
and the scale of the problems faced by local public services. Examples include the 
underfunding of the Primary Care Trust by £26 million per year (EPCT, 2004) and the 
£300 million of repairs needed to bring the District Council's housing stock up to the 
Decent Homes standard. Another mechanism envisaged by the NRU was 
'programme bending' through which resources would be diverted to an LSP's most 
deprived areas. This is clearly not practical in Easington where deprivation is so 
widespread. 
The failure of the central mechanisms of the government's programme of 
neighbourhood renewal outlined above has two important implications for the theories 
of governance and governmentality in understanding the processes of government 
outlined in chapter three. Jessop (2003) has written about the likelihood and 
implications of governance failure which Malpas and Wickham see as the most likely 
outcome of governance itself (ibid). Jessop noted that governance success may be 
limited, partial and localised and in order to fulfil expectations, governance must be 
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undertaken in a reflexive manner. The governmentality approach, by focussing on the 
way in which the problems of government are thought about, offers the possibility of 
providing the reflexive solutions to these problems of governance. It is clear, for 
example, that the way in which the government thought about the processes of 
governing regeneration which underlie its programme of neighbourhood renewal do 
not match the experience of those delivering that programme at the local level in East 
Durham. The concept of community which is central to the government's programme 
of neighbourhood renewal (chapter six) is another example where the concepts behind 
government policy do not correspond to local experience and consequently undermine 
the operation of those policies in particular places. The community implicitly 
envisaged by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit is active, unified, skilled and 
empowered. Although government policy makes superficial concessions to the 
unlikelihood of real-life deprived communities possessing all of these capacities, by 
providing funding for community development through Community Chests for 
example, this ideal-type community nevertheless remains central to the success of the 
neighbourhood renewal agenda. 
Governmentality is also concerned with shaping the way in which local actors think 
about the processes of governance. The evidence presented in chapters seven and 
eight on the operation of the Local Strategic Partnership suggests that as well as 
governance failure we should also be alert to the potential for 'governmentality 
failure'. By this, I mean that central government can shape the "conduct of conduct" 
but not necessarily the processes which lie behind the actions. It is important to 
remember that the local actors whose conduct is being shaped by the centre are 
sophisticated political actors in their own right. It is possible, therefore, for members 
of the LSP to give the appearance of involving the local community, as directed by 
the centre, whilst effectively marginalizing them through their actions and processes 
(Arkley, interview 02.07.03). Similarly, the LSP can talk about 'service 
improvements' when in fact it is funding projects (Lynch, interview 27.06.03). 
Whilst governmentality is useful for understanding the motivation behind government 
policy and the processes through which it operates, it is vital to keep in mind the 
lessons of complexity theory: it is impossible to know in advance what the 
consequences of particular local actions will be. 
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Improving 'best practice'. 
The concept ofbest practice outlined in chapter one highlights the importance of place 
based learning and the importance of place matters in regeneration policy. The 
evidence gathered in East Durham, however, suggests that place based learning has 
not been a significant feature of either the East Durham Task Force or the East 
Durham LSP. In particular, the analysis of the transition from the Task Force to the 
LSP has shown that the lessons of previous policy failures have not been learnt. This 
has significantly undermined the ability of the LSP to tackle the problems which 
remain. This suggests that there is considerable scope to improve 'best practice' 
within the District. 
The government's neighbourhood renewal agenda raises further interesting questions 
in relation to best practice. Despite appearing to devolve the responsibility for local 
solutions to local problems to local areas, the government is effectively pursuing a 
'one size fits all' policy to regenerate deprived neighbourhoods. The processes and 
governmental technologies through which it does this were described in chapter six. 
The neighbourhood renewal agenda leaves little scope for place based learning. In 
doing so it denies the importance of place based learning which the evidence from 
East Durham has shown to be so important in improving the District's own best 
practice. Furthermore, in its attempts to transfer best practice between places (as 
illustrated by its neighbourhood renewal website, for example) the government further 
sidelines the importance of place. This is likely to be central in shaping the outcome 
of the latest round of neighbourhood renewal policy. The government has yet to 
devise an adequate policy response which successfully resolves the contradiction 
between the Social Exclusion Unit's approach which highlights the similarities 
between deprived neighbourhoods (SEU, 1998) and the Coalfields Task Force's 
conclusion that the coalfields face a unique set of problems which demand place-
specific solutions (CFTF, 1998). 
Policy implications 
This research clearly has policy implications for both central and local government in 





The problems of deprived neighbourhoods cannot be tackled solely at the 
neighbourhood level. Government policy must recognise the limits of what can be 
achieved through local public services. 
Public services in deprived areas may be underfunded and this may be a significant 
factor in the persistence of deprivation. It may be unreasonable to expect those public 
services to contribute to the regeneration of the area without first redressing the 
mainstream funding deficit. 
The LSP agenda contains significant contradictions regarding the responsibility and 
accountability for tackling specific issues which need to be addressed before they can 
be effectively tackled by the LSP. 
Organisations in deprived areas may lack the capacity to tackle the problems they face 
and the government should allow time for local actors to plan and produce a strategy 
before allocating large amounts of money and expecting the rapid delivery of results. 
Programme bending is not a realistic expectation m areas expenencmg severe 
deprivation and alternative mechanisms are required to tackle the problems these 
areas face. 
New institutional arrangements which add to the already high pressures on those 
involved in regeneration are unlikely to provide a forum for significant change in the 
way organisations tackle the problems they face. 
Local government (and its partners) 
A strategy is necessary to ensure that regeneration funds are used to tackle an area's 
problems. Spending resources without a strategy, or with an inadequate strategy, 
perpetuates an ad hoc, funding-led approach to tackling an area's problems. 
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A strategy should identify problems, potential solutions and the mechanisms through 
which solutions operate. It should abstract from reality sufficiently to enable 
mechanisms and solutions to be identified, but not so much that the implementation of 
those solutions does not correspond to conditions in the 'real' world. 
Where resources are scarce they will probably have greatest impact if they are 
targeted either spatially or thematically. 
An LSP should seek organisations to deliver projects that the LSP itself has identified 
rather than seeking organisations to spend the money it has available. 
Persistent problems are likely to require innovative solutions and not simply 'more of 
the same'. Innovative solutions require partnerships to adopt new ways of working, 
open themselves to new ideas, new forms of leadership and new understandings of the 
problems they face. 
Reflections on the approach taken in the thesis 
ESRC CASE collaboration 
The research for this thesis was conducted in the context of the ESRC's CASE 
programme for collaborative research with the District of Easington as the 
collaborating partner. This had a number of implications for the project. First, the 
District Council contributed financially to the project, making the research possible. 
Second, having the Council as a partner in the research facilitated access to a number 
of sources, including grey literature, interviewees, meetings and informants, without 
the need to negotiate access. Third, the Council played a significant role in 
developing the research questions on which the project was based. However, 
although the Council was involved in drawing up the initial brief for the research 
project, its officers subsequently took a non-interventionist approach to the 
development of the project. Whilst this reflects the pressures under which the staff at 
the Council were working and the lack of continuity in supervision of the project as 
successive supervisors retired or moved on to new jobs, it nevertheless benefited the 
project. The Council's staff remained helpful and supportive throughout the project. 
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The engagement of the District of Easington made it possible to conduct a research 
project which combined empirical and theoretical work to an extent that would have 
been difficult without their collaboration. In particular, the Council's participation 
made it possible to engage in (participant) observation at the offices of the Council's 
regeneration directorate and in meetings of its regeneration partnerships. This 
research method played a central role in producing a richly textured account of the 
regeneration of the District. Finally, this particular CASE studentship was fortunate 
in that it did not experience the difficulties described by other CASE students (for 
example Macmillan and Scott, 2003) with more interventionist research collaborators. 
Working closely with the District of Easington did, however, pose a number of 
challenges. The first was the rapid turnover of staff, described in chapter seven. 
Although the long-term nature of the collaboration helped to dispel the novelty of my 
presence at the Council and reduce the distortion that this might have on the processes 
which I sought to observe, the frequent arrival of new staff served to draw renewed 
attention to my presence. The second challenge of working with the District was the 
politics of the organisation, both internally and in relation to other organisations 
operating in the area. In this context it was necessary to adopt a somewhat 'slippery' 
identity and to draw on my links with the council differentially according to its profile 
in the eyes of the people with whom I wanted to engage. Whilst this may suggest an 
unethical approach to research, I was careful to maintain high ethical standards in 
relation to the evidence gathered. Consequently, in the context of this project I have 
been careful not to use evidence which may undermine one organisation in the eyes of 
another, even though this was one of the principal outputs of research in such a 
political environment. Indeed this raises further significant questions for future 
research relating to inter-organisational relations, which are examined below. 
Conceptual framework 
This thesis has taken an institutional approach to interpreting the regeneration of the 
former East Durham Coalfield. In part, this reflects the engagement of the District of 
Easington in the research project through the CASE collaboration. It also stems from 
the way in which the research questions were developed and, in particular, the critical 
realist methodology adopted. During the early stages of the project - the 
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conceptualisation of the objects of the research- the critical realist focus on structures 
and relations was used to draw attention to the role of organisations such as the state, 
local government and partnerships and regeneration policy in shaping the regeneration 
of the District. The debates on governance, metagovernance and governmentality 
were used to interpret the relations between these objects of the research, and in 
particular between different levels of government. This approach enabled the 
research to examine the role of place-based learning in regeneration and to highlight 
the implications of a (lack of) sensitivity to place for the outcome of regeneration 
policy. The metagovernance and governmentality debates allowed the research to go 
beyond the rhetoric which surrounds many accounts of partnerships and governance 
in regeneration and explore how the different levels of government interact. 
The focus on institutions and organisations, however, has a number of limitations. It 
is difficult to incorporate an understanding of the way in which people respond to the 
challenges of deprivation, poverty and regeneration when a project's analytical lens is 
focussed on organisations. Indeed, people, especially local people, are notable by 
their absence from the project. This does not detract from the value of the work done, 
however, since one of the insights from the use of the governmentality approach was 
to draw attention to the potential mismatch between the understandings on which 
policies are based and the realities of the world in which they are implemented. 
Further research would be required to investigate the way in which regeneration 
influenced people's lives. The possibilities of further research are considered below. 
Future Research 
The shift in emphasis from regeneration to neighbourhood renewal as the way in 
which the problems of deprived neighbourhoods are thought about in government 
policy raises a number of interesting questions which require further work if we are to 
understand their significance in terms of both their concrete effects and their 
implications for theoretical debates. The inclusion of so many different public, 
voluntary, community and, potentially, private sector interests in the regeneration of 
deprived neighbourhoods raises questions on the nature of governance, accountability, 
local democracy and the nature of citizenship. The interaction between the state and 
the citizen through the processes of advanced liberal government (Rose, 1999) and the 
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ability of this relationship to deliver regeneration in deprived areas are also subjects 
for future research. Future research must be sensitive to the specificities of place in 
order to develop an understanding of the ways in which deprived places are different 
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Meeting Papers and Minutes 
East Durham LSP: Papers and minutes from meetings held on 18 January 2002, 15 
March 2002, 10 May 2002, 28 May 2002, 26 July 2002, 18 October 2002, 17 January 
2003, 16 April 2003, 11 July 2003, 31 July 2003 (Development Day), 31 October 
2003, 30 January 2004, 23 April2004, 23 July 2004 
East Durham LSP Chairs Groups: Papers and minutes from meetings held on 20 
September 2002, 14 March 2003, 6 June 2003, 2 July 2003, 12 September 2003, 9 
January 2004, 2 April 2004 
East Durham SRB I European Funding Partnership: Papers and minutes from 
meetings held on 3 March 2003, 29 May 2003, 4 September 2003 
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May 2003 (Officer support group), 23 May 2003, 10 October 2003 
Note: I attended all of the above meetings as a (participant) observer and recorded 




Memlber§hip of the 1Ea§t Dlll!rham JL§JP 
Name Organisation 
MrP Hanley Government Office for the North East 
MrKHodgson One North East 
Mr T Crompton Learning & Skills Council (County Durham) 
MrDLane Learning & Skills Council (County Durham) 
MrMickWood Business Link County Durham 
Ms Jane Ritchie Co Durham Business & Learning Partnership 
County CUr G Tennant Durham County Council 
County CUr D Ross Durham County Council 
County CUr D Hodgson Durham County Council 
County CUr M Nicholls Durham County Council 
MrP Conway Director of Cultural Services, Durham County Council 
Mr N Charlton Assistant Director of Education, Durham County Council 
DrNReed Life Long Learning Partnership, Durham County Council 
MrR Ward Economic Development and Planning, Durham County Council 
CUr A Napier Leader of Council, District of Easington 
CUr R Crute Regeneration Portfolio holder, District ofEasington 
CUr L ODonnell District of Easington 
Cllr A Burnip District of Easington 
MrP Wilding Chief Executive, District of Easington 
Mr A Caygill Director of East Durham Homes 
Mrs J Johnson Director of Regeneration & Development 
MrS Arkley Head of Community Regeneration, District of Easington 
MrP Coe Head of Regeneration and Partnerships, District of Easington 
Ms Anna Lynch Director of Public Health & Health Development 




Mr T Scott Joint Trades Union, District ofEasington 
Mr David Robinson Business Broker, East Durham Business Service 
Mrs S Slaven East Durham Business Service 
MrB Blair Chair Strategic Funding Group 
Mr P Richards Groundwork East Durham 
Chief Supt Derek Hall Durham Constabulary 
Divisional Officer D Community Safety Manager 
Turnbull 
DrRBolas Primary Care Trust 
Mr I Prescott East Durham & Houghall Community College 
MsK Welch Easington Action Team for Jobs 
Mrs P Thirlaway Durham County Age Concern (Easington) 
Ms V Taylor Connexions 
Mr Norman Mackie Community Network (Chair) 
Mrs E Connor Community Network 
Ms Jane Robertson Community Network 
Ms Carol Firth Community Network 
Ms Gill Stokoe Community Network 
Mr Jack Hesslewood Community Network 
Mr C Reynolds Community Network 
Mr Allan Miller Community Network 
Mrs Taylor District of Easington Tenants & Residents Federation 
Ms A.E. Nutter Project Leader, Wingate & Station Town Family Centre 
Mr Gordon Tempest Wheatley Hill Community Partnership 
Mrs Margaret Roberts W estlea Residents Association 
Mr E Robinson Murton Steering Group 
Mrs M McPherson Easington Colliery Partnership (Chair) 
Mrs S Shippen Clerk, Harden Parish Council 




Mr Stan Cudlip Clerk- Seaham Town Council 
Mr John Arthur Clerk - Peterlee Town Council 
Mrs M Hindmarsh Senior Community Development Officer 
Mr David Dorman-Smith CVS Director 
correct at 18.6.04 






Arkley, MrS Head of Community Regeneration, District of Easington 
Bolas, DrR Primary Care Trust 
Caygill, Mr A Director of East Durham Homes 
Charlton, Mr N Assistant Director of Education, Durham County Council 
Coe, MrP Head of Regeneration and Partnerships, District of Easington 
Conway, MrP Director of Cultural Services, Durham County Council 
Greenfield, Mr K Chief Executive, East Durham Development Agency 
Hanley, MrP Government Office for the North East 
Johnson, Ms J Director of Regeneration & Development, District of Easington 
Lloyd, MrM Director of Economic Development, Durham County Council 
Lynch, MsA Director of Public Health & Health Development 
Mackie, MrN Community Network (Chair) 
Napier, Cllr A Leader of Council, District of Easington 
Richards, Mr P Groundwork East Durham 
Scott, Ms B Neighbourhood Renewal Coordinator, District ofEasington 
Smith, Mr J East Durham Task Force Co-ordinator & Head of Regeneration, 
District of Easington 
Smith, MrK Chief Executive, Durham County Council 




Sample interview schedule 
Paul Wilding, Task Force Member, currently Chief Executive of Easington 
District Council. 
4 April2003 at 12:00, Easington District Council 
Subject: establishment of the Task Force, the origins of the Task Force's Programmes 
for Action, the Task Force's construction of the District's problems and appropriate 
solutions, interaction between the District and County in the context of the Task 
Force, change within the Task Force during its operation, The way in which the 
Council is responding to the creation of the LSP. 
Rationale: to understand the reasons for the Task Force's successes and failures, how 
policy responses were related to problems with a view to informing future strategy in 
the District. 
Ql What were the origins of the East Durham Task Force? 
Where did the idea come from? 
Why was the Task Force created when it was? 
Why the Task Force model? 
Q2 Who were the key people driving the work of the Task Force? 
What were their backgrounds? Where did they come from? How did they obtain 
their understanding of the District's problems? Was there stability in the key 
personnel leading the Task Force over time? 
Q3 How did the District respond to the creation of the Task Force? 
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What role did the District play m setting up the Task Force and producing the 
Programmes for Action? 
What was the nature of the District's involvement in the Task Force? 
When and why did relations between District and County cool? 
How did the turbulence in the District Council in the late 1990s influence the Task 
Force? 
Q4 What problems did the Task Force set out to tackle? 
Why were these problems singled out for attention? 
How did the Task Force understand these problems? What were the causal 
mechanisms? 
What was the significance of the ECOTEC consultants report? And other existing 
strategies? 
Q5 What solutions did the Task Force attempt to put in place? 
How were these solutions based on the Task Force's understandings of the problems? 
What were the mechanisms which linked problems with solutions? 
What arguments were put forward to justify the Task Force's approach? 
Q6 Did the Task Force need to reconcile different positions I ambitions? 
Was there a broad consensus over the approach taken by the Task Force? (among 
who?) 
Was the strategy a compromise? 
Between District and County? 
Between local and national priorities? To what extend did national policy 
context shape the work and strategy of the Task Force? 
Between what was needed and what could be done? 
Did the Task Force achieve any additionality over the contribution of individual 
partners? 
Q7 How did the Task Force's strategy change over time? 
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How was the Programme for Action reviewed I updated? 
What were the implications of the contradiction identified in the 1993 Programme for 
Action for the strategy pursued by the Task Force? Were alternative strategies 
considered? [by whom I why not?] 
How did the District and County respond? Were there differences of opinion? 
What efforts did the Task Force make to reflect changing circumstances I 
understandings in its Programme for Action? 
What led to the slight softening of the Programme for Action by 1997? 
Q8 What was the role of the Task Force in shaping the national policy context? 
What did the Task Force do outside the County to improve conditions in the District? 
How did the Task Force influence national strategy - eg through the Coalfields Task 
Force, and consultation on the IMD 2000? 
Q9 How is the LSP different from the Task Force? 
What is your role in relation to the LSP? 
How does the LSP differ from the Task Force- in terms of its structure I operation 
and its aims? 
What are the implications and significance of local political involvement in the LSP? 
How does the work of the LSP relate to I overlap with the role of the council, apart 
from involving its staff? 
What is the LSP doing that the Council wouldn't I couldn't otherwise be doing? 
Are there any factors which limit the effectiveness of current arrangements? 
How has the Council responded to the changing requirements of its new role in the 
LSP- in terms of staff numbers, skills, the way it works ... ? 
What is the relationship between the political side of the council and its officers in 
terms of its regeneration work? How do politicians influence the way in which the 




Extract from field notebook 
East Durham LSP meeting at 9:30 on 31 October 2003 
The Glebe Centre, Murton 
Agenda items 1-3: formalities 
AN Introduces JM, the LSP's new Neighbourhood Renewal Co-ordinator. 
Agenda item 4: Development Day - progress 
PCoe presented recommendations from the LSP's development day (see handout). In 
particular issues raised related to the operation of the partnership and the performance 
management agenda which was to be imposed on the LSP. Outlined a commissioning 
approach to service delivery via the LSP. Asked for comments. 
PH emphasised that performance management was seen as critical by the NRU and 
that systems would be required to be in place by next April. 
RB The danger of emphasising performance management 1s that the LSP only 
manages the NRF and better joint working gets left behind. 
AN Agreed. NRF is only one element of what the LSP does, but performance 
management is important for that. 
PH Performance management can be applied equally to the LNRS 
KW Performance management has been used by the Horden and Easington Colliery 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder where it has been a valuable tool. 
JJ Seeks authorisation from the LSP for PC and his team to take the development day 
issues forward (6 themes). 
Agenda item 5: National LSP Evaluation 
JM has attended one evaluation meeting and considers that East Durham is not doing 
too bad. Nationally there is a great variation in structures adopted by LSPs. Many 
LSPs view voluntary and community sectors as one and the same, but they are 
different. LSP is the accountable body for the spending ofNRF. East Durham is seen 
by others as rural but sees itself as semi-urban I urban [JW - influence of IMD 
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indicators?] Allocation of NRF by LSP is complex and LSP is large compared with 
other partnerships. LSPs without NRF have had to look at mainstreaming much 
earlier. East Durham has been more bottom-up. Difficulties of engaging business in 
LSP agenda. 
RB Smart to work together across institutional boundaries despite difficulties. If it is 
right for the area, surely we can find a way through. 
AN Partnership is good when things go well, but when things don't go well, it falls 
back on the local authority. Need to move away from having 60 projects to having 
some big infrastructure projects which benefit the whole district, sub-region, region. 
GT Who will be responsible for the process of performance management? 
AN We are talking about the performance management of the LSP and the need for 
constitutional change. [JW- did not answer question] 
NC Difficult to say at the end of the day who is ultimately responsible. We are all 
responsible to our own organisations. We can't expect the District Council to 
performance manage everybody. Audit Commission and the national evaluation are 
ducking this issue. It is a paradox - it is difficult to have a system that everybody 
owns. Also budgeting problems on a year-by-year basis due to unforeseen problems 
make it even more complicated. 
BB Proper funding is needed to support community groups. 
Agenda item 6: Joe Montgomery's visit 
JJ East Durham is one of 26 of the original 88 LSPs awarded NRF to receive top-up 
monies over the next two years. Joe Montgomery (Head ofNRU) visited to see how 
the LSP is using NRF to tackle problems. Extra funding was awarded to districts 
furthest from the government's floor targets. Employment was a particular problem 
in East Durham. Also health and deprivation. The Business service has helped 50 
business start-ups this year, but only 5 are VAT registered- a long way to go. Joe 
Montgomery asked bluntly if the LSP was going to be able to spend its NRF 
allocation on time. He welcomed the proposed move away from a large number of 
small projects - said this situation was difficult to performance manage and was likely 
to result in an underspend. He didn't say that the money would be taken away, but 
stressed the importance of getting it spent. 
AN Clear from Joe Montgomery that the ODPM is under intense pressure from the 
Treasury. NFR is on our side, but Treasury has friends in the cabinet who want to see 
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the money drawn back. Montgomery stressed the inadequacy of 57 small projects. 
Pressure to spend the money or it might be withdrawn. 
RC Need to reduce the number of schemes and take up the NRU's offer of support on 
performance management 
NC EAZ money to run out next year. Schools in the south of the district have not had 
access to EAZ money. Big problems ahead for education. 
PH Joe Montgomery was aware of the SRB mentality lingering on and the need to 
move away from that. 
GT Wants to know what the 57 projects are, where the money is being spent and what 
on. Risk that moving away from small projects excludes local people. [JW- there are 
not 57 projects. '57' was originally mentioned in the context of a pun on the '57' 
Heinz varieties, but this seems to have been forgotten]. 
PConway Education, economy and health were the big three areas identified by Joe 
Montgomery where the LSP was under performing. Economy problems were related 
to a skills deficit and not premises. 
PR Groundwork had one single service improvement with 40 separate outcomes. 
Groundwork (the environment implementation group) have taken responsibility for 
managing the input of each of their service providers. 
AN This is the way forward. 
RB Need to subsume settlement differences and unify to work across the district. 
AN Agreed, but this is difficult because it requires cultural change. 
RB Primary Care Trust's primary aim in its 5 year plan is to improve the life chances 
of young children. 
Agenda item 7: NRF Update 
JM (Figures provided on handout) Anticipated £800,000 underspend at the end of the 
year. First round of NRF ends 31 March 2004 - this is the end of that programme. 
Carry-over for the following year is not guaranteed. Many projects are revenue based. 
Problems of recruiting staff for short term contracts given competition. Need to offer 
advice on how to spend creatively. 
AN At the moment there is a potential underspend of £1.4 million next March. 
£800,000 underspend last year when proposals to the value of £4.5 million were 
received by the LSP, but still the money wasn't spent. Short term fix required. 
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KW Freedom to spend within the service improvement is welcomed. Previously if a 
project couldn't spend on what it said it would in its bid the money was taken away. 
JM Government Office must be notified by 27 November how underspend will be 
spent. Government has told LSPs that this must be done. 
[Loud sighing and murmuring of discontent from community representatives] 
AN Is there a problem at the back? 
ANON (An angry community network representative) "It's scepticism. We had 
an underspend last year. We have an underspend this year. Have you not learnt 
anything?" 
AN Originally the LSP had to work within the LNRS. Unfortunately it hadn't learnt. 
Problems with reporting lines and financial arrangements. Cannot work fast enough. 
Taken on too much with the 57 projects. Sadly we didn't learn, but we will learn 
from this. 
GT Who is going to divvy up the un-spent money? Why can't the community have 
access to money? 
AN Led to believe that there is community representation on each implementation 
group. 
COMMUNITY Not on the economy group and little community engagement with 
the environment group. 
COMMUNITY Why doesn't the LSP fund projects which cover the whole spectrum 
-health influences education and so on? 
[JW- none of this angry exchange, one of the first attempts by the community to hold 
the executive to account, was recorded in the official minutes of the meeting] 
AN Agreed, but right now we need a quick fix to deal with the problems we have now 
and spend the money quickly. 
NM Is there any kind of health check on the people who deliver projects and their 
ability to deliver? Deliverability of projects needs to be looked at. True, the 
community are looking for money, but it must be from the right streams. 
JM There was a call in the early days to make the process simple. The idea was that 
anybody should have access to funding. LSP as a whole has not demonstrated a 
capacity to deliver. 
JJ Economy group reformed 6 months ago. Before that there was no private sector 
involvement. Third meeting will be held on Monday. JJ invites community 
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membership of that group today [JW- a bit late? Community largely excluded from 
economy group.] 
Agenda item 8: Coffee break 
Chat to BB about Dawdon steering group and NM about progress of Community 
Network. Arrange to phone PH's assistant to fix date for interview. 
Agenda item 9: Presentations 
KW (see handout) gave a presentation on the 14-19 Learning Review. Vision 
developed - learning in Easington leads somewhere. Big ideas for delivery and 
implementation outlined, including Centres of Excellence, Sports and Leisure, 
Business and Technology. Proposal for a 'learning campus' outlined- federation of 
training providers. 
NC (see handout) gave a presentation on 'Building Schools for the Future'. Proposals 
outlined to demolish and rebuild all 7 secondary schools in the district (cost £130 
million). The cabinet of the County Council chose to focus on East Durham. 
Indicators of deprivation used to allocate funding. County to bid for resources to 
central government [JW - bid ultimately failed]. Problems of mixed use of 
educational sites eg privacy if GP surgeries incorporated in new school buildings. 
Key 
AN Alan Napier, Leader of the Council and Chair of the LSP 
JM John Murphy, LSP's Neighbourhood Renewal Co-ordinator 
PH Peter Hanley, Government Office for the North East 
RB Roger Bolas, Chair Health Implementation Group and Chief Executive of 
PCT 
KW Kate Welch, Easington Action Team for Jobs 
JJ Janet Johnson, Director of Economic Development, DEC 
GT Gordon Tempest, Community Network 
NC Neil Charlton, Chair Lifelong Learning Implementation Group and 
Deputy Director of Education, Durham County Council. 
BB Bob Blair, Chair Dawdon Steering Group 
RC Rob Crute, Regeneration Portfolio Holder, DEC 
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PCoe Head of Regeneration and Partnerships, DEC 
PConway Director of Arts and Libraries, DCC 
PR Peter Richards, Chair Environment Implementation Group, Chief 
Executive Groundwork East Durham 
NM Norman Mackie, Chair of Community Network 




A Sample 1Illlltell"view l'll"anscll"ipt 
Interview with Anna Lynch 09:00 on 27.06.03 at Easington Primary Care 'frust, 
Bracken Hill, lPeterlee 
JW I wanted to talk about the LSP. My interest is in persistent deprivation, and I've 
been trying to get a feeling of what has been happening from the work of the Task 
Force, carrying on into the LSP, and I've spoken to lots of people who were involved 
at the County Council and now I'm trying to bring that up to date. And I'm interested 
in the implications of bringing health and health care into the regeneration arena. So, 
that is my starting point. I wonder if you could talk about the PCT's contribution to 
the LSP? What sort of stake do you have in the LSP? 
AL Organisationally, there is probably not a great understanding of the LSP and why 
we are involved in it. Personally, I see it as quite a high priority and I think Roger 
Bolas, the Chief Exec, also sees it as a high priority. But with my background in 
Public Health I know that realistically our biggest opportunity of improving health 
and therefore helping to reduce deprivation and poverty is around working with the 
partners around those factors that impact greatly on health. So that is to do with 
employment, education, the whole regeneration of the area, bringing jobs into the 
area, raising the aspirations of school kids, creating the environment where they are 
able to get jobs locally instead of migrating out of the area. 
JW What do you seek to get out of the LSP? 
AL Part of it is to try and get health higher up on their agenda, OK, from health 
issues, but also to work collaboratively with the other elements of the LSP. So, in 
particular with the Police, with education, with the housing, with environment. 




AL Oh God, yes, that's sort of ... those are really opportunistic things that come along 
because you've got NRF and you can see gaps in services or bits of services that you 
could deliver differently if you had an additional resource. So, for example, the 
smoking cessation one, we have a core smoking cessation team that works through 
Primary Care. One of the issues is that not everybody goes in to see their GP, so we 
wanted to widen the access - opportunities for people to come into that service if they 
wanted to stop smoking. So, we got NRF funding to.. . and it was a service 
improvement, to broaden the access into that service via communities. So, there is 
work going on in Working Men's Clubs, you know, stop smoking groups. There are 
community members becoming involved as volunteer smoking cessation advisors to 
work in their own community. So, from my perspective that is very important 
because that... the smoking element is a crucial one if we are looking at health 
inequalities. If people quit smoking en masse that would do more for our health status 
in the next ten- twenty years than anything else we could do. As one single item, I 
would always pick that out. OK, go back to your question, pull me back in! 
JW I know that it is early days in terms of the LSP, but how does that seem to be 
working out. 
AL Well, I think that it has been very Council dominated and it has been very formal. 
I think that it has gone down a very traditional route of the structural - organisational 
side of it, and I guess that is to be expected because the council work in a certain way. 
I think there is a certain lack of transparency about what the Council has got from the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund that hasn't been quite as overt as ... and subject to as 
much scrutiny as some of the other service improvement bits, and I know that for a 
fact. And I'm not sure that everybody else knows that. The Council didn't have to be 
the lead body. That could have been challenged, but nobody really had their act 
together or wanted to take it on board, because it is a massive administrative job and 
the council has got a lot of expertise in dealing with regeneration money whether it is 
European, whether it is Single Regeneration Pot or whatever. So they have a lot of 
expertise in that area. 
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JW What do you think the influence of running the whole LSP basically through the 
economic development directorate has been, because as you say it needn't have been 
that. 
AL No, it needn't have been that. I just think that it is historic in the fact that John ... 
it was seen as a continuation of the East Durham Task Force and John Smith was 
involved in that and moved back to the council and continued in the same manner of 
working that the Task Force had had. A bit bureaucratic, a bit top-heavy. And of 
course what is happening now is I think there are challenges coming from the 
Community Network which I think are quite timely. I think there is a development 
day which Berni Scott is trying to pull together, probably the end of July I August, 
although it should have been June, that was the original plan, then it slipped and 
slipped and of course Berni is leaving anyway. She is looking at having this 
development day because we need to take stock otherwise you continue as you are 
continuing. We need to take stock and see if we can do things differently and refocus. 
You know, that sort of thing that you need to do midway through a programme of 
some sort. I think the LSP has the potential to be very powerful and to really set the 
strategic direction over ... as an overarching body in a whole host of areas, but I don't 
think there is full engagement yet with all the partners, and all the partners, us 
included, are still doing our own strategic plan without necessarily looking at that 
bigger picture, and that is partly organisational culture, isn't it, that makes you want to 
keep what you've got in house somehow. I don't know whether I'm explaining it 
very clearly. And then everybody pays lip-service to completing their elements of the 
Community Strategy. Oh, yeah, we'll all put a bit in about health, we'll all put a bit in 
about environment, but somehow it doesn't just quite connect with what is going on. 
JW The whole isn't quite greater than the sum of the parts? 
AL No, no. 
JW I'll maybe ask you a little more about the partners ... 
AL I mean, I dread to think what the other LSPs are like because people think the 
Easington one is fabulous. And I think, well, God help the others, then, because ... I 
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don't think it is dysfunctional at all, but I don't think it is functioning as it could 
function. 
JW How does working with the LSP fit in with your own organisation and its 
priorities? 
AL Well, it is very clearly linked to public health, and that is why I am involved, 
because the whole regeneration element is going to improve health ultimately, and it 
is from that perspective. I mean, there isn't really at board level... there is a good 
understanding of the wider determinants of health and that the NHS treats people 
when they are sick and to stop people becoming sick we have to work at the other end 
of the spectrum and work with organisations that impact on the health of people. So, 
community safety- a massive impact on mental health and well being, particularly 
for older residents. Housing, street lighting, environmental issues -massive impact 
on health. You know, where we have houses that aren't heated adequately old people 
become ill, get admitted to hospital, may never come out, so all aspects of it link in to 
the heath improvement and health inequalities agenda. 
JW Right, and have your priorities had to change as a result of engaging with the 
LSP? 
AL Personally, mine haven't because I've always had a wider perspective of public 
health and always worked with that partnership agenda. Organisationally, it has 
probably become a little bit more formalised in that there is an understanding that we 
have to work broader than just with the NHS. And that didn't come naturally, that has 
had to be talked through with the chair and with the board to get them to understand 
why we are working with partners - education is education, what has it got to do with 
what we do? And it is about helping them to understand and make the links. 
Personally it has had a large impact on me. My role as Director of Public Health is a 
joint appointment between the PCT and the District Council, and that is new ground, 
you know, we've not done that before. It is very exploratory. The council aren't 
quite sure where it fits in! As an organisation, so we are still exploring. You know, 
I've never been to Directors meetings at the Council, I've never been to Corporate 
Management Team, and we are still ... 
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JW Oh, so are you a joint employee ofthe two organisations? 
AL My contract is with the PCT, but the post is a joint appointment. The funding 
comes from health, but it is a joint appointment. So, it has got to be unpicked further. 
I mean, I'm taking great pains to make sure I don't just become an NHS focussed 
Director of Public Health, that I need to work with the Council, and that will develop 
over the next year or so, really. 
JW Because from the outside that looks great, doesn't it, but. .. 
AL Oh yes, but what is the precedence because we haven't done it before. Although 
in the past up to 1974 Directors of Public Health, although they probably weren't 
called that, but their equivalents were based in local authorities and school nursing 
and district nursing were run by local authorities. So, it is a little bit of a ... it is not a 
backward step because the agenda is different now and certainly at Director level 
there is engagement with my appointment and an understanding of how we will work 
together, but in reality and on a day to day level that has not been realised yet, and it is 
still early days. It is going to be very interesting to see how it develops. And the 
other thing we have done is we have jointly funded with the council a 
communications post so that Head of Communications, Mike Lavender, is a joint 
appointment between the PCT and the Council, and he is managed by the council but 
half his time is with us to do some of the communication things that we need doing, 
basically, internally, externally with patients, with communities etc. 
JW So, these are very early stages in that process of bringing organisations closer. .. 
AL Yes, I mean, I certainly ... if I have a vision, then I do see a lot more joint 
working, so whether we go down the route of further joint appointments or 
secondments from one to the other and working in both directions, or whether we 
have a joint public health unit, that's down the road a few years. But the things that 
are happening like the housing stock is going out to the ALMO, the arm's length 
management organisation, hopefully that will happen. That's gone through the Deputy 
Prime Minister's office. That will reduce the responsibilities of Alan Caygill's role. 
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They are also looking at a compact with I think it is Chester-le-Street to take on board 
the environmental services like grass cutting and maintenance and things like that. 
So, that is reducing his directorate somewhat because the staff will go TUPE across. 
So, there may well be opportunities to pull public health and environmental health bit 
which is the statutory function that the council has around food hygiene, food safety, 
the environmental health issues that they have a statutory responsibility to do. And 
that is public health work. It is a bout protecting the health of the public, you know, 
the water quality, the air quality, the quality of the food that they eat, the checking and 
auditing of premises that have food on them. The public rely on the environmental 
health service to ensure that that is safe. But it is public health, it is another bit of 
public health. So, I can see a lot more collaboration and joint working in those 
specific areas. And the other bit where I see opportunities are the community 
development side, because within the economic development section Janet Johnson 
has a small team of community development workers. Now, I have a team of 
community health development workers. They are all working to similar agendas 
around community empowerment, involving local people and we need to be looking 
at those teams of people working closer together and not duplicating but having a 
complementary role, because there is little ... if truth be known it is not always plain 
sailing and there is treading on toes and we have to get around that. There is that 
preciousness, you know, this is my bit, that does go on with staff on the ground. And 
that has to be worked through. 
JW The council is quite a ... I have to be careful how I say this ... an interesting case 
politically, isn't it. It has a very strong heritage in political terms. To what extent do 
you see that influencing the work of the LSP? 
AL Erm, I think it is an old-style council. I think it comes across as being dragged into 
the 21st century not always happily. I think Alan Napier is an excellent advocate for 
Easington. I think he is an excellent leader. I mean, I don't know how long he will 
stay because he has probably got the regional agenda in his sight. I don't know. Who 
knows what will happen. But he has raised the profile of Easington because he is very 
vocal at other meetings that he chairs and outside of Easington, so he has raised the 
profile of Easington and I think that has been good. And he has the interests of the 
local people at heart and it is very clear, very clear. So, I think he is a very good 
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leader. I think it must be difficult for any other residents to think they have an 
opportunity of getting in to the council, because I think ... when you look, Robin 
Todd, who is our vice chair of our board, actually, and that is another good link that 
we are very pleased to be able to make. Robin Todd, he has been unopposed for God 
knows how many years in the area that he comes from. So, there is a very traditional 
approach, very traditional. It's not being challenged, really. It's not being 
challenged. So, I don't know whether the status quo will continue. I'm thinking in 
terms of the LSP, because the LSP meetings follow council.. . the agenda is set by the 
council. And that is partly the responsibility of partners to put things on the agenda as 
well, and to a certain degree that does happen, but on the whole the council. .. Berni, 
probably, and Alan Napier would set the agenda. 
JW The agenda seems to have been dominated by NRF for as long as I can remember. 
AL Yes, yes. 
JW And I am almost left wondering if the LSP does anything more than that. It 
obviously does from what you have been saying ... 
AL Well, [sighs] certainly the very first year it was NRF, NRF and NRF and that was 
it, because it. .. the allocations come down later in the year and Easington got quite a 
lot for a small area and there's panic to get the money spent. The slippage in the first 
year was quite enormous and Government Office allowed it to be rolled over, but you 
just create an on-going problem for yourself the second year. And the one thing that 
is lacking really is that big vision somehow. It is lots of small fry. Lots of small 
things, and when you look at places, and I know that metropolitan areas are slightly 
different and you look at Gateshead and you look at Newcastle and you look at 
Sunderland and over the last ten years there have been phenomenal changes in those 
areas. Massive changes, and when you look ... I've been working here eleven, twelve 
years, you know, the town centre looks almost the same. Yes we've got a nice 
arcaded area but that other street looks exactly the same. It's full of charity shops, 
low budget shopping. It's not going to attract people in. Dalton Park is one example 
of a success, and from all accounts it has succeeded in employing around 60 odd 
percent of local people which is very unusual and they've been monitoring that quite 
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carefully, so that is really good. But, you know, when you drive into this industrial 
estate it is ropey. You drive in and you think 'oh, this isn't a thriving area'. It's not 
so bad when you come round the bend into Bracken Hill with the newer buildings like 
this but the general air is one of deprivation when you come into this district. So 
somehow there hasn't been the big vision, the big thinkers because I'm damn certain 
they can pull in the money for it because there is always European money around and 
it goes on little things all the time. It's little things, and yes you can say that all those 
little things add up to big things in the end, and I know there are differences in what 
you can do in a semi-rural area compared with a city centre, and I understand that, but 
we haven't got anything other than Dalton Park that we'd say 'wow, this is a real 
flagship for our area'. 
JW Why do you think it has been all little schemes. 
AL Because there are a lot of people who are still around, probably me included, who 
have been around for a long time, and I guess you work on the day to day things and 
you don't step off that treadmill to think strategically and visionary. I can remember 
earlier this year or towards the end of last year the County Durham LSP had a 
visioning day and they had ... were you at that, it was held in the Glebe? 
JW I wasn't at that event, but I was ... 
AL They probably had them with other people. They had, I don't know if it was an 
American guy, somebody who was ... 
JW They had a consultant, Lee Schostak. 
AL Yes, and he was quite inspirational because he was trying to make people think 
out of the box and think big. And one of the things I'd said was ... in fact it was after 
Christmas, it must have been January because I'd been to Mexico for Christmas. 
What struck me about where I was in Mexico, we were about an hour south of Cancun 
in what 15 years ago had been nothing but rocks and rough coastline, and somebody 
had a vision and they saw this becoming a marina and a big resort area, and they 
pulled money together and they did it and it is a fabulous development. We've got a 
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coastline that is totally really unexploited, and yet it is different, it is not the 
Caribbean or whatever it is around Mexico. It is the North Sea and it is damn cold, 
but actually it doesn't matter to people who sail boats. The water temperature only 
matters if you are going to be swimming basically. Why has nobody developed a 
marina? Look what Hartlepool has done. So it is that sort of small-mindedness 
instead of thinking of the potential. And nothing may every come of it, but at least it 
gets people thinking than they have been thinking. I do see that as a drawback in this 
area that there isn't a grandiose master plan of how the area is going to be in twenty 
years. 
JW And I suppose the people who are involved are so busy and tied up with the day to 
day business. 
AL Yes, yes, that is part of the problem I think. But the NRF ... this year again we are 
forecasting from the projected spends of the service improvements around a million 
pound underspend, and we have a chairs meeting next week to look at how we are 
going to address that and we've got service improvements that have to be capital 
basically. But they will all be reasonably small, discrete things, you know. 
JW So even the governments grand scheme to try and address the problems is not 
working in the right direction. 
AL It is being addressed by very small initiatives and developments without any 
grand masterplan type of thing. Do you understand what I am saying. There is not 
one big thing that everybody is working towards. There is still a lot of insular thinking 
around health, environment, although we can make the links with the service 
improvements, but they go on in isolation and they are not all ... somehow they are 
not quite gelled together. 
JW It is almost a question of 'what are you making things better for?' 
AL We would all say we are improving the lot of people who live and work here. 
And I think that genuinely that is what we all feel, but I don't know that it is enough. 
I do think more has to be done with creating the employment and the sustainability of 
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employment. It is small employment like engineering, there is nothing major here, 
but one of the things that local employers say is, well, we can't employ local people 
because they haven't got the skills we need. So it just gets to be a vicious circle. So 
then they say, how do we get the people with the skills we need? Well, we'll get them 
from Sunderland, we'll get them from Teesside, so you get people coming from out of 
the area to work in the area, and so it is not improving the opportunities for local 
people. So that needs the college, and Ian Prescott at the college would say that they 
are trying to work with local employers to put on courses that deliver the skills, but 
again there's politics with a small 'p' where the college is involved, you know, with 
the Learning and Skills Council, with the District Council, although they've probably 
resolved some of the issues, but they are not mutually supportive organisations. And 
Ian is a bit of a maverick. He has done quite a lot for the college in the number of 
years that he's been here. Well, he's done a phenomenal amount to improve the 
environment for learning and the range of opportunities, but I don't know whether it 
would be able to create the skills necessary for bringing employers in. And if you 
don't bring the employers in, you train the young people up and they will go ... the 
most able will go. So it is about that synergistic approach, about working together to 
that common aim, because the college could put on all sorts of skills based modem 
apprenticeship courses, they could do all that sort of thing, and if the jobs aren't here 
we've got the outwards migration of the young, able people again and you are left 
with the less able people, and that is what happens, and that just perpetuates the 
deprivation. And the kids are going in to schools and they are from second and third 
generation of parents with no jobs, so they have low aspirations and in an area such as 
this where you have kids with low aspirations, teachers don't want to come and teach 
so you end up with crap teachers in some instances. I'm not meaning that derogatory, 
there are some excellent teachers, but they can't get locum, they don't call it locum, 
supply cover in some of the schools because they won't come here. It's just amazing. 
So you can see how all these disparate bits are all contributing to the problems of the 
area. 
JW Do you think it is something that a local initiative can break out of this vicious 
circle that you've described. 
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AL Well, [sighs] who else is going to be interested? One of our MPs is Tony Blair. 
You can't get a more high profile MP than that. And yes, he only does cover the west 
of the District, but who else is going to take it forward. When you look at the IMD 
stuff and Easington is the most deprived area outside London, you think that would 
trigger bells in people's minds. When you look at the health domain from the IMD 
stuff, out of the 8,000 odd wards in England, out of the 20 with the poorest health, ten 
ofthem are in Easington. You say that to people and they are astounded, and then we 
as a PCT for our health service provision in this area are £26m below what we should 
have per year. Now, there is something not right somewhere. Somebody isn't 
making the connections up there at Whitehall. So you think, well, they're not doing 
anything at government level, and of course we know why. I shouldn't say we know 
why, but politically it is a safe seat. Nobody is ever going to get in here but Labour, 
so why would they break their necks to do anything different? Do you understand 
what I am saying about the big political context. There is never ever going to be 
anybody but Labour voted in here. It is one of the strongest Labour seats in the 
country, so why should the government go out of their way to improve things. You 
can see them doing it in marginal constituencies, and they are not going to do it here. 
And that is political with a big 'p'. I think it is very covert, and I don't think anybody 
ever says that, but it makes you wonder, doesn't it. 
JW It is just another element of the powerlessness, isn't it. Somebody I've spoken to 
said the District could have done with riots like Toxteth ... 
AL Yes, well, then it would have got on the agenda. But we don't have a mass of 
people, we don't have a mass of people to be able to ... for anybody to generate that 
head of steam. Peterlee is the biggest bit of the conurbation with 35, 36,000 or 
whatever it is. It is a small amount. Culturally, they are very homophobic, very 
racial, you know, we have hardly any ethnic population here. It is not a comfortable 
place for people to settle in if they are a little bit different. 
JW How has the LSP handled the issue of targeting? 
AL [Big sigh]. It is very difficult when you have an area that is so deprived. We have 
very tiny pockets of relative affluence, but across the district as a whole, when we 
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were doing the target setting, the ward based target setting looking at the IMD stuff 
and any other data we could pull in, there was a hair' s breadth between why we would 
choose X, Y and Z and not A, Band C wards. It's very difficult in an area like this, 
and to certain degrees they are unnatural boundaries, and I think greater and greater 
we are finding that a lot of the service improvements will impact across the district 
rather than specific wards. And of course one of the things that is always very 
difficult in anything like this is when you are trying to identify how much you spend 
in a ward. There is no formula for it. So, yes, we provide health visitors who work 
across the district, but no health visitor works in one ward, and no school nurse works 
in one ward, no district nurse works in one ward, no GP works in one ward, so how do 
you start apportioning their time and the relative cost. We don't have a formula to say 
well ... what we should do is say, well, our budge it £99m, we have 26 wards, lets just 
do a straight division, because that is the reality, you know. But of course there are 
different numbers of people in the wards, so you would have to factor in all of these 
different issues into a formula, and nobody has come up with a satisfactory formula 
for us. 
JW And how about when it came to the NRF, dividing that between the different 
implementation groups. I think in the end it was just divided by five, wasn't it? 
AL Yeah, well, how do you separate the issues of, well, health is underfunded by 
£26m in any given year, the housing stock you know needs £100m spending on it to 
bring it up to reasonable living standards, community safety, a statutory 
responsibility, needs lots of money in to it. So, all those areas are priorities and there 
was no agreement. .. it was never discussed that we should focus on one of the floor 
targets but that the NRF would be spread across all. And as an indicative amount to 
get things moving, then I think there was an agreement that it would be roughly 
split... I mean, at the end of the day it didn't come out quite like that, but that was the 
starting point which was as good as anything. It was as good a model as anything you 
can hope to work with. I think one of the things that will hopefully help as time 
progresses is this strategic funding partnership that is being established, because one 
of the things that is an absolute nightmare is the fact that all these pots of money that 
come in- Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, Children's Fund, the Single Pot money, the 
Urban II money, other European pots, I can never remember, 2, 3 & 4, you know, all 
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these different pots of funding that come in, all have different documentation that 
you've got to complete, different proformas, different timescales, different monitoring 
criteria, different requirements for audit purposes, and you think ... nightmare. We've 
had here, because we have quite a lot of funny money coming in for health 
improvement. .. what I call the funny monies, not mainstream NHS, we've had to take 
on somebody who is a financial management person because we can't deal with all of 
these different audit requirements and requests that come in. We have a big system, 
you know, the Health Economy in Durham, and we have a shared financial service 
that deals with £700m a year, and then they are asking, NRF is as bad as any of them, 
Berni is asking for copies of invoices, details of travel expenses. We don't have a 
system that allows us to do that. And a small voluntary organisation will, because 
they'll have all theirs in house, they'll have it all filed somewhere and they can 
produce that. We can't do that. We can't do it, and we've been penalised for not 
being able to do that, although we are delivering ... you know, we lose money because 
we can't demonstrate some of the spend although it is there on the spreadsheet. I 
don't know what happens to invoices. And it has taken a phenomenal amount of staff 
time for peanuts, for peanuts. Anyway, we've had to get somebody from finance to 
have a full time dedicated post for dealing with this because we just can't do it. 
JW It is ridiculous, isn't it? 
AL Yeah, so it has been ... and it is not just us that is complaining about it. Everybody 
complains about the bureaucracy. And NRF was meant to be an easily administered, 
loose pot of money, and it is as bureaucratic as any of them. And I think that is the 
council's fault as the accountable body. But I also understand that they had an audit 
that penalised them quite heavily - an external audit, so they have tightened up their 
procedures. But when you read the NRF guidance, it is meant to be very flexible, very 
easy to administer, not like all the other regeneration pots of money, and it has 
become one of them from an administrative point of view. And that is not right, 
although you have to monitor and be accountable for public money, but there must be 
a better way of doing it. Because it creates jobs for people. It creates jobs in the 
system that could be spent out there doing other things. 
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JW That is interesting. Within the Health Implementation Group you got a pretty 
small sum of money at the end of the day from the NRF. How did you select service 
improvements or projects? How did you put them together. 
AL Well, the members of the Health Implementation Group were the main ones who 
put in service proposals, though some did come from communities who weren't 
members on the Health Implementation Group, like Barnardos submitted a proposal 
and they are not on the group, although they could be, but they are based in Newcastle 
but they have a worker here with the carers project. We had our own ... the HIG 
had ... has its own priorities and had worked ... the HIG was an existing group before 
NRF, and we re-vamped it when NFR came along. It was originally, as all the others 
were, a sub-group of the Task Force, a Task Group, and we re-vamped it when the 
LSP came along and took on a broader membership and tried to widen the scope. 
Now, I don't think we've been particularly successful at doing that. I think ... 
although people think the HIG is a well-functioning group, and it is quite good, and it 
stays quite focussed, but it could be much more. I think it could be much more. And 
we are going to have a day either at the end of October or the beginning ofNovember 
where we are pulling all the members in ... its time to take stock, as it is with the LSP, 
we need to take stock and we are going to get an external facilitator in to take us 
through the process. We need to think a bit more laterally, outside the box and think 
about how that group develops and what its role and responsibilities are. I mean, 
nobody sends anything to the agenda. I do the agenda with Roger. It becomes one of 
those groups that just keeps going. Would people care if it didn't keep going? You 
don't know, do you? You don't know. I do have another pot of money, and part of 
me thinks that I should take it to the HIG and put it in there because it is for health 
inequalities, you know, pump-priming money to start things off and that are a bit 
innovative and a bit different, and I am not doing that at the moment, I'm just waiting 
to see what happens, because on of the things that annoys me to a certain degree is 
that pre-NRF, all the money that went into the Health Implementation Group came 
from health. It was a partnership, but nobody else put a penny in. Not a penny, but 
they were all quick enough to want to draw out of it. There was a commitment at the 
beginning that money would come in from different organisations, that we would look 
at it with a corporate health approach, that multi-agency partnership, and look at the 
best use of that money for small projects, small developments, innovation, different 
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areas of work. And of course, nobody put any money in, and it is the same old story. 
And it is ironic that we are so grossly underfunded for health, that we end up funding 
the things like the handyman scheme at the council. It is a really good programme. 
We funded that for the first year fully, second year we've more or less ended up 
funding it, but we've only done it on the proviso that it is picked up by the council as 
well and we'll part-fund it. And I can't believe that they can't find £15,000. 
JW That's not bending the mainstream, is it, it is more like substituting one source of 
funding for another? 
AL One of the issues I've had with the implementation groups, and I can see both 
sides of the arguments, is that if you are looking at bending mainstream services, then 
you need to be doing things differently, and everybody takes great care to talk about 
service improvements, whereas in reality what we have are projects. There are some 
service improvements, I've certainly got a couple that I would consider service 
improvements- that smoking is one ... 
JW That happened before NRF, didn't it? 
AL Yes, we had the smoking cessation service. Now, a lot of the other pieces of work 
that are going on with the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund are additional pieces of 
work, they are not service improvements, they are new pieces of work. It is not 
bending the mainstream. Now, I had a big problem accepting that we should be 
spending on aids and adaptations from the health budget, because that is mainstream 
funded. Yes, there is a big backlog, but I said we are doing exactly what we have 
always done with it - we are putting more money in to try and get rid of the backlog. 
We will never do it. We are not doing anything differently. Now the HIG, the group 
did not support that proposal to go through, and of course it was overruled at the 
chairs meeting, and that was partly because of Patrick Conway who comes, because of 
the political pressure he'd got from county councillors over this. So it was overruled. 
The HIG didn't support it, and we had to backtrack and take it to the HIG and say, 
well, sorry, we need it for the record that we'll support this. But they said exactly 
what I've said originally. This is putting good money into bad, not that the ... aid and 
adaptations are essential but the service isn't delivering anything any different, it has 
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just got more of the same. It is the system that needs changing and that's not 
happened. So, I had a real problem accepting that that was bending the mainstream. 
And I said it wasn't. The same with the housing, the money that went into housing. 
How is that bending the mainstream? It is not doing anything different. It is bringing 
forward what would be done in two years time, but it is not doing anything different. 
And that is what I have a problem with. Because there is so much underfunding, and 
we are at such a poor level of services anyway ... and the converse argument is, well, 
if your services aren't the normal services that people should expect, then you should 
be using this money to bring them up to that standard, and you can't bend them until 
you get to that level where it is the same as everywhere else in the country. So, there 
is that converse argument which is the argument they used. I don't care what they 
say, there is very little of that NRF gone on bending mainstream services. We say 
service improvements and I say it tongue in cheek because its projects. How many of 
them are going to be sustainable. Very few, because they rely totally on NRF. We 
will pick up ours, I think, but we are expecting, and we've talked about it at the 
chairs' that where there are posts involved for years four and five there needs to be a 
taper, so that is going to eat into the new allocations. So where there is a post that is 
100% funded, instead of saying, OK, you did say it would be sustainable and you 
would look to mainstream it for years four onwards, we recognise that that is not 
always possible, so we will fund 75% this year, 50% year five and then you are on 
your own after that, so it is a tapered approach. And I think that is what will happen, 
so I actually think that the new monies for years four and five won't be ... will already 
be spoken for to a certain degree. In theory, that is what will happen, because you 
can't just take away a service that you've been providing. You can't just do that, it is 
not ethical. And I'm thinking across all of the floor targets, for example, the Place to 
Be that is in the schools, that is a joint one between lifelong learning and health where 
there is a group of people who support kids in schools with any problems that they 
have that are health related, emotional, behavioural or whatever. That is totally 
funded by NRF. That is not going to be picked up by schools. They have no money. 
So, ethically, we can't say, sorry guys, you had £250,000 over the last two years, you 
can't have any more. That will have to be a tapered approach. There is that whole 
issue of you can't. .. where services are so grossly underfunded, they are not going to 
be able to mainstream things and make them sustainable, so they need to rely on the 
NRF for another two years. Then who knows what happens? So, all those issues are 
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there, and they are talked about. The chairs talk about those. The other big one that 
could have been a flagship and could still be quite good and certainly I've talked with 
Trevor Watkins [Watson] about it, and we know that it needs to happen because of the 
community appraisals and the issues around substance misuse and young people is 
this young people's substance misuse service. And we've actually got £400,000 
allocated to this. Not a penny has been spent yet, and there is pressure on that, and it 
will be spent. It is a difficult one, we are actually looking at premises next week in 
the town centre, right next to the college, so I'm doing with the DAT coordinator 
David Cliff, and if that looks suitable, and we are not going to look at it as a young 
person's substance misuse centre, we're going to look at it as a young person's health 
and resource unit or something like that because otherwise it would become 'the drugs 
shop' or ... it will get some stigma attached to it, so it needs to be in a more generic 
approach to working with young people. So there is a lot more to be done on that. 
JW What has held that up? There was something about the lack of a business plan ... 
AL Well, again, yes, because we have a two-tier local authority we have a DAT, Drug 
Action Team, that cover the county and a DAT coordinator that works across the 
county as a whole, and that is seven local authorities and it is not easy. Seven local 
authorities, five PCTs I think. I might be one off with the local authorities. 
Historically it has been quite a difficult partnership, I think, now ... the DAT leads on 
commissioning of drugs or substance misuse services across the county, so PCTs 
don't ... we work with the DAT to commission. There is a joint commissioning 
budget for adult services and we are piloting a joint commissioning service for young 
people's services this year as one of five national pilots, I think, for drug action teams. 
So, it has meant that yes, although I managed to get the money ring-fenced and 
carried over from last year to this year, the DAT coordinator and, we have to take 
some responsibility - Roger is the DAT chair as well, so we have to take some 
responsibility as well for not putting a rocket up David's backside to get this moving 
quicker. And he is totally committed to it and he has had a group working on this, but 
part of the jigsaw puzzle didn't fit, and that was the supporting people element 
because they were looking at trying to get more of a residential setup established, and 
the supporting people element didn't get supported by the supporting people board or 
whatever it is called, so that bit of the picture fell out. So, it had to go back to square 
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one a little bit, so the full business case has never been in a position to be developed. 
And I had said 12 months ago that we needed a project manager to take this forward, 
and I think David was loathed to give up that element of involvement, but there is 
going to have to be a project manager appointed. One of the things that we will ... the 
actual cost is going to be far more than the £400k. One of the issues that we will 
have, of course, is trying to get some agreement in principle that NRF will support 
this in the subsequent two years, because we can't go ahead with this unless we know 
that there is some more revenue corning onstrearn, because we are probably talking a 
£1m piece of work with some revenue implications which, yes, the PCT and partners 
may be able to pick up ultimately, but that needs feeding in to our local planning. We 
haven't got the money to do it now, but if we know in two years time we are going to 
have to pick up a bill of £400k for recurring costs or whatever, then we can 
programme that in and make allowances for that, but we can't do it now. So it's a 
position where we want that piece of work to move forward, everyone in community 
appraisals mentions the issues, we know from the work that goes on in the 
community, from the work that... we have an adult substance misuse - ESMI, 
Easington Substance Misuse Initiative based in Peterlee and we have one based in 
Seaharn, and we know that those are over-subscribed, there are too many people 
wanting to use the services, they don't deal with under 16's. So there is that whole 
issue of we are not providing a service. There is nothing in reality ... it is essential 
that we get that going. But there will be some hoops to go through before that 
happens, but then I have to acknowledge that yes, I think I should have done more, 
but actually I couldn't have done more because I had too much to do anyway, and you 
rely on other people in partnership work to take things forward, and sometimes things 
are slower than you expect them to be and there are valid reasons why that is the case. 
But there will be pressure next week on this money, because if we can't give a clear 
indication that it will be spent it will go into the pot. But we have to be able to get it 
re-provided next time so ... and that could be quite a nice mini-flagship type of 
service, because Trevor Watson wants to get the community safety angle in, there is a 
big issues with hornelessness and young people, we'd want to get something around 
that in, generic health issues, there's a lot we could do. We could get Connexions 
involved, we could get community education involved, or education in the community 




JW And once it is up and running it sounds like it would be an ideal candidate for 
mainstreaming. 
ALAnd it would be a real good piece of work. And there is no reason ... the will that 
is there to make this happen ... so, we'll see what happens. 
JW I'm very conscious of the time ... one final thought, if I may. I'm interested in 
how you get from identifying local problems and priorities and how you understand ... 
or where the understanding comes form and how problems operate and how that feeds 
in to what you are trying to tackle them... I've been looking at the Task Force and 
that seems to be something that was missing ... 
AL Yes, that is the crux of the matter, isn't it, and that is part of the community 
network's ... well, the Task Force didn't have a community network to support it or to 
feed in to it, or public involvement, really, from my recollection. Or if it did, it was 
lip-service. Public services have been notoriously poor at involving local people. 
Basically what happened in the past, services would do all the work around 
developments and changes and come up with a proposal that basically was a done 
deal and then go out to consultation, and there were bureaucratic management events, 
and you were lucky if you got two or three people coming to them. And you think 
somebody would have said at some point, 'hey guys, this isn't working, we're not 
doing it right else people would be more interested in what was happening.' So, 
notoriously bad history of involving local people. I think that will all change, and I 
think it will be a slow process. One of the things from a health perspective that we 
did in 1995 we set up the community health forums. In theory that is a good model, 
in practice it didn't work as effectively as it could have done, and again, on reflection, 
we subcontracted that to the council, and it got a bit subsumed by the council agenda, 
and there were some petty issues between some of the staff who were working on that 
initiative and some health staff not getting on, and actually partnership work depends 
on the personalities involved. More and more you see that where you've got 
somebody who's very difficult to work with, it can halt and stop any development at 
all. So, I think that can hold things up enormously, and people come and people go, 
and there is always that tum over of people in an area in statutory services. The 
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engagement comes when, as with the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder when 
you are working in a very small area - that is three wards - or when you are working 
in an area like SureStart, which again is focussed on three wards and you have 
dedicated people who are working on an area basis, instead of a district wide basis, 
and you can get that true involvement with people, you can invest the time, because 
you can't just go along and expect people to want to be involved, you know, 
community development is long term, it is resources intensive, it is time intensive. 
And for too long we have had non-recurring pots of money to develop community 
development work, and you can't do it. We did have an opportunity, it must have 
been about eight years ago, we had a big initiative called East Durham Community 
Development Initiative and we had a team of sixteen community workers working in 
the various communities, but politics got in the way big time between the [county] 
council and the district council, and it was not a smooth programme of work and it 
didn't get picked up or mainstreamed or anything. People were glad to see it go for 
political reasons, basically. And that was the Task Force involved, dabbling, 
parachuting stuff in. Now, when I think to the small area work, where you have 
SureStarts, where we have the Neighbourhood Management pathfinder, you see real 
engagement with local people, although I think the pathfinder tends to ... [interruption] 
What was I saying, I've lost my thread? Where you have that involvement like the 
pathfinder, and I believe actually there's a lot of local councillors on the pathfinder 
board. Now I don't know, because Graham Gregg's the chair of the health group 
there, he's one ofmy heads of service, and I've never worked on that piece ofwork, 
he leads on that. There are politics with a small 'p'. They get in the way all over the 
place, and there are local councillors who think they know what everybody wants, and 
they think because they are a local councillor that everything should go through them 
and they should have a control of what is going on. What was quite interesting in the 
health bit of the Neighbourhood Pathfinder, we thought that the issues from health 
would be all around access to GPs, not having GPs where they want them, poor 
quality services, and none of that came up from the communities. It was all around 
lifestyle issues - smoking and young people, about smoking in pregnancy, and around 
substance misuse, teenage pregnancy rates, nothing to do with the level of services 
which surprised us, because we'd got somebody from a service commissioning point 
of view involved in that group initially, Susan Foster, and then we had ... she stepped 
down and Graham had to take it over because the area of work was not what we 
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expected. So, that was quite unusual, I think, but you only get true community 
involvement when, as an organisation, you work to change the culture of an 
organisation. We're just about. .. and Carol has come in because we are shortlisting 
for a public and patient involvement coordinator post, and that person will have a 
massive agenda, because not only will they be trying to involve local communities, 
supporting some of the work that the health forums do, the Community Network, 
looking at whatever other mechanisms there are like the area forums, I mean, there's 
all sorts of two-way communication networks for agencies to tap into and work with 
local people, but I still don't. .. I think we are a million miles away from getting true 
engagement and involvement, but from this year PCTs have been given a statutory 
duty to involve local people, and that is quite scary, and we've got to have a change in 
our organisational culture. And it will happen because we've got a board that is a lay 
board. We've got more non-executives who are local people on our board than we 
have officers from the PCT, and they are strong advocates for local people. And we 
have to be working ... and part of our new strategic plan, which is a five year plan that 
is at the printers now, so it is going to be sent to partners to engage dialogue. We 
haven't done it with partners, we've done it in house, and again you think 'oo, well, 
was that the way to do it?'. But that is the way we have done it. But partnership work 
is in there, and also we've set our self objectives that we will have a robust 
community involvement strategy implemented by 2005 or whatever it was, I can't 
remember the date, and we are being performance monitored on it. And part of that 
community involvement strategy will involve training for staff and ... because our 
front line staff work with people in the community day in, day out. They have a 
responsibility to be involving, engaging and treating them as equals, not the doctor 
patient relationship where you are done to by the doctor, but where you have a true 
engagement. We have a lot of opportunities to do that but we don't capitalise on it. 
So, I think that will happen, but I think it will be a slow process, you know, me 
doctor, you patient, me nurse, you patient mentality that is still there and is part of the 
training. 
JW It sounds like an exciting future ... 
AL Oh, yes. And I'm very optimistic, and I think that the partnership work and the 
work with the council, the opportunity with my post, I think the LSP has a good 
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opportunity. It is quite interesting that Alan has been appointed as Chair again 
unopposed - nobody else has even been in the frame, put their head above the parapet, 
and I'm sure there are very able people out there who would do that and do it 
differently, but there is a lack of willingness to challenge that status quo. And I 
admire Alan enormously, he's done a lot for the District, and I'm not saying he 
shouldn't be chair, but there are other people who would do it differently and the LSP 
would be a different animal. We're not there yet, we're not there where anybody is 
being open enough or creative enough to take that forward. It might happen ... 
JW We've run over, thank you ever so much. 





Analytical categories and themes established following interviews 
with members of the East Durham Task Force 
1. District ill-prepared for colliery closure 
Only a small council - essentially a housing authority. Unusual political situation -
difficulty of planning for closure whilst supporting the case for the continuation of 
mining. Absence of planning for closure at national level. 
2. Immediacy of problems 
The immediacy of the problems made planning for the longer term difficult -
emphasis on inward investment was understandable then. Limited options available. 
Perhaps LSP will have the edge now? 
3. Lack of capacity in District 
District didn't have an economic development function until1996- even then it was a 
one-man-band (Bill Scorer). County had extensive expertise from its work in Consett 
and Shildon, dedicated staff & budget. Promotion of people for wrong reasons within 
District (people without the appropriate skills)? 
4. Scale 
The County Council had resources which it was able to divert to particular problem 
areas such as East Durham, the District Council did not. The County Council has an 
annual budget of £500m compared to the District Council's £1Om 
The County Council had, and was able to use, links, influence and trust with 
organisations and individuals that the District Council did not. Links with 
government and Europe were particularly important in this context. This has 
implications for the work of the LSP. 
5. Physical success- easy to achieve? 
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The majority of the Task Force's successes were physical. Easy to achieve with the 
'bullish', well-connected leadership of Ken Frankish? For further investigation -
where did funding come from? Not mainstream regeneration ... 
6. Organisational roles 
To a large extent the County Council was simply addressing its statutory 
responsibilities through the work of the Task Force - especially highways, 
environmental improvements. Likewise with the District Council - especially 
housing. There was apparently little joint working (of the sort emerging under the 
LSP). 
7. Relationship between County and District 
The relationship between County and District was undermined by local government 
review in the early 1990s. District suspicious of intentions of County. Strong feeling 
of 'go it alone' from District - almost keen to wind up the Task Force? Strong 
paternalistic attitude held by some officers at County (still). Strong personalities with 
long memories remain significant obstacles to better relations. Feeds a culture of 
'separatism'. 
8. Turmoil in the District Council 
Financial mismanagement, staff turnover and Bill Scorer made the District an 
unappealing investment for public sector bodies. 
9. Influence of Task Force structure on LSP 
Structure of the Task Force with its working groups has been taken up by the LSP. 
(Unsurprisingly) same people involved to some extent. Likely to shape the problems 





East Durham LSP Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
Service Improvements 2002 I 3 and 2003 I 4 
Key 
Project title Implementation Group 
£ NRF awarded I£ total cost of project 
Lead Partners 
Brief description of the project, its aims and objectives. 
Economic Development 
Positive Pathways Economic Development IG 
£125,351 I £193,000 
East Durham Partnership, Shotton Hall School 
Advice, guidance, basic and soft skills training (including parenting and confidence 
building programmes) for people not currently engaged in active work, in an informal, 
non-threatening environment to enable those people not reached by mainstream 
service provision to enter the labour market. 
Marketing and Promotion of the Economic Development IG 
District 
£180,000 I £180,000 
District of Easington 
Promotion and marketing of the District and its Enterprise Zone sites to promote the 
opportunities for job creation and business growth. The establishment of a Business 
Forum to engage local businesses with each other and the community. 
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Dalton Park Training Economic Development IG 
£120,000 I £180,000 
New College Durham 
Retail, customer service and basic skills training tailored to individual needs to enable 
Jobseekers to apply for jobs in the Dalton Park Retail Outlet. 
Providing Business Advice to Retailers Economic Development IG 
£89,554 I £89,554 
East Durham Development Agency 
Provision of retail advice to the retail sector and non-SMEs through funding of staff 
and overhead costs at EDDA 
Business Broker Economic Development IG 
£30,400 I £152,000 
East Durham Development Agency 
Additional funding to support a government sponsored Business Broker pilot to 
engage the business community in the work of the LSP. 
Business Start-Up Grants Economic Development IG 
£150,000 I £150,000 
Business Link County Durham 
Support and advice for individuals starting up their own businesses 
Small Business Grants Economic Development IG 
£88,000 I £168,000 
East Durham Development Agency 
Grants to enable firms to move into larger factory premises and businesses seeking to 
move into office accommodation. 
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Improving Physical Infrastructure Economic Development IG 
£300,000 I£? 
District of Easington 
Economic and environmental impact assessment of the East Durham Link Road 
(£50k) and construction of access to the former Hawthorne Cokeworks site (£250k) 
which has been identified as the location for the next business park in East Durham 
and will hopefully house over 5000 jobs. 
CCTV Scheme Economic Development IG 
£200,000 I £200,000 
District of Easington, Community Safety Unit 
Installation of CCTV equipment in Easington Colliery to act as a deterrent to crime 
and antisocial behaviour and to record evidence to assist in prosecutions. No recorded 
progress on this project. 
Bracken Hill Call Centre I IT Training Economic Development IG 
and Childcare Facility 
£95,000 I £175,000 
Northern Training Trust 
Provision of call centre and IT training linked with a childcare facility (30-40% of 
places for training participants). NTT went in to liquidation during the project which 
was taken up by East Durham and Houghall Community College. 
Action for Housing and Communities 
Thornley Improvement Scheme Action for Housing and Communities 
£1,280,579 I £2,980,579 
District of Easington 
Improvements to council houses in Thornley to improve security and bring the 
properties to the Decent Homes Standard, with additional benefits to residents' health. 
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lParkside Improvement Scheme Action for Housing and Communities 
£638,316 I £3,378,520 
District of Easington 
Improvements to council houses in Parkside to Improve security and bring the 
properties to the Decent Homes Standard. 
Health Improvement Group 
1Easington Young Carers Health Improvement Group 
£74,000 I £74,000 
Barnardos 
Employ a project worker to identify and work with young carers in schools to tackle 
the impact of caring on young people's health and education. 
Aids and Adaptations Health Improvement Group 
£200,000 I £200,000 
Social Services, Durham County Council 
Provision of specialist equipment and property adaptations for disabled people and 
their homes. 
Food and Health Health Improvement Group 
£66,000 I £102,000 
Primary Care Trust 
Work with local communities to address barriers to healthy eating, including breakfast 
clubs in schools and healthy eating classes for older people. Undertaking of a food 
mapping exercise in a number of settlements 
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Sustainable Health for Easington Health Improvement Group 
£20,000 I £40,317 
Durham County Council 
A programme of cycling and walking training events across the District to encourage 
cycling and walking for recreation and transport with benefits for people's health. 
Older People's Health Initiative Health Improvement Group 
£74,000 I £98,000 
Primary Care Trust 
To employ a development worker to focus on older people's health issues, including 
flu immunisation, exercise, home safety, the Warm Homes Initiative, and combating 
isolation and its effects on mental health. 
§moking Cessation Health Improvement Group 
£68,000 I £96,000 
Primary Care Trust 
To employ a project officer to provide group sessions and individual counselling for 
people wanting to stop smoking through a community-based, self-referral service to 
compliment the PCT' s Smoking Cessation Service. 
Health Programmes Health Improvement Group 
£58,025 I £89,600 
Primary Care Trust 
To employ a project officer to work with practice staff in the coastal wards to deliver 
services in response to local needs and to develop a community development 
approach to health improvement. 
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.l?lnysicaR Education & §port Health Improvement Group 
Development 
£50,000 I £590,000 
School Sport Co-ordinator (DCC I DEC) 
To complement Lottery Funding from Sport England to provide sports activities for 
young people across the District, including major events and festivals, training for 
coaches and leaders and transport to enable disadvantaged youngsters to participate. 
Health, Education and Allotments Health Improvement Group 
£60,000 I £120,000 
Groundwork East Durham 
Allotment improvement work and the development of a community allotment to 
contribute to improvement in mental and physical health of residents through the 
"Grow Well, Eat Well" initiative. Environmental improvements Ill selected 
settlements and involvement of young people to divert them from inactivity. 
Young People's Substance Misuse Health Improvement Group 
Service 
£400,000 I £700,000 
Primary Care Trust 
Housing, education, counselling and specialist prescribing for young people with 
substance misuse problems. 
Skipping for Health Health Improvement Group 
£22,000 I £38,000 
East Durham and Houghall Community College 
Expansion of a project initially funded by SRB5. Introduction and coaching for 
primary school children to skipping and organisation of inter-school competitions. 
Opportunity to try non-contact boxing 
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Sport for Better Health Health Improvement Group 
£21,000 I £40,200 
East Durham and Houghall Community College 
To employ a dedicated development worker to introduce children aged 7+ to 
basketball and provide opportunities for progression in the sport which will improve 
health, educational attainment, reduce crime and antisocial behaviour. [Staff time 
largely spent on administration- January to March 2003: 40 children participate in 
taster sessions, 41 hours of basketball delivery, 209 hours of administration, total cost 
£3,223 
Learning and Skills Forum 
Easington District Basic Skills Support Learning and Skills Forum 
£270,000 I £470,000 
Developing Initiatives for Support in the Community (DISC) Ltd 
To employ a team of four peripatetic workers to deliver basic skills provision for non-
traditional learners in community venues. 
Lifelong Learning Co-ordinator Learning and Skills Forum 
£80,000 I £80,000 
To employ a lifelong learning coordinator to promote lifelong learning across the 
District, produce a lifelong learning audit and strategy, encourage employers to 
engage in skills development and engage community groups in learning. 
Supporting Child Development Learning and Skills Forum 
£40,000 I £1,000,000 
Sure Start Peterlee 
Physical infrastructure (three venues) to deliver a range of early years services to the 
most high-needs children 
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World Class Digital Literacy Learning and Skills Forum 
£400,000 I £1,957,000 
Education Action Zone 
Provision of electronic whiteboards and laptops - one whiteboard and four laptops in 
every year six classroom to promote digital literacy among pupils who will be able to 
act as teachers for others and compete for jobs in the new economy. 
Excellence Challenge Summer Schools Learning and Skills Forum 
£40,000 I £146,000 
Education Action Zone 
To provide a one week motivational summer school for 60 year 9 students (10 from 
each of 6 schools) identified as having high potential but low motivation. Students 
provided with laptops as long as they remain in education. 
Place to Be Learning and Skills Forum (joint with 
Health Improvement Group) 
£340,000 I £412,000 
Education Action Zone 
Commissioning therapeutic mental health services from The Place to Be (charity) to 
address the needs of primary school children by contributing to social and emotional 
well-being and self esteem. The project aims to increase attendance, reduce 
unauthorised absence and improve results in 12 EAZ primary schools. 
Speech and Language- Early Years Learning and Skills Forum 
£112,000 I £164,000 
Education Action Zone 
Provision of 4 nursery nurses trained to deliver speech therapy and language 
enrichment to nursery children to improve their education and life chances. 
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Flexible Vocational Learning Learning and Skills Forum 
£80,000 I £210,000 
East Durham and Houghall Community College 
To expand a project supported by the Learning and Skills Council to provide 
vocational training (through the college) for 14- 16 year olds. The project aims to 
improve staying on rates in education and training, improve participants' job 
prospects and decrease the likelihood of young people becoming involved in crime 
and antisocial behaviour. 
Leadership and Management Learning and Skills Forum 
£118,000 I £134,000 
Education Action Zone 
Leadership and management training for senior managers in EAZ schools, including 
tuition costs, residential fees and teacher cover. Improved managers will be able to 
share their skills with other staff and contribute to the improved performance of the 
District's schools. 
Learning Mentors Learning and Skills Forum 
£462,000 I £517,000 
Education Action Zone 
To provide 19 learning mentors (3 for each secondary school in the District) to raise 
expectations and enable students to attain their full potential. The project is based on 
a successful initiative developed through the Excellence in Cities programme 
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Secondary Schools English Assistants Learning and Skills Forum 
£116,000 I £153,000 
Education Action Zone 
To employ three support staff in each of 6 secondary schools to work with individual 
pupils and small groups to improve literacy, prepare materials and undertake 
administration, releasing professional teacher time. 
Pathways to Academic and Vocational Learning and Skills Forum 
Learning 
£440,000 I £755,000 
Northern Training Trust 
Short courses (up to 13 weeks) in soft skills (citizenship, communication, motivation, 
interpersonal skills and attitudinal Issues incorporated into vocational courses 
designed to meet the needs of the client group) to encourage schoolleavers (16- 19 
years) to remain in further education with the incentive of a training allowance paid to 
those taking part. 
Community Safety Partnership 
Reducing Burglary Initiative Community Safety Partnership 
£238,266 I £300,000 
Community Safety Partnership 
A multi-agency co-ordinated approach that will identify and target prolific offenders. 




Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour Community Safety Partnership 
£561,734 I £608,734 
Community Safety Partnership 
Establishment of a dedicated team of council and police officers to address anti-social 
behaviour from an enforcement, prevention and rehabilitation perspective. Work with 
young people at risk through Positive Futures and Youth Inclusion Programmes. 
Environment 
Common Ground Environment 
£600,000 I £1,200,000 
Groundwork East Durham 
Production of a strategy document for environmental improvements in the District for 
the next decade and community-led environmental improvements in settlements, 
including improving derelict land and buildings using Intermediate Labour Market 
labour wherever possible. Project will improve people's well-being, the basis of 
community and employability. Environment was a high priority in community 
appraisals. 
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